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In Afghanistan wheat availability is important for national food security as it is 
the key staple food, accounting for over half of calorie intake. The country has imported 
on average 32% of its wheat consumption over the period 2000-2015, primarily from 
Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Since domestic production is volatile, consumer well-being 
depends on access to international markets. 
Pakistan, a key supplier of wheat and flour to Afghanistan, has not been a reliable 
source for Afghanistan to meet its wheat deficit. Pakistan subsidizes and stabilizes its 
wheat production, and this benefited Afghan consumers before 2008. Pakistan restricted 
wheat and flour exports to Afghanistan during the 2007-08 food crisis. Pakistani export 
restrictions combined with a severe shortfall in domestic production placed substantial 
pressure on the Afghan grain market. This forced Afghanistan to find alternative 
suppliers, so it started wheat imports from Kazakhstan. Kazakh prices are more variable 
than Pakistani prices, and the Afghan wheat market was not as well integrated with 
Kazakhstan as with Pakistan. The increase in the wheat prices in Afghanistan in 2008 
was much greater than the increase experienced in international and regional grain 
markets. Afghan policy responses have focused on self-sufficiency (which could bring 
greater instability) and stockpiling in commercial centers.  
In this research we assess the impacts of trade and stockholding policies on 
market outcomes in Afghanistan. Prior to assessing these stabilization policies, we use a 
VECM model to assess price transmission signals from regional to domestic markets, and 
between rural and urban areas in Afghanistan. Our analysis suggests domestic price 
adjustment occurs very slowly, particularly with respect to prices in Kazakhstan. 
xv 
 
Moreover, Pakistan’s export restrictions in 2008 had a major impact on transmission of 
price signals from Pakistan to Afghanistan. After the export restrictions policy there is no 
longer a statistically significant price linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our 
analysis also suggests that markets are not well integrated between rural and urban areas, 
but that commercial centers along the ring road are tightly integrated.  
We also conducted a trader and miller survey in Afghanistan. Our survey findings 
suggest commercial centers are supplied by imported flour from both Pakistan and 
Kazakhstan. This implies rural zones are segmented from the urban centers and often 
surplus wheat is retained as private stocks in rural areas. The survey findings also suggest 
that domestic wheat is not a perfect substitute for imported wheat. Imported wheat, 
especially Kazakh wheat, is higher quality than domestic wheat and is preferred by 
bakeries in commercial centers.  
Using the results and findings from the price transmission analysis and the trader 
survey, we develop a simulation model using Armington specifications that captures both 
weak market integration and imperfect price transmission to assess the impacts of trade 
and stockholding policies on prices and welfare of producers and consumers. Modeling 
results suggest that trade policy is effective mainly in trimming the upper tail of price 
distributions and thus mostly improving consumer welfare. Also, a trade policy is not as 
effective in stabilizing prices in rural areas as in commercial centers.  
A stockholding policy with a primary objective to support producer prices is 
mainly effective in eliminating the lower tail of price distributions and this mostly 
improves producer welfare. A stockholding policy may also be used to stabilize prices for 
consumers and prevent extreme price shocks. Such a policy has to maintain large 
quantities of stocks (up to 2MMT) in commercial centers likely for several years, with an 
estimated annual holding costs of about $120 million.  
Considering the welfare of both producers and consumers, and the costs of these 
stabilization policies, a combination of public stockholding and trade policy is 
recommended. Trade policy is more cost effective than a public stockholding policy in 
stabilizing prices for consumers. Public stockholding/procurement policy in rural areas of 







Using the findings from the price transmission analysis and the trader survey, we 
develop a simulation model in a framework of imperfect market integration to assess the 
impacts of stabilization policies on market outcomes in Afghanistan. First, we will 
analyze the impacts of the stockholding policy as an instrument to stabilize the wheat 
market in Afghanistan. We assess whether government intervention through public 
stockholding can stabilize domestic prices and the welfare of producers and consumers in 
the county. Second, we examine the impacts of trade policy, such as a variable levy, on 
wheat market outcomes in rural versus urban areas in Afghanistan. We assess the effects 
of a variable levy on the distribution of prices and on the welfare of producers and 
consumers across rural and urban areas. Finally, we assess the combined effects of trade 
and stockholding policies, implemented simultaneously, on the distributions of prices and 
on producer and consumer welfare. Analyses are done with both static and stochastic 
models. Measurement of changes in the market outcomes will be examined through 
Monte Carlo simulation, given stochastic world price and production.  
The findings will provide guidelines for policy makers on how to stabilize the 
wheat supply chain in Afghanistan, taking into account the needs of producers, 
consumers, traders, millers, and the government. This quantitative economic research will 
improve the current discussions on these policy options for stabilization of the wheat 
markets in Afghanistan.  
This dissertation is organized into ten chapters. The early few chapters contain all 
the background information needed to model Afghanistan’s wheat sector: estimating 
supply and demand elasticities, price transmission elasticities, and findings from the 
trader and miller survey.  Following this introduction is an overview of regional wheat 
supply and estimation of supply elasticities. The estimation of per capita demand for 
wheat in Afghanistan is presented in Chapters 3. Price transmission analysis between 
regional and domestic markets and between rural and urban markets is discussed in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents findings from our trader and miller survey. The second part 
of this dissertation focuses on the main objective of our research, which is assessing 
stabilization policies and their impacts on the welfare of producers and consumers.  We 
discuss literature on stabilization policies in Chapter 6. Model specifications, including 
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spatial specifications, and model equations for supply and use balance and trade flows are 
presented in Chapter 7. The implementation of the simulation analysis and explanation of 
alternative scenarios are presented in Chapter 8. The effects of trade and stockholding 
policies on market and welfare outcomes using a stochastic model are presented in 





Figure 2-1: Irrigated, Rainfed and Total Wheat Production 
 
Figure 2-2 shows domestic production, national imports and total supply of wheat 
and flour over the 1970-2015 period in Afghanistan from USDA  (2015). Overall grain 
production exhibited a declining trend over the period 1987-1992 due to combined effects 
of droughts and war (Persaud, 2010). Imports of wheat and flour were low over this 
period, as well, because millions of people left the country and fled to Pakistan and Iran. 
Wheat production rebounded in 1997 and 1998 due to good growing conditions, but 
droughts led to a record decline in wheat output in 2000 and 2001. Wheat production was 
fairly good over the period 2002-2007, with a bumper harvest in 2003 (about 3.5 MMT). 
Very low rainfall and snowfall in late 2007 and early 2008 caused major declines in 2008 
wheat production. Wheat production was down to 1.5MMT from 2.3MMT the previous  
year (Persaud, 2010; U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2008).  In the 2009/2010 marketing 
year, wheat production recovered. Afghanistan produced its record level, at 4.3MMT, in 
that year2. According to Afghan authorities high domestic wheat prices encouraged 
                                                 
2 Wheat production was 5 MMT in 2009 based on MAIL estimates. Wheat production 
data in Afghanistan are not consistent from various sources. National wheat production is 
higher based on the estimates from MAIL, compared to estimates from USDA. We use 
the production data from MAIL, as MAIL is the only source that has regional production 
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farmers to increase planted wheat acreage. This was combined with good growing 
conditions and above normal precipitation, and led to a bumper wheat harvest (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 2009). Domestic wheat production declined and fell below 3 
MMT again in 2011, mainly due to insufficient rainfall. The annual wheat production has 
been fairly stable and high, at about 5 MMT, since 2012.  
 
 
Figure 2-2: Production, Imports and Consumption of Wheat in Afghanistan-1970 to 2015 
 
Figure 2-2 shows that Afghanistan was mostly self-sufficient in wheat until 1998. 
The difference between domestic production and consumption gets bigger starting in 
1999 and reaches a peak in 2008. Imports have been stable since 2009, at about 2MMT 
each year. Wheat consumption has increased dramatically since 2000, mainly due to 
growing population. Total consumption was about 2MMT in 2000, and it increased to 
more than 6MMT in 2009. Domestic production could not catch up with total wheat 
requirements in the country and as a result imports have been increasing.  
Figure 2-2 shows that apparent total consumption was much higher in 2009 than 
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reported as total domestic production plus total imports. Therefore, consumptions data 
implicitly includes stocks and seed used for the next planting season. Domestic 
production was high in 2009 and since the markets were not well integrated across the 
country, a large portion of domestic production was likely retained as stocks in wheat 
surplus areas3.  The higher apparent consumption in 2009 can be partially explained by 
an increase in stocks, not consumption. Also, wheat prices were very low in 2009 
compared to the previous and next years. The increase in consumption in 2009 was 
partially due to low wheat prices, as well.  
The variability in production is higher in northern Kunduz and Mazar compared 
to other regions, mainly due to large rainfed wheat production in the northern regions. 
Irrigated wheat yields do not differs largely across regions. They range from 2.32 tons per 
hectares in Mazar to 2.85 tons per hectare in central Kabul. Irrigated yields are slightly 
lower in Mazar and Herat, because there are larger farm sizes in those regions and mostly 
extensive agricultural methods are used to increase production. Land is more scarce in the 
central Kabul and eastern Jalalabad, compared to the northern and western regions. Thus, 
it is more likely that farmers use fertilizer and other intensive methods to increase 
production. Summary statistics for our regional production data are presented in 












                                                 
3 This issue will be discussed later in the price transmission chapter.  
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Table 2-1: Summary Statistics on Regional Production, Area and Yield Data: 2002-2013 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Abbr. Region N mean sd min max 
 HER4 Herat 12 607.6 181.7 281 927 
 JAL Jalalabad 12 247 111.5 110 445 
Production 
(1000 MT) 
KAB Kabul 12 377 85.67 208 468 
KAN Kandahar 12 488.5 109.7 247 686 
KDZ Kunduz 12 917.4 281.0 459 1,424 
KST Khost 12 276.2 90.08 87 367 
MAZ Mazar 12 1,015 371.4 472 1,378 
        
 HER Herat 12 398.6 52.47 313 461 
 JAL Jalalabad 12 91 24.53 57 121 
Area  
(1000 ha) 
KAB Kabul 12 148.8 22.87 102 180 
KAN Kandahar 12 196.4 21.69 167 231 
KDZ Kunduz 12 543.3 69.78 384 633 
KST Khost 12 104.8 24.38 44 140 
MAZ Mazar 12 807.6 143.3 518 930 
        
 HER Herat 12 1.494 0.302 0.898 2.011 
 JAL Jalalabad 12 2.602 0.575 1.719 3.771 
Yield 
(MT/ha ) 
KAB Kabul 12 2.518 0.376 1.893 3.211 
KAN Kandahar 12 2.476 0.431 1.479 2.985 
KDZ Kunduz 12 1.675 0.395 0.832 2.252 
KST Khost 12 2.581 0.460 1.511 3.096 
MAZ Mazar 12 1.237 0.335 0.605 1.627 
        
Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) 
                                                 
4 See Table 7-2 for more complete regional definitions.  
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The Northern region, with Balkh at its center, is the largest surplus zone in the 
country. Figure 2-3 represents wheat balance in 2010 for Afghanistan, showing deficit 
and surplus provinces. 2010 is considered a normal year for wheat harvest in 
Afghanistan. About half of wheat output is produced in the northern plains of 
Afghanistan (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007).  Central and eastern Afghanistan are wheat 
deficit areas. The largest deficit areas are Kabul (the capital of Afghanistan), Nangarhar 
and Kandahar.  
 
 
Figure 2-3: Surplus and Deficit Regions in 2010 
 
Over the 2002 - 2013 period approximately 48% of wheat cultivated area was 
irrigated. Irrigated wheat acreage is the major source of wheat production in Afghanistan, 
accounting for about 72% of total wheat production. Over the 2002-2013 period the 
yields on irrigated wheat area were on average three times those on rainfed wheat land 
(2.6 tons/hectare versus 0.9 tons/hectare).  Average wheat production, wheat cultivated 





Table 2-2: Production, Area and Yield 2002-2013: Irrigated versus Rainfed Wheat 





l Production (1000 MT) 608 247 377 488 917 276 1015 
Area (1000 ha) 399 91 149 196 543 105 808 
Yield (MT/ha ) 1.52 2.71 2.53 2.49 1.69 2.64 1.26 





d Production (1000 MT) 392 244 356 479 590 271 510 
Area (1000 hectares) 163 87 125 182 220 98 220 
Yield (MT/ha ) 2.41 2.82 2.85 2.63 2.69 2.77 2.32 





 Production (1000 MT) 220 3 21 9 327 5 505 
Area (1000 hectares) 236 4 24 14 323 7 588 
Yield (MT/ha ) 0.93 0.68 0.87 0.66 1.01 0.72 0.86 
         
Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) 
 
About half of the wheat output is produced in the northern Kunduz and Mazar 
regions of Afghanistan. The remaining half is produced mostly in the southern and 
western regions of the country in Herat and Helmand. Helmand province is the main 
producer of wheat in the southern region, and most of the wheat in the western region is 
produced in Herat.  
Given current production inefficiencies and moderate yields, there are real 
potentials to increase wheat production in Afghanistan. According to the World Bank 
(2014), even with current yields and production inefficiencies, domestic wheat 
production may compete with imports. Thus, Afghanistan appears to have comparative 
advantage to produce wheat, and it is not unrealistic to expect that Afghanistan could 
reach self-sufficiency in wheat within five to ten years, at least in non-drought years.    
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Where A is the area planted, P is wheat price      s the coefficient 
measuring area response to price, Y is yield, e and u are the error terms, and the index r 
represents region. Wheat yield growth is driven by rates of improvement in technology 
and irrigation. However, yield data does not show improvement in yield over the period 
2002-2013. Hence the yield data do not follow a regular time trend.   
We use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method to estimate equation (1) using 
the data for each separate region in Afghanistan. Our annual time series data are too short 
to allow us to test for stationarity. The OLS estimates are presented in Table 2-3. The 
data used for this analysis are for the period 2002-2013.  
 
Table 2-3: OLS Estimates of Price Elasticity for Wheat Area Planted. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES HER JAL KAB KAN KDZ KST MAZ 
        
  
price) 
0.157 0.602*** 0.301*** 0.147** 0.0961 0.303** 0.250 
(0.0910) (0.0750) (0.0584) (0.0591) (0.0698) (0.0905) (0.148) 
        
Constant 5.123*** 1.148** 3.307*** 4.453*** 5.769*** 2.985*** 5.308*** 
 (0.497) (0.415) (0.328) (0.331) (0.403) (0.512) (0.831) 
        
Observations 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 
R-squared 0.230 0.866 0.726 0.383 0.192 0.584 0.262 
Standard errors in parentheses 




significant at the 1% level. The price coefficient for Kunduz region is significant at the 
5% level.  
 
Table 2-4: SUR Estimates of Price Elasticity for Wheat Area Planted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES HER JAL KAB KAN KDZ KST MAZ 
        
   
price) 
0.185*** 0.552*** 0.337*** 0.166*** 0.0790** 0.261*** 0.307*** 
(0.0682) (0.0548) (0.0251) (0.0277) (0.0377) (0.0569) (0.0605) 
	 Constant) 4.960*** 1.441*** 3.086*** 4.330*** 5.867*** 3.221*** 4.993*** 
 (0.380) (0.311) (0.146) (0.159) (0.219) (0.323) (0.341) 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared 0.283 0.797 0.750 0.598 0.186 0.573 0.249 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
As the SUR model produces better results than the OLS model, we generate 
parameters for the supply functions from the SUR model estimates. The price coefficient 
is significant for all regions in the SUR model, but it is not always significant using the 
OLS model. Also, the variance-covariance matrix of error terms that will be used in the 
simulation analysis is from the SUR model. The variance-covariance matrix of errors 
from the SUR model are presented in Table 2-5. The variance-covariance matrix of error 
terms is from a function with logarithmic specification, where area planted is measured in 
thousand hectares6. In most cases the correlation is positive across regions, except for 
eastern Jalalabad and Southern Kandahar which demonstrate negative correlation with 
some regions. Area planted are highly correlated across surplus regions. The correlation 
                                                 
6 In the simulation model, we take the exponential of the error realization and add to the 




Mazar is about 0.73, and it is 0.70 between Herat and Kunduz. The correlation between 
surplus and deficit regions are positive but smaller in magnitude. The correlation 
coefficient between Herat and Jalalabad is 0.29, and it is 0.32 between Herat and Kabul.   
 
 
Figure 2-4: Wheat Yield across Regions in Afghanistan 
 
Table 2-6: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Yield across Regions 
Regions HER JAL KAB KAN KDZ KST MAZ 
HER 0.0835 0.0463 0.0330 0.0685 0.0772 0.0726 0.0676 
JAL 0.0463 0.3034 0.0295 0.1548 0.0470 0.1455 0.0324 
KAB 0.0330 0.0295 0.1296 0.0837 0.0457 0.1201 -0.0080 
KAN 0.0685 0.1548 0.0837 0.1701 0.0567 0.1640 0.0408 
KDZ 0.0772 0.0470 0.0457 0.0567 0.1433 0.0580 0.0891 
KST 0.0726 0.1455 0.1201 0.1640 0.0580 0.1943 0.0278 
MAZ 0.0676 0.0324 -0.0080 0.0408 0.0891 0.0278 0.1028 


























CHAPTER 3. DEMAND FOR WHEAT AND FLOUR  
Wheat is an important staple food in Afghanistan. Average wheat consumption is 
about 162 Kilograms (Kg) per capita per year, accounting for about 60 percent of caloric 
intake of the population (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007; Persaud, 2010). Chabot’s estimates 
are based on NRVA 2003 household survey data from CSO7. However, per capita 
consumption for wheat appears to decline over time as income increases, and people start 
to shift to high-value protein diets. The same household data from NRVA 2007/8 shows 
per capita wheat consumption has declined to 155 Kg, and it is even lower based on the 
estimates from the NRVA 2011/12 data, at 146 Kg per capita per year.  
The decline in per capita wheat consumption might be due to the increase in 
wheat prices. The real prices of wheat products have increased rapidly since 2003. The 
price of wheat flour was about $200 per metric ton in 2003, while it was about $700 and 
$500 in 2007 and 2012, respectively. Thus, there was a huge increase in flour prices since 
the NRVA survey was first conducted in 2003, with some variability. We will estimated 
the price elasticity of demand later in this chapter to assess the demand behavior with 
respect to prices.  
The Afghan economy has experienced rapid growth since 2002. Nominal GDP 
grew at an annual rate of 17% over the period 2002-2009. GDP per capita grew at an 
annual rate of 13% over the same period (UN, 2010). The effects of an income increase 
on per capita wheat consumption can be either negative or positive, depending on 
whether wheat is a normal or inferior good. Formal estimates of demand elasticities for
                                                 
7 NRVA stands for National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment. This household survey 
was conducted in 2003, 2007/08 and 2011/12. CSO stands for Central Statistic 
Organization of Afghanistan.  The NRVA survey is a comprehensive nationwide survey 





Households in rural areas and the nomadic Kuchi population spend even a higher share of 
their expenditure on food compared to urban households. Table 3-1 shows average 
monthly expenditure, share of expenditure on food, and expenditure share of important 
food items for households across rural, urban and Kuchi areas.  
 
Table 3-1: Monthly per Capita Expenditure and Share of Expenditure on Food Items 
  National  Urban  Rural  Kuchi 
Average monthly expenditure (AFN) 1961 2800 1839 1515 
Average monthly food expenditure (AFN) 1302 1564 1265 1154 
Share of food expenditure (%) 66.39 55.86 68.79 76.17 
Expenditure share of key food items (%)     
1. Grain 40.80 33.72 41.96 40.39 
a. Wheat (share of grain) 63.84 55.17 65.19 65.36 
b. Rice (share of grain) 23.43 29.14 22.59 20.79 
2. Meat 12.27 15.43 11.75 12.53 
3. Dairy Products 13.08 8.87 13.61 17.84 
4. Fat & Oil 10.79 12.34 10.55 10.19 
5. Vegetables  10.46 12.92 10.10 9.18 
6. Fruits 6.70 10.20 6.26 4.01 
7. Sugar 5.84 6.48 5.74 5.84 
Source: NRVA (2011/12) data from CSO. 
 
The Kuchi term refers to the 1.5 million nomadic people of Afghanistan who 
migrate semi-annually with their sheep, goats, and camels. The Kuchi population data 
have been included in the analysis so that our sample represents the entire population of 
Afghanistan. Normally the Kuchi population are assumed as part of the population living 
in rural areas.  
Households spend a large portion of their food budget on wheat in Afghanistan. 
About 40 percent of the food budget is spent on grain, which is mostly (64%) wheat 
products. Dairy products and meat come next in the food budget, with shares of 13 and 







normal or inferior good. If it is normal, an increase in income implies a higher 
consumption per capita of flour, but the opposite is true if flour is an inferior good.  
The evidence from the overall data suggests that flour is not a normal good. Per 
capita consumption of wheat has decreased over the 2003-2012 period, while income has 
increased rapidly over the same period. Moreover, people with high income consume less 
flour than those with low income. Per capita flour consumption is lower in urban areas 
where income is high than in rural areas with low income.  
Rice and pasta are considered to be close substitutes for bread. It is expected that 
an increase in the price of rice or pasta is associated with an increase in per capita 
consumption of flour. Thus, we expect a positive sign for the cross-price elasticities.  
Weekly per capita consumption is computed as consumption of flour in Kg 
divided by effective number of household members. The effective number of household 
members are all household members who were resident in the household during the last 
seven days of the survey time, including guests and children. Children under five years 
old either do not consume bread or consume much less than adults. Thus, the actual per 
capita consumption of flour is higher for a household with a higher number of children 
than what has been estimated. To take care of this, the number of kids (age under five) 
are included in the model. The prior belief is that per capita consumption is lower in the 
households with higher numbers of kids. Ag variable is a dummy variable showing 
whether a household is agricultural or not. Most agricultural households produce wheat in 
Afghanistan. This variable is used as a proxy to see the difference, if any, in per capita 
consumption of wheat across wheat producers and wheat buyers.  
Table 3-2 shows the summary statistics of the data used for this demand analysis. 
Consumption per capita is measured in Kilograms consumed of flour per capita in a 
week. In the consumption section of the questionnaire, some households reported the 
amount of flour in Kg consumed, and some reported loaves of bread consumed during the 
last seven days. Number of bread have been multiplied by 0.2 kg to convert to kg flour 
consumption.  Each loaf of bread is about 0.2 kg in Afghanistan. All prices are nominal 
in AFN per kg of each commodity. The prices are not deflated, given the short one year 





consumption of flour changes due to a change in the size of bread. But we do not have 
rich enough data to keep track of changes in the size of bread produced in urban areas in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Table 3-3: Estimated Demand Coefficients from the OLS Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES National Rural Urban 
Flour price -0.202*** -0.258*** 0.335*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0211) (0.0754) 
Rice price 0.0935*** 0.116*** 0.0893 
 (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0655) 
Pasta price 0.194*** 0.188*** 0.0891** 
 (0.0146) (0.0164) (0.0412) 
income -0.0420*** -0.0429*** -0.0283* 
 (0.00510) (0.00549) (0.0149) 
Number of kids -0.0159*** -0.0138*** -0.0203** 
 (0.00335) (0.00358) (0.0103) 
Household size -0.0198*** -0.0231*** -0.00271 
 (0.00128) (0.00139) (0.00365) 
Agriculture dummy 0.0641*** 0.0627*** 0.0771*** 
 (0.00803) (0.00848) (0.0260) 
Rural dummy 0.148***   
 (0.0115)   
Kuchi dummy 0.151***   
 (0.0260)   
Constant 0.936*** 1.233*** -0.618* 
 (0.103) (0.113) (0.335) 
    
Observations 20,032 16,820 2,756 
R-squared 0.063 0.057 0.022 





The coefficients for the price of close substitutes to flour (rice & pasta) have the 
expected signs. An increase in the price of rice and pasta raises the per capita 
consumption for wheat as people try to switch from rice and pasta to flour. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1- percent significance level when using the overall 
national data, and with rural data. However, the coefficient for rice price is not 
significant, and for pasta price is significant at the 5-percent level, when using the data 
for urban households. 
 The coefficient on income is significant in all three columns, with a negative sign. 
The negative sign implies that wheat flour is an inferior good in Afghanistan. As income 
rises people starts to consume more high-value protein diets and less grain. This is true in 
Afghanistan as well. Per capita wheat consumption has decreased over time, from 162 kg 
per capita per year in 2004 to 146 kg in 2012. But income per capita has increased rapidly 
over this period. The spatial differences in income and per capita flour consumption also 
suggest that populations with high income consume less flour than those with low 
income. Per capita consumption for flour is 153 kg in rural areas where income is 
relatively low versus 127 kg in urban areas with relatively high income.   
 Average per capita consumption for households with a higher number of children 
are less than others. This make sense, as children under five years old either do not 
consume bread or consume less than adults. Thus, the coefficient sign is negative as 
expected, and it is significant at 1-percent significance level using the national and rural 
data, and at 5-percent level with the urban data. The coefficient of the household size is 
significant with a negative sign implying per capita flour consumption is lower for the 
households with large size.   
 The dummy variable for agriculture households is significant with a positive sign 
with overall national, rural and urban data. This implies per capita consumption of wheat 
is higher for the agricultural households which are most likely wheat producers. The data 
are not rich enough to distinguish wheat producers from wheat buyers. The agriculture 
dummy has been used as a proxy to estimate the differences across wheat producers 




 Per capita consumption of wheat is expected to be higher in rural and Kuchi areas. 
Rural and Kuchi population do not have access to a diverse diet or cannot afford high-
value protein diets as urban people. Thus, a higher portion of their food budget is spent 
on wheat compared to urban populations. Our OLS results are consistent with the theory 
that per capita consumption of flour is higher in rural and Kuchi areas than in urban 
areas. The coefficient sign for both rural and Kuchi dummies are positive and significant. 
 In the above results the price data were averaged over season for each province 
across rural and urban areas. In some areas price data are not available for all 12 months 
of the year. Thus, we took the quarterly average to avoid dropping too many 
observations, and to mitigate potential biases caused by measurement errors in the price 
data. We thought it would be interesting to see the modeling results with monthly average 
price data. So, the price data are averaged over month, and the observations with missing 
price data in given months are dropped.  
 The ordinary least square results based on the monthly average price data are 
presented in Table 3-4. The results are consistent with those using the quarterly average 
price. The own price elasticity of demand for flour is still negative and significant with 
the national and rural data. The coefficients on prices of close substitute to flour (rice & 
pasta) are positive and significant, the same as with the quarterly price data. The 
coefficient on income is negative and significant. The coefficients on agriculture, rural 
and Kuchi dummies are positive and significant consistent with the results when using 
quarterly price data.  
 The number of observation used with the monthly average data are less than what 
was used for the quarterly average data. Some observation were dropped due to missing 
monthly price data. Therefore, the modeling results when prices are averaged over season 
include more observations, and will be used for further analysis when setting up supply 







Table 3-4: Estimated Demand Coefficients from the OLS Results using Monthly Data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES National Rural Urban 
    
Flour price -0.218*** -0.252*** 0.0920 
 (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.0653) 
Rice price 0.127*** 0.136*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0180) (0.0549) 
Pasta price 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.0724** 
 (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0350) 
income -0.0380*** -0.0374*** -0.0258* 
 (0.00555) (0.00604) (0.0156) 
Number of kids -0.0143*** -0.0132*** -0.0141 
 (0.00362) (0.00389) (0.0108) 
Household size -0.0193*** -0.0223*** -0.00557 
 (0.00138) (0.00151) (0.00375) 
Agriculture dummy 0.0545*** 0.0524*** 0.0837*** 
 (0.00869) (0.00927) (0.0270) 
Rural dummy 0.142***   
 (0.0123)   
Kuchi dummy 0.151***   
 (0.0272)   
Constant 0.961*** 1.178*** -0.206 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.326) 
    
Observations 17,230 14,412 2,392 
R-squared 0.060 0.055 0.017 






CHAPTER 4. PRICE TRANSMISSION ANALYSIS  
The price shocks in international grain market during the 2007-2008 food crisis 
had a major impact on food security in Afghanistan (D'Souza and Jolliffe, 2012). The 
increase in wheat prices in Afghanistan was greater than the price increases experienced 
in the world and regional grain markets. Wheat prices in Afghanistan reached to 
$700/MT in May 2008, up from $250/MT in May 2007, a 175% increase within one year 
(Halimi, 2011). The greater increase in wheat prices in Afghanistan in 2008 implies that 
domestic wheat prices do not adjust quickly to the price changes in the regional or world 
grain markets.  
Variability in wheat prices has increased in Afghanistan since 2008 as a result of 
Pakistani export restriction policy. This is mainly because wheat markets in the Central 
Asian region are not as stable as in Pakistan. Thus, some of the variability in the Afghan 
domestic market is now imported from the Central Asian markets. Figure 4-1 show 
monthly average wheat prices for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and the US Gulf.  
Recent price shocks in Afghanistan suggest that reliance on international markets 
does not always guarantee price stability. The government of Afghanistan needs to 
examine policy options to combine with a trade policy in order to manage price 
instability in its wheat and flour markets. Policy responses to stabilize the wheat market 
are conditioned on whether Afghanistan is well integrated into the world market, as well 
as the integration level across rural and urban markets within the country. Trade policy 
without complementary stockholding policy is not as effective in the case of imperfect 
integration into world markets. Stocks policy is also needed to complement trade policy 
in order to manage seasonal price shocks along with delays in import delivery (Abbott, 




 prices in wheat producing areas if markets are poorly integrated across rural and urban 
areas.   
 
 
Figure 4-1: Wheat Prices in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and the US. 
 
There has not been much research on domestic market integration in Afghanistan, 
nor integration of wheat markets with the Central Asian region and Pakistan. Chabot and 
Dorosh (2007) used monthly wheat price data over the 2002-2005 period for major 
markets in Afghanistan and Pakistan to assess market integration. They conducted formal 
econometric tests to explore issues of market integration between major cities within 
Afghanistan, and integration between markets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their 
findings suggested that wheat prices in major markets in Afghanistan and in Lahore, 
Pakistan, tended to move together in the long run (Chabot and Dorosh, 2007). However, 
this does not appear to be true after 2008, mainly due to the export restriction policies by 
the government of Pakistan.  
In this chapter we examine the degree to which Pakistani wheat and flour price 
signals have been transmitted to Afghanistan domestic markets during the last 15 years. 






























































































and removing physical constraints to trade between them. Chabot and Dorosh (2008) 
used cointegration analysis with monthly price data for the period 2002-2005 to examine 
market integration with Pakistan. Their results suggest that wheat and flour markets 
between major cities in Afghanistan are reasonably well connected.  
 Market integration across rural and urban areas in Afghanistan is an important 
issue that policy makers should consider while thinking about policies to stabilize wheat 
and flour markets in Afghanistan. Wheat markets across rural and urban areas do not 
appear to be as well integrated (Halimi, 2011). Figure 4-2 shows the price data across 
Daykundi and commercial centers. Daykundi is a wheat deficit rural market where we 
observe that wheat prices are much higher than the prices in commercial centers. The big 
difference in price series data of Daykundi versus commercial centers suggests there are 
high transportation and transaction costs associated with moving wheat and flour between 
rural and urban areas in Afghanistan.  
 
 















































































In this chapter we assess the relationships between price data in each of the five 
commercial centers in Afghanistan along with price sets for Pakistan and Kazakhstan. 
The five commercial centers are Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar.  
Figure 4-3 shows the location of these commercial centers and the selected rural markets 
used in our study. 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Rural Markets and Commercial Centers in Afghanistan 
 
To examine the price transmission of wheat between rural and urban areas, we 
assess the relationship between price series data of rural areas with their closest 
commercial center. The selected five rural markets which are partially segmented from 
the commercial centers and the world market are: Bamyan, Badakhshan, Faryab, Ghor, 
and Daykundi. The rural areas are selected based on the proximity to commercial centers 





Thus, cointegration analyses are done with all price series using the level model.  We will 
use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests to examine 
the stationarity of price series data and their corresponding linear combination.  
Following Minot (2011), the analysis for each pair of prices under consideration 
consists of three steps:  
1. We test each price series data individually for nonstationarity using the 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), and Phillips-Perron (Phillips 
and Perron, 1988) tests.  
2. We determine whether the two price series data are cointegrated, using the ADF 
and PP tests on the residuals of each corresponding level regression.  
3. If there is a long-run relationship between the two price series data based on the 
cointegration tests, then we estimate the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).  
The long-run cointegrated relationship between the world price and domestic price can be 







t pp     4.1 
Where 
d
tp  and 
w
tp  are the domestic and the world price of a given commodity in time 
t, often expressed in logarithms.  and   are parameters to be estimated, and t  
denotes the error term. 	
    
 -run elasticity of price transmission. 
From the above regression the law of one price holds if   equals unity and the intercept 
term equals zero, here assuming small transportation and transaction costs.  
Once the long-     ) is estimated from 
equation 4.2, we use the residual from the levels model to estimate the VECM. The 




















a small number of observation, the ADF test shows cointegration between price series, 
but PP does not. The PP test is based on asymptotic theory (Phillips and Perron, 1988),  
and thus it may not be as powerful with small datasets.  
4.4.1 Domestic and Regional Prices Related to US Wheat Prices 
As discussed earlier, we are interested in which of the major wheat supplier 
countries to Afghanistan, Pakistan or Kazakhstan, is better integrated with the world 
wheat market. We also examine the degree of price transmission from the world market 
to commercial centers in Afghanistan. We start presenting our modeling results with the 
analysis on market integration of Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan with the world 
wheat market. We use US prices as the world price in this analysis. The modeling results 
show that Kazakh and Afghanistan wheat prices have a stronger linkage than Pakistani 
prices with the US gulf prices. Modeling results assessing Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Kazakhstan price linkages with the world market are presented in Table 4-1. The ADF 
and PP cointegration test results suggests that Pakistan wheat prices do not follow world 
wheat prices in the long run, but Afghan and Kazakh wheat prices are cointegrated with 
the US prices.  
The R-squared value of Kazakh and Afghan prices is much higher than the R-
squared value for Pakistani prices. This implies a larger portion of variability in Kazakh 
and Afghan prices, compared to Pakistani prices, are explained by the changes in the US 
prices. The long-run adjustment coefficient is statistically significant for all three 
countries. However, the coefficient is smaller for Pakistani price data than for Kazak and 
Afghanistan prices, suggesting a smaller portion of variability in the world price is 
transmitted to the Pakistan wheat market than to the Kazakh and Afghan wheat market in 
the long-run. The greater than unity coefficient on the Kazakh price suggests variability 
in Kazakh prices is higher than variation in the US prices. This can be due to large 
transaction costs between these two regions and/or market power.  
We also use a VECM model to assess price transmission dynamics from the 
world to Afghanistan and Kazakhstan’s domestic markets. VECM cannot be used with 
the Pakistani price, since the linear combination of the Pakistani prices and the US price 




Table 4-1: Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan Wheat Prices Related to US Gulf Prices 
  (1) (2) (3) 















    
   0.427*** 1.270*** 0.955*** 
 (0.0660) (0.0809) (0.0463) 
    
Constant 3.291*** -1.682*** 0.504** 
 (0.368) (0.454) (0.247) 
    
ADF -1.932 -3.124** -3.275** 
PP -1.718 -2.974** -3.242** 
    
Observations 112 103 184 
















    
Short-run   0.530*** -0.0359 
	
   (0.104) (0.0688) 
    
Speed of   -0.169*** -0.115*** 
	
   (0.0470) (0.0206) 
 
4-month 
   
Adjustment (%)  78 39 
    
Autoregressive   0.00132*** 0.000363** 
   (0.000344) (0.000178) 
    
Observations  101 182 
R-squared (VECM)  0.388 0.175 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variables are domestic wheat prices in Pakistan, Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan, and the independent variable is US gulf wheat prices. ADF is the 
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ically significant and large for 
Kazakhstan, but is not significant for Afghanistan. This suggests price movements in the 
international market are transmitted to Kazakhstan, but not to Afghanistan in the current 
period. The speed of adjustment coefficient       




long-run, but slowly. The 4-month price adjustment is about 80 percent for Kazakhstan 
and 40% for Afghanistan. The results are consistent with our expectation, as Kazakhstan 
is better integrated than Afghanistan with the world grain market. We will examine in the 
next section how commercial centers in Afghanistan are integrated with Kazakhstan and 
Pakistan.  
 
4.4.2 Price Transmission from Regional to Domestic Markets 
We now want to assess price transmission of wheat and flour from Pakistan and 
the Central Asian region into the Afghan domestic markets (commercial centers). Since 
most of the wheat imports to Afghanistan are in the form of flour, we look into price 
relationships for both wheat and flour. Since the data for flour prices are not available for 
Kazakhstan, we use the price data from Kyrgyzstan as a proxy for Kazakh flour prices. 
The cointegration test results show Kazakh and Kyrgyzstan wheat price data are 
cointegrated and move together closely in the long run. See results for the Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan price linkage in appendix Table A3.  
The results from the level and VECM models are combined and presented in one 
table. T   	
     (cointegration) model is presented in the first row 
of the table. The R-squared values from the level model is labeled as R-squared (Level), 
and the R-squared from the VECM is labeled, R-squared (VECM).  
Based on the results from the levels model, the Afghan-Kazakh price linkage for 
wheat is not as strong as expected. Modeling results for the Kazakh and Afghan price 
relationship are presented in Table 4-2. The long-run elasticity of price transmission 
ranges between 0.35 and 0.55, implying less than 50% of variability in the Kazakh wheat 
prices are eventually transmitted to Afghanistan’s domestic markets. The values for R-
squared are also small, ranging between 0.24 and 0.47, suggesting less than 50% of 
variation in domestic prices are explained by changes in Kazakh prices. The ADF test 
results indicates domestic prices in all commercial centers follow Kazakh prices in the 
long run. However, the results from the PP test are less significant than those from the 




Table 4-2: Domestic Prices of Wheat Related to Kazakhstan’s Wheat Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PARAMETERS Kabul Kandahar Jalalabad Herat Mazar 
      
Long-run 0.350*** 0.396*** 0.408*** 0.484*** 0.546*** 
 	 
 (0.0615) (0.0697) (0.0622) (0.0698) (0.0584) 
      
Short-run  0.0568 0.0615 0.124 0.0958 0.114 
 	 
 (0.0912) (0.0720) (0.0864) (0.0961) (0.101) 
      
Speed of  -0.144*** -0.107*** -0.121*** -0.133*** -0.163*** 
 	 
 (0.0457) (0.0318) (0.0414) (0.0412) (0.0496) 
 
4-month 
     
Adjustment (%)  46 
 
36 40 43 51 
Autoregressive  0.132 0.113 0.0885 0.210** 0.0778 
 
 (0.0966) (0.0937) (0.0960) (0.0936) (0.101) 
      
      
ADF -2.916** -3.439** -3.09** -3.179** -3.263** 
      
PP -2.725*     -2.556 -2.593*   -2.650* -2.903** 
      
Observations 101 101 101 101 94 
R-squared (Level) 0.242 0.242 0.299 0.322 0.471 
R-squared (VECM) 0.123 0.161 0.153 0.186 0.172 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the domestic wheat price in each commercial center, and the 
independent variable is the Kazakh wheat price. The long-run adju	 	 

and R-squared (Level) are estimated using the level model, as in equation 4.1. The 
coefficients for short-	 	 
   	 
   

and R-squared (VECM) are estimated from the VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron test 
 
VECM modeling results show there is no immediate price transmission from the 
Kazakh wheat market to commercial centers in Afghanistan. The short-run adjustment 
coefficient is not significant for any commercial center. The speed of adjustment 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level for all commercial centers. However, 




consistent with its long-run relationship to the Kazakh prices. The 4-month price 
adjustment ranges between 36% in Kandahar and 51% in Mazar. Mazar is the closest 
commercial center to Kazakhstan, and southern Kandahar is the furthest province from 
Kazakhstan.  
The level regression results show a stronger linkage between Afghanistan and 
Kyrgyzstan flour prices, compared to the Afghan-Kazakh wheat price linkage. The 
results examining the relationship between Kyrgyzstan’s flour prices and domestic prices 
of flour in four commercial centers are presented in Table 4-3. All coefficients are 
statistically significant at a 1% level, and close to unity. Kabul has the closest coefficient 
to one (0.99), implying all of the variation in Kyrgyzstan flour prices is eventually 
transmitted to flour prices in Kabul. R-squared values are also fairly high, all greater than 
0.72. Mazar was dropped from the table since its price data for flour are not available. 
The ADF t-statistics are significant at the 1% level for all commercial centers, ranging 
between -3.8 and -4.2. The results from the PP test are consistent here with the ADF test.   
The results from the VECM indicate the flour price linkage is slightly faster than 
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price adjustment ranges between 51 percent and 62 percent, slightly faster than for 
Kazakh wheat prices. None of the short-	 	 
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significant. The autoregressive term is also significant for commercial centers. This 












Table 4-3: Domestic Prices of Flour Related to Kyrgyzstan’s Flour Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PARAMETERS Kabul Kandahar Jalalabad Herat 
     
Long-run  0.991*** 0.961*** 0.911*** 1.039*** 
 	 
 (0.0493) (0.0540) (0.0507) (0.0507) 
     
Short-run  -0.0135 -0.0851 -0.0265 0.0372 
 	 
 (0.117) (0.107) (0.122) (0.108) 
 










 (0.0487) (0.0410) (0.0503) (0.0433) 
4-month     
Adjustment (%) 62 53 62 51 
     
Autoregressive  0.246*** 0.176** 0.184** 0.300*** 
 
 (0.0851) (0.0857) (0.0860) (0.0868) 
     
     
ADF -4.231*** -3.816*** -4.173*** -3.893*** 
     
PP -3.892*** -3.445** -3.976*** -3.552*** 
     
Observations 122 122 122 122 
R-squared (Level) 0.768 0.721 0.725 0.775 
R-squared (VECM) 0.193 0.150 0.159 0.191 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the domestic flour price in each commercial center, and the 
independent variable is the Kyrgyzstan flour price.The long-run adjustment coefficient 

 	 -squared (Level) are estimated using the level model, as in equation 4.1. The 
coefficients for short-	 	 
   	 
   

and R-squared (VECM) are estimated from the VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron test. 
 
Using the level regression model and VECM, the relationship of the Afghan 
domestic wheat and flour prices with wheat and flour prices of Pakistan are also assessed. 
The modeling results for wheat and flour prices are presented in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5, 
respectively. With Pakistan, the long-	 	 
  both wheat and flour prices 




than one. This implies the variation in Afghan domestic prices is higher than the variation 
in Pakistani prices. Pakistan heavily intervenes in its grain market and has been 
successful in keeping wheat and flour prices stable over time. Thus, the price shocks in 
the wheat and flour markets in Pakistan are less severe than those in Afghanistan and 
Central Asian countries.  
In terms of R-squared values, the price linkage for flour is stronger than for wheat 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Using flour prices, the R-squared values ranges 
between 0.67 and 0.73, implying about 70% of variability in domestic prices of flour are 
explained by changes in Pakistani prices. But for wheat price data between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan the R-squared values are smaller, ranging between 0.33 and 0.76. Most of 
the imports from Pakistan are in terms of wheat flour, rather than wheat grain.  
Using the VECM to examine Afghanistan-Pakistan’s price relationships, we find 
a large portion of price variability in Pakistan is transmitted to the Afghanistan domestic 
market in the short-run. Using wheat prices the short-run adjustmen    	
 
              	
  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magnitude for all commercial centers, ranging between 0.4 and 0.7. This implies on 
average about 50% of price shocks from Pakistan are transmitted to Afghanistan markets 
              
     
commercial centers, except Mazar. This result is consistent with our expectation, as 
Pakistani wheat and flour does not flow to the northern province of Mazar. The 4-month 
price adjustment ranges between 61 and 79 percent. Surprisingly, wheat prices in 
Jalalabad adjust slowly to Pakistani price signals compared to other commercial centers. 
Jalalabad and Kandahar are the closest commercial centers to Pakistan, but wheat is 
rarely imported to Jalalabad from Pakistan. Most of the imports from Pakistan to 








Table 4-4: Domestic Prices of Wheat Related to Pakistan’s Wheat Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PARAMETERS Kabul Kandahar Jalalabad Herat Mazar 
      
Long-run 0.981*** 1.408*** 1.009*** 0.972*** 0.797*** 
 	 
 (0.0863) (0.0745) (0.0949) (0.116) (0.110) 
      
Short-run  0.646*** 0.594*** 0.407** 0.713*** 0.734*** 
 	 
 (0.215) (0.159) (0.199) (0.216) (0.217) 
      
Speed of  -0.121** -0.122*** -0.103** -0.0843** -0.0124 
 	 
 (0.0483) (0.0411) (0.0404) (0.0357) (0.0389) 
      
4-month      
Adjustment (%)  79 
 
75 61 79 74 
Autoregressive  0.0902 0.151* 0.145 0.201** 0.143 
 
 (0.0966) (0.0882) (0.0946) (0.0911) (0.0932) 
      
ADF  -2.979** -3.645*** -2.910** -3.264** -3.317** 
      
PP -2.771* -2.993** -2.749*   -2.419   -2.492 
      
Observations 111 111 111 111 108 
R-squared (Level) 0.540 0.765 0.506 0.390 0.328 
R-squared (VECM) 0.128 0.188 0.101 0.171 0.133 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the domestic wheat price in each commercial center, and the 
independent variable is the Pakistani wheat price. The long-run adjustment 	 

and R-squared (Level) are estimated using the level model, as in equation 4.1. The 
coefficients for short-	 	 
   	 
   

and R-squared (VECM) are estimated from the VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron test 
 
Using flour prices, Kandahar and Jalalabad are more integrated than other 
commercial centers to Pakistan’s flour market. The short-run adjustment coefficients are 
significant for all commercial centers, and large in magnitude. They range between 0.56 
in Herat and 0.73 in Kandahar. The results are consistent with our expectations, as 




adjustment coefficient is also significant for all commercial centers. The 4-month 
adjustment ranges between 71 and 82 percent.  
Table 4-5: Domestic Prices of Flour Related to Pakistan’s Flour Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PARAMETERS Kabul Kandahar Jalalabad Herat 
     
Long-run 1.252*** 1.236*** 1.146*** 1.313*** 
 	 
 (0.0748) (0.0661) (0.0710) (0.0706) 
     
Short-run  0.584*** 0.733*** 0.623*** 0.567*** 
 	 
 (0.137) (0.119) (0.139) (0.124) 
     
Speed of  -0.0887** -0.0953*** -0.110*** -0.114*** 
 	 
 (0.0361) (0.0345) (0.0384) (0.0332) 
     
4-month     
Adjustment (%) 71 82 76 73 
     
Autoregressive  0.165** 0.234*** 0.182** 0.373*** 
 
 (0.0828) (0.0790) (0.0826) (0.0818) 
     
ADF -3.314** -3.645*** -3.284** -3.485** 
     
PP -2.813* -2.605* -3.070**   -3.165* 
     
Observations 129 129 129 129 
R-squared (Level) 0.685 0.731 0.669 0.729 
R-squared (VECM) 0.171 0.265 0.182 0.241 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the domestic flour price in each commercial center, and the 
independent variable is Pakistani flour price. The long-run 	 	 
 	
R-squared (Level) are estimated using the level model, as in equation 4.1. The 
coefficients for short-	 	 
   	 
   

and R-squared (VECM) are estimated from the VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron test.  
 
Based on the modeling results, some variability in prices both in Pakistan and the 
Central Asian region are eventually transmitted to Afghanistan domestic markets. The 




Central Asian region. Results are consistent with our expectation, as most wheat imports 
to Afghanistan are conducted in the form of wheat flour rather than wheat grain (Persaud, 
2013).  
Using the overall data, the results suggest the level of integration between 
Afghanistan and Kazakhstan versus Afghanistan and US gulf to be quite similar. 
However, the results for the post-2008 data suggest that Afghanistan is considerably 
more integrated with the Central Asian region than with world market. This result is 
consistent with our expectations that Afghanistan has become more integrated with the 
Central Asian market after 2008. We discuss in detail Pakistani policy reform and price 
transmission results for post versus pre-reform periods in the next section.  
 
4.4.3 Structural Changes and Pakistani Policy Reform 
Wheat and flour prices in Afghanistan tended to follow wheat and flour prices in 
Pakistan until 2008. However, this does not appear to be as true after 2008. The linkage 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan wheat markets broke during the 2007/08 food crisis. 
Pakistan’s ban on wheat and flour exports to Afghanistan allowed Kazakhstan to increase 
its exports to Afghanistan. Since then, Afghan wheat and flour prices appear to have a 
higher correlation with prices of Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) 
than with Pakistani prices.  
In this section we examine the price linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as 
well as Afghanistan and the Central Asian region, taking into account these structural 
changes. The appropriate dating of policy reform by the government of Pakistan is not 
entirely clear. However, there was no such policy before 2008, and it has been off and on 
since January 2008. To take this into account, we separate our price series data into two 
time periods: pre-reform and post-reform. The pre-reform period is from January 2004 to 
December 2007, and the post-reform period is January 2008 to April 2015.  
We have to use only the flour price data for Kyrgyzstan for this analysis since the 
price series data for Kazakhstan are available only from late 2006. Thus, we do not have 
enough observations to run a regression for the pre-reform period with Kazakh price data. 




available only after January 2006 for both Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan. That leaves us with 
few observation for the pre-reform period. 
 Our hypothesis is that the price linkage between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 
stronger in the pre-reform period than in the post-reform period. We expect that the 
Afghanistan wheat market has become more integrated with the Central Asian market 
after the 2007-08 food crisis. Table 4-6 presents the modeling results for the pre-reform 
versus post-reform period flour price linkages between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 
Table 4-7 for Afghanistan and the Central Asian region.   
Modeling results show that the long-run elasticity of price transmission from 
Pakistan is close to unity for all commercial centers in the pre-reform period, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies the price linkage between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan was very strong before 2008. On the contrary, statistical results 
show no linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistani prices after 2008. The long-run 
elasticity of price transmission is not statistically significant for any of the commercial 
centers in the post-reform period, even though there are more observations in the post-
reform period than in the pre-reform period. The long-run elasticity of price transmission 
is smaller in the pre-reform period compared to the overall period. The coefficients are all 
larger than unity using overall data, while they are less than one in the pre-reform period. 
The R-squared values are very small for the post- 2008 data. This implies only a small 
portion of domestic price variability reflects Pakistani price movements after January 
2008. The results from ADF test show strong cointegration between flour prices in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the pre-reform period, but there is not significant 
cointegration between them using the post-reform data. The results from the PP test is 
consistent with the ADF results using the post-reform data. However, for the pre-reform 
period PP tests results are not as significant as the results from the ADF, as PP test is not 








Table 4-6: Pre-Reform versus Post-Reform Flour Price Linkage with Pakistan 








     
   0.898*** 0.882*** 0.819*** 0.707*** 
 (0.150) (0.0819) (0.0986) (0.0965) 
     
Constant 0.716 0.745 1.123** 1.773*** 
 (0.820) (0.448) (0.539) (0.528) 
     
ADF 3.612*** -2.957*** -3.349** -3.375** 
PP -2.747* -2.417 -2.835* -2.584* 
     
Observations 43 43 43 43 








     
   0.152 0.131 0.0726 0.396* 
 (0.225) (0.197) (0.219) (0.221) 
     
Constant 5.325*** 5.381*** 5.723*** 3.928*** 
 (1.323) (1.160) (1.291) (1.301) 
     
ADF -2.131 -2.781* -2.681* -2.335 
PP -2.323 -1.863 -2.113 -2.283 
     
Observations 88 88 88 88 













     
Short-run -0.415 0.115 0.295 0.211 
	
  (0.263) (0.174) (0.191) (0.176) 
     
Speed of  -0.171* -0.618*** -0.308** -0.381*** 
	
  (0.100) (0.161) (0.142) (0.125) 
4-month     
Adjustment (%) 52 97 77 85 
     
Autoregressive 0.117 0.0853 0.0550 0.217 
  (0.223) (0.190) (0.192) (0.168) 
     
Observations 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.166 0.286 0.144 0.249 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: We do not estimate VECM for Pakistan’s post-reform data, as they are not 
cointegrated with Afghan prices in the post-reform period. See Table 4-5 for comparison 




Table 4-7: Pre-Reform versus Post-Reform Flour Price Linkage with Kyrgyzstan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
   0.361*** 0.387*** 0.317*** 0.289*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0436) (0.0436) (0.0390) 
     
Constant 3.515*** 3.267*** 3.744*** 3.940*** 
 (0.264) (0.261) (0.261) (0.233) 
     
ADF -2.398 -2.312 -2.468 -2.159 
PP -2.291 -2.143 -2.562   -2.006 
     
Observations 36 36 36 36 








     
   0.838*** 0.653*** 0.748*** 0.897*** 
 (0.0605) (0.0642) (0.0686) (0.0494) 
     
Constant 0.885** 1.995*** 1.388*** 0.543* 
 (0.386) (0.409) (0.437) (0.315) 
     
ADF -3.785*** -2.946*** -3.722*** -3.533*** 
PP -3.545*** -2.725* -3.658*** -3.266** 
Observations 88 88 88 88 













      
 Short-run 0.380** 0.133 0.315* 0.467*** 
 Adjustme 	 (0.171) (0.165) (0.187) (0.166) 
      
 Speed of  -0.380*** -0.295*** -0.333*** -0.480*** 
 
  (0.0812) (0.0727) (0.0788) (0.0897) 
 4-month     




75 80 96 
 Autoregressive 0.303*** 0.218** 0.235** 0.395*** 
   
 
(0.0946) (0.0977) (0.0998) (0.0967) 
 Observations 88 88 88 88 
 R-squared 0.269 0.185 0.205 0.318 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: We do not estimate VECM for Kyrgyzstan’s pre-reform data, as they are not 
cointegrated with Afghan prices in the pre-reform period. See Table 4-3 for comparison 




We want to analyze the impact of Pakistani policy reform on price transmission 
using the cointegration and VECM model. The cointegration test results for sub-period 
data suggest that there is no long-run relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
prices after 2008, while they are cointegrated before 2008. On the contrary, flour prices 
between Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan are cointegrated for the post-reform period but they 
are not cointegrated before 2008. Thus, we cannot use VECM for both pre-reform and 
post-reform periods as the price series data are cointegrated only for one period. We use 
VECM model only for the sub-period in which series are cointegrated. Results are 
compared with the overall period results. Thus, for Kyrgyzstan VECM is used with the 
post-reform period, and for Pakistan with the pre-reform period data.  
We use VECM with the pre-reform period data of Pakistan and compare with the 
results from the overall data presented in Table 4-5. Although the number of observation 
are considerably smaller in the pre-reform period, compared to overall data, the results 
are informative to some extent. With the sub-period data, the speed of adjustment 
coefficient is larger compared to the results using overall data for all commercial centers. 
However the coefficient using Kabul and Jalalabad prices are less significant in the pre-
reform period compared to the results with overall data. This can be due to the small 
number of observations in the pre-reform period. Also, the results in the pre-reform 
period show there is not instant price transmission from Pakistan to Afghanistan domestic 
markets. However, the short-run adjustment coefficient is significant using overall data. 
The 4-month price adjustment is higher for the pre-reform period than for the overall 
period in all commercial centers except Kabul.   
 Regression analysis from the levels model reveals that the price linkage between 
Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan is stronger in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform 
period, as expected. The modeling results for both periods are presented in Table 8. The 
long-run elasticity of price transmission coefficient is significantly larger for all 
commercial centers in the post-reform period compared to the period before 2008. The 
larger coefficient with the post-reform period data implies a larger portion of the 
variability in the Kyrgyzstan prices is transmitted to prices in Afghanistan compared to 




Afghanistan has become more integrated with the central Asian region after 2008. The t-
statistics from the ADF test are highly significant for post-reform data, while none of 
them are significant with the pre-reform data. The results from the PP test are mostly 
consistent with the ADF test results.  
The VECM results for Kyrgyzstan flour in the post-reform period are also 
presented in Table 4-7. The speed of adjustment coefficients for all commercial centers 
are larger in the post-reformed period compared to the overall period for Kyrgyzstan. The 
  		
   	
  -reform period, compared to the overall period, 
suggests price signals in Central Asian region are transmitted to Afghan domestic 
markets faster after 2008 than in the pre-reform period. The 4-month price adjustment 
ranges between 75 in Kandahar and 96 percent, in Herat for the post-reform period. But 
the 4-month adjustment is less than 60 percent with the overall data. Although price 
series data are shorter here, R-squared values are larger with the post-reform period data, 
compared to the overall series. The short-
 
 		
  	 		  
significant with Herat and Kabul prices, suggesting price variability in Central Asian 
region is quickly transmitted to Herat and Kabul. The short-run adjustment coefficient is 
not significant with any commercial centers with the overall data. Using the post-reform 
data the results show Herat, followed by Kabul, is more integrated with the Central Asian 
markets. This make sense as Herat and Kabul are closer than other commercial centers to 
the Central Asian region.  
 
4.4.4 Wheat Price Relationships between Rural and Urban Markets  
We use the levels model in logarithmic form and the VECM to examine price 
transmission across rural and urban centers, as well. Price data for rural markets are 
available only for wheat. The rural-urban price linkages examined are: Baymyan-Kabul, 
Badakhshan-Mazar, Ghor-Herat, Faryab-Mazar, and Daykundi-Kandahar. See Figure 4-3 
for a map of the rural markets and commercial centers used in our model. Table 4-8 





Table 4-8: Rural Wheat Prices Related to Urban Wheat Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PARAMETERS Bamyan Badakhshan Ghor Faryab Daykundi 
      
Long-run 0.584*** 1.152*** 0.628*** 1.018*** 0.811*** 
 	 
 (0.0741) (0.0403) (0.0944) (0.0411) (0.0429) 
      
Short-run  0.261 0.469*** NA 0.511*** 0.381*** 
 	 
 (0.167) (0.0748)  (0.0987) (0.0771) 
      
Speed of  -0.428** -0.151*** NA -0.340*** -0.212*** 
 	 
 (0.186) (0.0394)  (0.0594) (0.0519) 
      
4-month      
Adjustment (%)  
 
89 72 NA 90 75 
Autoregressive  0.0909 0.0320 NA -0.158** 0.266*** 
 
 (0.250) (0.0736)  (0.0771) (0.0847) 
      
ADF -3.241** -3.807*** -2.543 -4.369*** -3.537*** 
      
PP -2.370 -3.837*** -2.405 -5.043*** -3.418** 
      
Observations 17 140 36 120 93 
R-squared (Level) 0.766 0.851 0.552 0.829 0.786 
R-squared (VECM) 0.336 0.265 0.239 0.351 0.387 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the wheat price in rural markets, and the independent 
variable is the wheat prices in the closest commercial center to the rural market. 
The long-	 	 	 
 	 -squared (Level) are estimated using the 
level model, as in equation (1). The coefficients for short-	 	 
  
	 
   
 	 -squared (VECM) are estimated from the 
VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron 
test. 
 
The results from the levels model show that there is a long-run linkage between 
rural and urban wheat prices. The long-run adjustment coefficient is statistically 
significant for all pairs of price series data. The long-run elasticity of price transmission 
between Kabul and Bamyan is 0.58, implying 58 percent of the variation in Kabul prices 




are very short for some rural markets (Bamyan and Ghor), the R-squared values are large, 
ranging between 0.55 and 0.83.  
The cointegration test shows prices in rural markets are moving together in the 
long-run, with the prices in the closest commercial centers, except for Ghor. We use 
VECM to examine price relationships across rural and urban areas for the rural markets 
with statistically significant ADF t-    	  
		   	 		   
statistically significant at 1% for Badakhshan, Faryab and Daykundi, and it is significant 
at the 5% level with Bamyan. The price series for Bamyan and Ghor are shorter than for 
the other three rural markets. The short-run adjustment coefficient is significant for 
Badakhshan, Faryab and Daykundi, at a 1% level, implying a portion of the price shocks 
from commercial centers is transferred to these rural markets in the current period. The 
autoregressive term is significant only for Daykundi and Faryab price series. The 4-
month price adjustment ranges between 72% in Badakhshan and 90% in Faryab. 
Although it is difficult to determine which rural market is more integrated to its closest 
commercial center as the number of observations are not the same for all rural markets, 
Faryab and Daykundi appear to be more integrated than other rural markets with their 
closest commercial centers. The results are consistent with our expectations when 
considering the geographical locations of the rural markets, poor transportation 
infrastructure and distance from the commercial centers, (see Figure 4-3). Badakhshan 
has the longest distance to its commercial center, (Mazar) and its price adjustment to 
changes in price in Mazar is the slowest. Ghor and Bamyan appear to have the shortest 
routes to their commercial centers, but the number of observations for these markets are 
substantially less than for other rural markets.   
 
4.4.5 Wheat and Flour Price Linkages across Commercial Centers  
Wheat and flour prices appear to move together across commercial centers and to 
adjust quickly. We examine Kabul wheat and flour prices versus other commercial 
centers using both cointegration models and VECM. The results of the VECM and the 
levels models for flour prices are presented in Table 4-9. Modeling results show that the 




statistically significant at the 1% level for all commercial centers. The ADF and PP tests 
results also show strong cointegration between Kabul prices and price in all other 
commercial centers for both wheat and flour.   
Table 4-9: Kabul Flour Prices Related to Other Commercial Centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 




















 (0.0573) (0.0526) (0.0599) 
 








 (0.0465) (0.0475) (0.0468) 
    
Autoregressive  6.66e-05 0.000105 7.43e-05 
 
 (0.000120) (0.000113) (0.000132) 
    
4-month    
Adjustment (%) 88 88 86 
    
ADF -3.763*** -4.867*** -6.008*** 
    
PP -6.713***   -5.583***   -6.700*** 
    
Observations 178 182 182 
R-squared (Level) 0.942 0.955 0.931 
R-squared (VECM) 0.436 0.477 0.328 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the domestic flour price in each commercial center, and the 
independent variable is the flour price in Kabul. 
The long-	 	 	 
 	 -squared (Level) are estimated using the 
level model, as in equation 4.1. The coefficients for short-	 	 
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 	 -squared (VECM) are estimated from the 
VECM model. ADF is the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron 
test.  
The results from the levels model suggest strong linkages across commercial 
centers. All the long-run adjustment coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 




centers are eventually transmitted to the Kabul flour market. The R-squared values are 
also fairly large, ranging between 0.88 and 0.92. This suggests about 90% of the 
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ranging between 0.45 and 0.65. This implies more than 50% of price shocks in other 
commercial centers are immediately transmitted to the Kabul flour market.  The speed of 
adjustment coefficients are fairly large, ranging between 0.23 and 0.29. The 4-month 
price adjustment is about 90 percent. Results from both level regression and VECM 
models suggest Kabul is more integrated with Jalalabad and Kandahar compared to 
Herat. This intuitively makes sense since Jalalabad and Kandahar are closer to Kabul than 
to Herat.  
Using wheat prices, the results are similar to the flour prices. The results show 
strong linkages between Kabul and all other commercial centers. With wheat prices, 
Mazar is added to our analysis, since its prices for wheat are available. It is interesting to 
notice that Kabul appears to be more integrated with the eastern and southern markets 
than with the northern market. The results of level regression and VECM for wheat prices 


















from Kazakhstan increased wheat availability in Afghanistan, it created variability in 
wheat and flour prices, because prices of wheat and flour in the Central Asian region are 
not as stable as prices in Pakistan.  
The Pakistani export restriction policy appears to have had substantial effects on 
price transmission. The regression analysis suggests strong cointegration between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan price series data before January 2008, while there is no price 
linkage after January 2008 when the export restriction policy was in place. Modeling 
results also suggest that Afghanistan’s domestic wheat and flour markets have become 
more integrated with the Central Asian market since January 2008. 
Even though Kazakhstan has increased wheat and flour exports to Afghanistan 
since 2008, market integration with the Central Asian region is not strong enough to 
stabilize Afghan domestic wheat and flour markets in the short-run. Prices in Afghan 
domestic markets adjust to changes in Kazakh prices slowly. The 4-month price 
adjustment to changes in Kazakh prices is less than 50% for most cases. Moreover wheat 
and flour markets in the central Asian region are not as stable as those in Pakistan. They 
do not implement stabilization policies to the extent observed in Pakistan.  
 We also find a stronger relationships for Afghan flour prices than wheat prices 
with both Pakistan and the Central Asian region. Our analysis shows that spikes in flour 
prices in Pakistan and the Central Asian region are transmitted to Afghanistan’s domestic 
markets faster than wheat prices. This result is consistent with our findings from the 
trader survey during summer 2014 in Afghanistan and from Persaud (2013), that most 
wheat is imported in the form of flour rather than grain to Afghanistan. Flour is imported 
to Afghanistan despite the fact that most commercial mills are operating at less than half 
capacity. This suggests the Afghan milling industry has problems competing with 
subsidized Pakistani flour and high quality Kazakh flour imports.    
Our analysis shows that wheat and flour markets are well connected across 
commercial centers in Afghanistan. However rural markets do not appear to be well 
integrated with commercial centers. Thus, an increase in domestic wheat production is 




price in surplus areas, as in 2009. Moreover, it is less likely that imports could stabilize 






Kabul and Herat said they purchase Kazakh wheat directly from Kazakhstan rather than 
purchasing from other traders in Afghanistan. Thus, imports of wheat grain from 
Kazakhstan are carried out mostly by millers in Afghanistan. However, millers in Mazar 
said they pay trading companies to import wheat for them from Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan.  
While traders appear to capture higher profits from flour imports than wheat 
imports, flour imports are more likely to make Afghanistan dependent on imports and so 
vulnerable to Pakistan policy changes. Flour cannot be kept in storage for a long periods 
of time like wheat. So, this makes Afghanistan more dependent on frequent imports. 
Flour imports create major problems for millers and farmers in Afghanistan. Afghan 
millers cannot compete with subsidized flour imports from Pakistan, given the same ad 
valorem tariffs for both flour and wheat imports. Afghan millers have suggested 
removing the tariffs on wheat imports in order to increase the share of wheat imports and 
decrease flour imports. This policy will help millers, and it may not have significant 
effects on farmers. Most millers in Afghanistan blend the high quality Kazakh wheat with 
lower quality domestic wheat during processing. So, an increase in Kazakh wheat imports 
implies a higher demand for domestic wheat, as well. Most importantly, this policy 
should not hurt Afghan consumers, as wheat flour prices would fall.  
Most of flour markets in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kabul and Herat are supplied by 
Pakistani flour. It is unlikely that Pakistani flour moves to the northern market, Mazar. 
Based on the survey, Pakistan flour is observed in the provinces close to Kabul like 
Parwan, but it is not observed in Mazar. On the contrary, Kazakh flour is moving to all 
commercial centers, including Jalalabad and Kandahar. But demand for Kazak flour is 
less in Jalalabad and Kandahar than in Mazar and Herat, mainly due to higher 
transportation costs. The price of Kazakh flour is about $90 higher than Pakistani flour in 
Kabul, and the difference gets bigger in eastern commercial centers due to transportation 
costs.  
In spite of the huge differences between the prices of Kazakh, local and Pakistani 




driven mainly by the quality differences between Pakistani, Kazakh and local flour. Most 
commercial bakeries in the cities combine Kazakh flour with local or Pakistani flour.  
Kazakh flour contains a higher percentage of gluten compared to local and 
Pakistani flour. More gluten in flour makes elastic dough, and that is very valuable for 
commercial bakeries in Afghanistan. It is easier to make bread in different sizes with 
elastic dough. Thus, there is demand for Kazakh flour in all commercial centers because 
of its high quality.  
Local flour is blended with Kazakh or any other flour with higher gluten in order 
to make elastic enough dough to make bread. All millers interviewed said they combine 
local wheat with Kazakh wheat, mostly with shares at 50-50 before processing it. If local 
wheat is not blended with Kazakh wheat at the milling stage, commercial bakeries or 
household mix the flour when making dough. Local flour is rarely used without mixing it 
with other flour in commercial centers. However, in it is used without blending with 
Kazakh wheat in rural areas.  
Pakistan, with a shared border of 1,600 Km with Afghanistan, is an easier option 
than Kazakhstan for Afghan traders to import flour from. Most traders interviewed said 
they do not need contracts or any additional arrangements for importing flour from 
Pakistan. Some traders reported later payment for Pakistani millers, after selling the flour 
in Afghanistan. Some traders also reported importing flour from Pakistan without paying 
the whole tariffs. Traders can report less than the actual import level to the customs 
officials. But the northern border where Kazakh flour comes through is better organized, 
and it is less likely to import commodities without paying the complete tariffs. It is also 
much faster to import flour from Pakistan than from Kazakhstan. Most traders said with 
just making a call today, they can get the shipment two or three days later in Afghanistan. 
Also, it is not required to purchase a large volume of flour at one time.  Traders importing 
flour from Pakistan said they can make a transaction as small as 100 metric tons with 
Pakistani millers.  
Importing wheat and flour from Kazakhstan is much more complicated than 
importing from Pakistan. Traders are required to make contracts with the government of 




fluctuating price contract for a large volume of wheat and/or flour and then start 
importing. Most of the traders importing wheat and flour from Kazakhstan are much 
larger traders than the ones importing from Pakistan. Most traders importing wheat and 
flour from Kazakhstan have contracts of 10,000 to 50,000 MT of wheat and flour with 
the government of Kazakhstan.  
Transportation costs are much lower for flour import from Pakistan than imports 
from Kazakhstan. Flour imports from Pakistan enter Afghanistan at three different ports: 
Spin Boldak to Kandahar, Torkham to Jalalabad and through Ghulam Khan Port to Khost 
province. All the wheat deficit provinces are strategically located next to the Pakistani 
border. Kabul, the largest flour market in Afghanistan, is close to both Khost and 
Jalalabad.  
Based on the trader survey, the transportation costs of flour imports from 
Peshawar Pakistan to Jalalabad is $40 per ton, and with an added $10 per ton the 
shipment gets all the way to Kabul. The route from Khost to Kabul is more cost effective, 
based on the information from the traders. The transportation costs of flour is $43 per ton 
from Panjab to Kabul via Khost province. The transportation costs of flour from Quetta 
Pakistan to Kandahar is about $10 per metric ton. That is the most efficient route to 
supply all the southern provinces.  
Since Afghanistan does not share a border with Kazakhstan, it is costly to trade 
with Kazakhstan. More importantly, wheat surplus areas in Kazakhstan are mostly in the 
north, and wheat deficit areas in Afghanistan are central, south and west. That makes the 
transportation costs even higher. Based on the trader survey, the transportation costs of 
wheat and flour from Kazakhstan to Mazar are about $110 per metric tons. It costs 
another $40 for tariffs and taxes until it reaches to Mazar. The transportation costs from 
northern Kazakhstan to Saryagash, on the border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is 
about $50 per metric tons, and from there to Hairatan, the border between Afghanistan 
and Uzbekistan, costs another $50 per metric tons. If it is moving to Kabul, another $35 
per metric is added. Thus, the total transportation costs from Kazakhstan where wheat is 






substitutes for domestic wheat and flour. This characteristic combined with the imperfect 
market integration from the price transmission chapter suggest an Armington modeling 
approach better fits the current wheat and flour market structure in Afghanistan than a 
competitive spatial equilibrium approach.  
  A potential policy option to support Afghan milling industry is the removal of 
tariffs on wheat imports. Currently there is a 5% tariff and another 5% of taxes on both 
wheat and flour imports. With the current policy Afghan millers cannot compete in the 
market with subsidized Pakistani flour. I will consider a scenario in my model with no 
tariffs on wheat imports while tariffs on flour imports stay as they are now to determine 







policies that result in large welfare losses. Instead, governments should consider a 
combination of policies, including national stocks, reliance on world markets, promotion 
of domestic production, and safety net programs, to deal with price instability (Dorosh, 
2009). 
It is important that policies at borders are coordinated with domestic production 
and storage polices in order to stabilize domestic prices. An optimal storage policy, 
without a trade policy, may not improve consumers’ welfare, as its stabilizing benefits 
may leak to the world market (Gouel and Jean, 2015). Storage may increase domestic 
prices through additional demand for stockpiling, but it is not effective at preventing 
price shocks. Gouel and Jean (2015) find that an optimal combination of public stock 
policies and trade policies are effective in stabilizing domestic food prices. Their results 
show that an optimal combination of trade and storage policy eliminates both upper and 
lower parts of the domestic price distribution, and this can lead to welfare gains. 
 Following this literature review, we will assess the government intervention 
through public stockholding and trade policies in the Afghan wheat market.  
Stockholding policy as an alternative to trade policy is expected to be a costly option. 
However, stocks are required to clear domestic markets and stabilize prices if the small 
country assumption does not hold due to imperfect integration into the world market, or 
when the domestic prices are inside parity bounds, in which case spatial price 
differentials are less than transfer costs and as a result trade does not occur.  
Stocks are essential to manage short run dynamics due to delays in import 
delivery and seasonal price dynamics in the isolated rural markets.  Stockholding policy 
may also be effective in stabilizing domestic markets in the case of imperfect integration 
into the world market. Stockholding policy is likely to be more effective than a trade 
policy to stabilize prices in the rural areas where wheat is produced. However, 
stockholding policy might be less cost-effective than variable levy.  
 Given that Afghanistan is a landlocked country, the transactions costs to bring 
imports from the world market are high, and it became even higher when Pakistan 
banned it wheat exports in 2008. Moreover, markets do not appear to be well integrated 




Afghanistan, stocks may play a significant role to stabilize prices in extreme cases. 
However, weak market integration may limit the stabilization effects of stocks only to the 





 grouping 34 provinces into seven region will simplify the model. Therefore, we use 
regions instead of provinces in our model. Three of the seven regions are surplus regions 
and the remaining four are in deficit. Surplus areas are in northern Kunduz and Mazar, 
and Herat in the west. Deficit areas are in the south, center and east.  
There are five official ports that supply wheat and flour to the commercial centers. 
Commercial centers are Mazar, Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Kunduz, and Khost. 
Commercial centers are supplied by five ports, inter-regional flows between these 
centers, and marketed surplus from rural areas. Rural areas are supplied by their own 
production and flour inflows from commercial centers. Surplus wheat in rural areas is 
either accumulated as stocks or carried to commercial centers and distributed to other 
urban centers.   
The five official entry points or ports that wheat and flour come through are 
Hairatan, Tourkham, Spin Boldak, Tourghundi, and Khost. Three of the five entry points 
are on the Pakistani border, suppling wheat and flour to southern Kandahar, eastern 
Jalalabad and Khost, and central Kabul. Kazakh and Uzbek wheat and flour come via 
Hairatan to Mazar and through Tourghundi to Herat. There is an official port to the west 
with Iran but rarely wheat and flour come from that port because Iran itself is a wheat 
deficit country.  
 Figure 7-1represents regions, provinces, commercial centers, ports and wheat 
flows in Afghanistan. Commercial centers are defined by the star sign. Thick arrows 
show import flows from ports. Interregional flows are mostly from surplus to deficit 
regions. Wheat surpluses from Kunduz and Mazar regions are mostly exported to Kabul. 
The flows change depending on domestic production, and export policy of foreign 
suppliers. Following the 2007-2008 food crisis, Pakistan closed the border for wheat and 
flour exports to Afghanistan. Flows of wheat and flour changed in the country after 
Pakistani export restriction policy. Central Kabul started to import Kazakh wheat from 





h ports:  
 
Table 7-1: Border Points 
 Code Name   Location 
HAIR Hairatan Northern Port connecting Mazar  to Central Asia (Kazakhstan) 
TOUR Tourkham Eastern port  connecting  Jalalabad to Pakistan 
BOLD Spin Boldak Southern Port connecting Kandahar to Pakistan  
TGDI Tourghundi Western Port connecting Herat to Central Asia (Kazakhstan) 
KHST Khost  Eastern port connecting  Khost to Pakistan 
 
Table 7-2 shoes index r for regions:  
r  Regions defined by  commercial centers:  
 
Table 7-2: Regions used in our Model 
Code Name Location  Status Provinces 
HER Herat  West Surplus Herat, Farah, Badghis, Ghor 
JAL Jalalabad  East 





Deficit Kabul, Parwan, Panjsheer, Kapisa,     
Logar, Wardak, Bamyan 
KAN Kandahar  South Deficit Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul,  









Deficit Paktya, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni 
MAZ Mazar North 
Surplus  Faryab, Juzjan, Sari Pul, Balkh,          
Samangan 
 
Sub-indices for surplus and deficit regions, and for rural versus urban zones are presented 
below:  
j(r) surplus regions: HER, KDZ, MAZ 





Table 7-3: Notation for our Model 
Endogenous Variables                                              Description 
Xw(j,d,ty)          Interregional wheat flows from center j to d  
Xf(j,d,ty)           Interregional flour flows from center j to d  
XwR(r,ty)          Wheat flows from a rural  zone to its urban center  
XfU(r,ty)            Flour flows from an urban center to its rural zone 
Xwm(h,r,ty)       Wheat import flows from port h to center r 
Xfm(h,r,ty)         Flour import flows from port h to center r 
C(r,z,ty)            Consumption in region r and zone z, z = 1 urban , 2 rural 
M(r,z,ty)           Quantity of wheat going to milling in region r zone z 
ST(r,z,ty)           Private carry out stocks in region r zone z 
PS(j,z,ty)           Public stocks in rural zones of surplus regions                                
Q(r,ty) Realized production by region 
Qe(r,ty)             Expected wheat production by region  
A(r,ty)              Realized area planted by region 
Ae(r,ty)             Expected area planted by region 
PwWe(h,ty)    Wheat price at border points h after tariffs 
PwRZ(r,z,ty)  Domestic wheat price  in region r zone z 
PfWe(h,ty)    Flour price at border point h after tariffs 
PfRz(r,z,ty)  Domestic flour price  in region r zone z 
Exogenous Variables  and Parameters                          Description 
Si(r,z)              Beginning private stocks in region r  and zone z 
Sm(r,z) Minimum private stocks in regions r and zone z 
Ye(r,ty)        Expected yield of wheat in region r 
Y(r,ty) Realized yield in region r 
cXm(h,r)        Costs of wheat and flour import flows from port h to center r 
cX(j,d) Costs of interregional flows from region j to d 
cXw(r)             Costs of wheat and flour flows between rural and urban areas 
Tw(h) Tariff on wheat imports (ad valorem tax) 
 h,r Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic wheat 






quantity of wheat milled. Carry-in stocks are the ending stocks from the previous period. 
Hence, the beginning stocks are treated as exogenous in the initial period.  
Supply and use balance for wheat in deficit rural areas is similar to surplus 
regions, with the exception that there are no public stocks and there is no wheat flow 
from rural to urban centers. Supply and use balance in rural deficit regions is presented in 
equation 7.2:  
 tyzrMtyzrSttyrQzrSi ,,(),,(),(),(    ) 7.2 
 
Where r = d, z = rural, Si is beginning stocks, Q is production, St is carry out stocks, and 
M is wheat quantity milled.  
 Wheat equilibrium in urban centers of surplus regions is set as: beginning private 
stocks plus wheat imports from ports and wheat coming from rural areas equals carry out 
stocks, wheat going to mills in urban centers and wheat going to deficit regions. The 
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Where r = j, and z = urban  
In urban centers of deficit regions, supply and use balance is similar to balances in 
surplus regions. There is no flow from rural to urban centers in deficit regions and there 
is no outflow from deficit to surplus regions. Instead there is inflow from surplus to 
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Where Xw is wheat flow from surplus to deficit regions, and Xwm is wheat imports from 
ports to deficit regions.  
 Similarly, there are equations that capture supply and use balance for flour in 
regions and zones in our model. Supply and use equilibrium for flour in rural areas is set 




flour coming from urban centers equals consumption in rural areas. We assume the 
extraction rate is constant and it is the same across all rural and urban areas. There are not 
carry out stocks in flour form. The supply and use balance for flour is the same between 
surplus and deficit rural regions. It is presented in equation 7.5 for rural zones:  
 
 ),,(),(),,(* tyzrCtyrXfutyzrMFER    7.5 
 
Where r include both j and d, and z = rural, FER is the extraction rate, M is wheat milled, 
Xfu is flour inflow from urban centers and C is consumption.  
Supply and use balance for flour in urban centers is somewhat different between 
surplus and deficit regions as surplus regions can only export flour to deficit regions and 
are not allowed to import from those regions, while deficit regions may only import flour 
from surplus regions and are not allowed to export flour to surplus regions. In surplus 
regions, flour imports from ports and flour produced in the urban center are equal to 
consumption, outflows to deficit regions and outflow to rural areas in the same region. 
The supply and use balance of flour in urban surplus regions is presented in equation 7.6, 
and for deficit urban region is presented in equation 7.7: 
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Where r = j, and z = urban  
 
Deficit regions:  
 ),(),,(),,(),,(),,(* tyrXfutyzrCtyrjXftyrhXfmtyzrMFER
jh
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7.4.2 Supply Equations  
We use the price elasticities of supply estimated in Chapter 2 to generate 
parameters for the supply functions used in the model. The relationship between the 
expected area planted of wheat and price is captured in equation 7.8. Equation 7.9 shows 
the expected production as a function of area and yield:  
 
 ),,(*)()(),( tyzrPwRzrbsrastyrAe    7.8 
 ),(*),(),( tyrYetyrAetyrQe   7.9 
 
Where z is rural, as and bs are the intercept and slope of the area function with respect to 
price, and slopes and intercept are calculated using the elasticities estimated in the supply 
section presented in Chapter 2 plus base year data on regional area, yield and production.  
In order to capture the stochastic elements of the production function, the 
variance-covariance matrix of the error terms generated in chapter 2 are used. We use a 
Cholesky transformation to create correlated error realizations for Monte Carlo 
simulation. Using this method we produce realized area of wheat planted and realized 
yield in each Monte Carlo iteration. These relationships are captured in equation 7.10 
and 7.11: 
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Where A(r,ty) is realized area,    ! "" #  the error realization in a 
specific case and LA(r,s) is the Cholesky transformation matrix generated from the 




random number with mean zero and variance equal to one. Y(r,ty) is realized yield, 
  	
 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 yield error realization and LY(r,ty) is the Cholesky 
transformation from the yield variance-covariance matrix8. Area is stochastic and 
endogenous so the variance-covariance of the error terms are used to capture the 
stochastic element of the estimated area planted. Yield is stochastic and exogenous to our 
model, so the variance-covariance matrix of the historical yield data are used. Monte 
Carlo simulation is used to generate error realizations of area planted and yield following 
the distributions estimated from historical data. We use the realized area and realized 
yield to generate realized production in each iteration as in equation 7.12.  
 
 (, ) = (, )  (, ) 7.12 
 
 
7.4.3 Border Prices 
 Similar methodology is used to capture the stochastic element in world prices. 
Historical price data suggest that Kazakh and Pakistani prices are correlated. Price data 
for Kazakhstan and Pakistan are used to generate a variance-covariance matrix, and so 
the Cholesky transformation matrix. GAMS random number generator is used to generate 
random normal errors with mean zero and variance equal to one. The Cholesky 
transformation matrix for the Kazakh and Pakistani price is multiplied by the matrix of 
random normal realizations Np(0,1), and added to the mean of the prices to generate 
realized actual prices in each iteration. This relationship is captured in equation 7.13:  
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8 The CHOL add-in in Microsoft Excel is used to generate the Cholesky transformation 




Where Pw(w,ty) is the realized prices in Pakistan and Kazakhstan, Pwe(w,ty) the average 
(expected) prices over the period 2007- 2015,     		
	 	
   
case, LPw(w,wa) is the Cholesky transformation of the world price variance-covariance 
matrix for Kazakhstan and Pakistan and Np(0,1) is the matrix of normal random number 
with mean zero and variance equal to one for prices. The variance-covariance matrix of 
prices is presented in Table 7-4, where prices are measured in US$/MT. Kazakh prices 
are more variable than prices in Pakistan. The correlation coefficient between Pakistan 
and Kazakh prices is approximately 0.31.  
 
Table 7-4: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Wheat Prices for Kazakhstan and Pakistan. 
  Kazakhstan Pakistan 
Kazakhstan 2715 497 




 Carry-out private stocks are estimated based on the approximated L shaped stock 
function presented in equation 7.14 below.  St is carry-out stocks, PwRz is realized wheat 
price,    
   	 	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 
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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are exogenously assumed minimum price and minimum stocks, respectively. The stock 
function is very elastic at low prices as large quantities of stocks are accumulated, and it 
becomes inelastic at high prices when stocks are depleted. However, stocks are never 
zero, as small quantities of stocks are always maintained in practice. We take this into 
account by adding the last term in equation 7.14, which represents the minimum stock 
level.  
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 A similar L shaped function is used for the public stockholding policy. As 
normally the minimum support price of a public stockholding program is higher than the 
minimum market price, the minimum price used in the public stocks function is higher 
than the price used in the commercial stock function. The functions for the private and 
public stocks are described in more detail in Chapter 8 where public stockholding policy 
is investigated.  
 
 
7.4.5 Demand for Flour Consumption 
The price elasticity of demand estimated in Chapter 3 is used here to estimate 
parameters for the flour consumption function. For simplicity, we assume the demand for 
regional consumption is linear. The consumption function is presented in equation 7.15:  
  
 ),,(*),(),(),,( tyzrPfRzzrbczractyzrC    7.15 
 
Where C is consumption, ac is the intercept, and bc is the slope. Regional consumption 
functions are generated from the estimated per capita demand function using regional 
population data and per capita consumption data. The slope (bc) is based on the estimated 
demand elasticity and base data.  
 
 
7.4.6 Trade Flows  
 Based on the results from the price transmission analysis, markets are well 
integrated between commercial centers. Therefore, for the flows between commercial 
centers we assume spatial competitive equilibrium. Thus, the price difference between 
commercial centers are not allowed to exceed the transportation costs between them. 
Complementary slackness conditions for flows from surplus to deficit urban centers are 
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Pwrz(j, 1, ty) + cX(j, d)  Pwrz(d, 1, ty) = 0 
7.16 
These conditions ensure that competitive price linkages between commercial 
centers hold. If there is flow between two urban centers then the price difference must be 
equal to transportation and transaction costs between them. The price difference between 
two commercial centers must be less than the transportation costs if there is no flow 
between the two given urban centers. The commentary slackness conditions are used, as 
there are occasionally zero flows between certain commercial centers. Thus, the price 
difference does not necessarily need to be equal to transportation costs.             
 
For the import flows and flows between rural and urban areas we use an 
Armington specification. That is, we assume imperfect substitutes between domestic and 
imported wheat, and that some markets are not well integrated. An Armington model 
appears to better explain the market structure and trade flows in Afghanistan, based on 
our price transmission analysis. This is a model which was developed by Armington and 
has been used to analyze world grain trade when prices are not perfectly correlated across 
space (Armington, 1969). The results from our price transmission analysis also suggest 
the Armington model is a better choice than competitive spatial equilibrium to assess the 
impacts of trade policy options on wheat market outcomes in Afghanistan.  
The supply and use balance in an Armington model is the same as in the spatial 
equilibrium model. The complementary slackness conditions used in spatial equilibrium 
model, however, are replaced by demand for imported wheat and flour in each region 
using the Armington specification. Imported wheat is differentiated from domestic wheat 
by an assumed elasticity of substitution. The demand for the imported wheat is a function 
of the initial import flow, the world to domestic price ratio and the elasticity of 







Equation 7.17 presents the import flows of wheat from ports to commercial 
centers. Xwm is the endogenously determined wheat imports, Xwmo is the initial (base) 
quantity of wheat imports, Pw is border wheat prices, Tw is tariffs on wheat, CXm is the 
transportation costs from border points to commercial centers, Pwrz is wheat price in 
commercial centers, and    is the Armington elasticity.  Import flows increase as the 





Equation 7.18 represents the import flow of flour from ports to urban centers in a 
given year. Equation 7.18 is identical to equation 7.17, except the earlier is for wheat 
flows and the later one is for flour imports (Xfm).  
  
7.19 
Equation 7.19 shows wheat flows from rural to urban centers in surplus regions. 
where 1 is the index for urban areas and 2 is the index for rural zones. Xwr is 
endogenously determined wheat flows from rural to urban areas, Xwro is the initial wheat 
flow from rural to urban centers, Pwrz is endogenously determined wheat prices in urban 
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the urban rural zones Armington elasticity. This equation is only for the surplus regions, 











































Flour flows from commercial centers to rural areas are captured in equation 7.20. 
Based on our trader survey, flour flows from commercial centers to rural areas are 
observed in all regions, including the northern surplus regions. Thus, equation 7.20 
represents flour flows from commercial centers to rural areas in all regions.  
A higher Armington elasticity implies better integrated markets across space. 
Using the elasticity of price transmission results we estimated the Armington elasticity of 
price substitution for different trade flows. A detailed description on how these 






Table 8-1: Benchmark Data for Production, Area, and Yield 
Region Production(MT) Area(Hectare) Yield(MT/Ha) 
HER         643,487       404,486  1.59 
JAL         321,974       108,143  2.98 
KAB         424,695       162,312  2.62 
KAN         547,382       204,259  2.68 
KDZ         962,638       568,484  1.69 
KST         322,626       115,897  2.78 
MAZ      1,082,374       850,595  1.27 
Total      4,305,176    2,414,175  2.23 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) 
 
Population data and per capita consumption for wheat are obtained from the 
Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (CSO). Population data estimated by the 
government of Afghanistan are said to be under estimated and they are lower than the 
population estimates by the World Bank (2015) and the United Nations (2015). We 
obtained the national population data from the World Bank (2015) for the year 2013 and 
allocate this population estimate across regions and zones using the data and information 
from the Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan (2014). Population data across 
regions between rural and urban areas in million people are presented in Table 8-2.  
 
Table 8-2: Population Data across Rural and Urban Areas. 
Region Urban Rural 
HER 0.5148 2.5658 
JAL 0.2174 2.8036 
KAB 3.435 4.2174 
KAN 0.4097 4.6425 
KDZ 0.2436 4.0256 
KST 0.16 3.0873 
MAZ 0.4633 3.8951 
Source: Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan. Units are in Million people.   
 
Annual per capita consumption of flour is 150Kg, based on the household surveys 




price elasticities are used to benchmark regional demand function across rural and urban 
areas.  
Data for regional commercial stocks are not available for Afghanistan. However, 
national beginning stock data for Afghanistan are available in the (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2015) database.  We allocate the total national quantities of beginning stocks 
proportional to the production level of each region in the country. The beginning stocks 
quantities measured in metric tons are presented in Table 8-3. We assume equal stocks 
across rural and urban areas in deficit regions. In surplus regions, higher quantities of 
stocks are observed in rural areas than in urban areas, as wheat is produced in rural areas 
and mostly retained as stocks by farmers there. Beginning stocks in rural surplus regions 
are assumed to be almost twice as much as those in urban areas.  
 
Table 8-3: Beginning Stocks. 
Region Urban Rural 
HER 7000 13000 
JAL 5000 5000 
KAB 10000 10000 
KAN 7000 8000 
KDZ 7000 13000 
KST 5000 5000 
MAZ 7000 13000 
Source: USDA. Units are in MT 
 
Transportation costs data are from our trader survey presented in Chapter 5. 
Transportation costs of wheat and flour flows from Kazakh port at Saragash to the 
western and northern Afghan border is about $60 per metric ton.  The transportation costs 
for Pakistani wheat and flour flow to the Afghan border is $20 per metric ton. The 
average transportation costs between rural and urban areas ranges between $20 and $30 
per metric ton, depending on the region. Transportation costs for the inter-regional flows 
are presented in Table 8-4. The transportation costs of $100 are used for the routes on 




from northern regions to eastern Khost only in cases where Pakistan restricts its exports. 
Wheat and flour flows have never been observed on routes with a transportation costs of 
$200/MT.   
 
Table 8-4: Transportation Costs for Inter-regional Flows. 
Region JAL KAB KAN KST 
HER 200 100 40 200 
KDZ 60 40 80 100 
MAZ 60 40 80 100 
Source: Trader and Miller Survey (2014). Units are in $/MT 
 
The data for milling processing costs are both from our trader and miller surveys 
and from the observed difference between wheat and flour prices. The costs of milling 
are lower in Pakistan compared to Afghanistan and Kazakhstan as the government of 
Pakistan subsidizes its milling industry. The same milling costs are used for Afghanistan 
and Kazakhstan, as the wheat and flour price difference suggests milling costs are not 
different in these two countries. The milling processing costs in Afghanistan and 
Kazakhstan are $80 per metric ton, and it is $50 per metric ton in Pakistan.  
Import flows for wheat and flour are obtained from the Trade Statistics for 
International Business Development database of International Trade Center (2016). The 
database only shows the import flows from Pakistan and Kazakhstan to Afghanistan. We 
use the information from the trader survey to allocate the import flows through each entry 
point and to each commercial center in the country. Wheat and flour imports measured in 
metric tons are presented in Table 8-5. The quantity of flour imports are much larger than 
wheat flows from both Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Kazakh imports come to Afghanistan 
mostly through the northern HAIR port, and some through the western TGDI port. 
Pakistan wheat and flour flows to Afghanistan through three ports, with about equal 
quantity through each.  
In an Armington model, initial flows are important. An initial flow set to zero 
means there will not be a trade flow in any scenario. There are routes on which normally 




use small numbers for those routes to allow wheat and flour flows in extreme cases. For 
example, wheat flows from Pakistan to central Kabul are rarely observed, as most of 
imports are in the flour form. Only large price differences will force trade flows along 
those routes. 
 
Table 8-5: Base Wheat and Flour Imports. 
Port/Region HER JAL KAB KAN KDZ KST MAZ 
Flour Imports       
BOLD 
       
10,000  
               
-    
               
-    
       
230,000  
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
HAIR 
             
-    
               
-    
       
200,000  
               
-    
       
90,000  
               
-    
       
100,000  
TGDI 
       
80,000  
               
-    
               
-    
           
1,000  
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
TOUR 
             
-    
       
120,000  
       
140,000  
               
-    
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
KHST 
             
-    
               
-    
         
90,000  
               
-    
             
-    
       
180,000  
               
-    
 Wheat Imports           
BOLD 
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
         
15,000  
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
HAIR 
             
-    
               
-    
         
10,000  
               
-    
       
10,000  
               
-    
         
50,000  
TGDI 
       
10,000  
               
-    
               
-    
           
1,000  
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
TOUR 
             
-    
         
15,000  
              
100  
               
-    
             
-    
               
-    
               
-    
KHST 
             
-    
               
-    
              
100  
               
-    
             
-    
         
15,000  
               
-    
Source: Trader and Miller Survey (2014). Units are in MT 
 
We specify parameters for the supply, demand and stocks functions in our model. 
The parameters for the supply function used in our model are generated from the 
estimated supply elasticities in Chapter 2 and base supply data. Supply functions are 
different across regions based on their estimated elasticities. Similarly, parameters for the 
demand curve used in our model are obtained from the estimated price elasticity of 






Table 8-6: Alternative Scenarios 
Scenario  Explanation and Key Assumptions  
Static Base Assuming average prices and normal production. Error 
realization are assumed to be zero in the static base case. No 
export restrictions from Pakistan and Kazakhstan. There is 
only 10% ad valorem tariffs on wheat and flour imports.  
Export Restriction  Pakistani export restriction policy is in place. We assume the 
transportation costs for Pakistani imports increases from $20 to 
$150 per metric ton. Everything else is the same as in the static 
base case.  
Stochastic Base The same as static base, but Pakistani export restrictions kicks 
in when the Kazakh price exceeds the $370/MT threshold.  
Export Restriction 
plus low domestic 
production  
Domestic production is assumed to be low as in 2008 and 
Pakistani export restriction policy is in place. Kazakh and 
Pakistani prices are high as in 2008.  
High Production  Domestic production is assumed to be high as in 2009 and in 
2013. Error realization adjusted for this static case.  
Variable Levy Border prices after import tax are fixed at all border points. A 
variable levy is adjusted to capture the variability in the world 
prices and stabilize domestic prices.  
Modified Variable 
Levy 
In the modified variable levy assumption, prices are not fixed 
at the Pakistani border when the Pakistani export restriction 
policy is in place. The variable levy on imports from Pakistan 
is the same as the one on imports from Kazakhstan when the 
export restriction policy is in place. When export restriction 
does not occur, fixed prices are maintained at all ports.  
Public 
Stockholding 
Policy with a MSP 
of $200 (Stock1) 
Wheat procurement policy is implemented in rural surplus 
regions with a minimum support price (MSP) of $200 with a 
primary objective to support producer prices. Stocks are also 
accumulated in rural surplus areas.  
Public 
Stockholding 
Policy with a MSP 
of $250 (Stock2) 
Wheat procurement policy is implemented in rural surplus 
regions with a minimum support price (MSP) of $250 with a 
primary objective to support producer prices. Stocks are also 




Stocks are maintained and released in commercial centers to 
stabilize consumer prices. The primary objective of 
stockholding policy here is to prevent price spikes.  
Variable Levy plus 
stockholding policy 
Also referred to as variable levy plus stock1 in the text. This is 
the combination of variable levy plus stockholding policy with 




Also referred to as modified levy plus stock2 in the text. This 
is the combination of modified variable levy plus stockholding 






all domestic and international imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan in each region. On 
the demand side, we have consumption, carry out stocks, exports to other regions and 
wheat used for seed in a given region. Wheat exports on the supply side refers to inter-
regional flows from surplus to deficit regions. Beginning stocks and seed use are 
exogenous variables, and other variables are determined by the model. Modeling results 
represent that supply and use balance holds for all regions.  
 
Table 8-8: Regional Supply and Use Balance.  
 Region Supply  Use 
 Production Si Inflow Consumption  St outflow Seed 
HER*10   537,749  
  
20,000  
    
78,373       494,439  
  
43,181  49,302 
  
49,200  




198,090       463,450  
  
29,035   
  
18,900  




861,329    1,205,989  
  
28,264   
  
27,200  




389,442       804,853  
  
29,409   
  
38,900  
KDZ*   813,011  
  
20,000  
    
84,405       686,871  
  
41,702  114,343 
  
74,500  




256,372       500,308  
  
29,671   
  
23,000  




124,947       704,553  
  
42,605  194,388 
  
90,700  
Includes flour imports expressed in wheat equivalent. Inflow is the quantity of wheat and 
flour flows from surplus to deficit regions plus imports from the world market. Units are 
in MT.  
 
 In the base case, there are wheat and flour flows from all surplus regions to deficit 
regions, with Kunduz and Mazar supplying Kabul and Herat supplying Kandahar. The 
eastern Jalalabad and Khost regions are supplied by Pakistani wheat and flour and 
domestic production in their own regions. Wheat and flour from northern and western 
surplus regions does not flow to the eastern regions of Khost and Jalalabad. Thus, the 
                                                 




outflow from Herat is received in Kandahar, and the outflow quantities from Mazar and 
Kunduz go to Kabul.  
 The inflow column represents the combined import flows and flows from other 
regions for both wheat and flour measured in the wheat form for deficit regions. Since the 
surplus regions do not receive wheat or flour from other regions, the inflows represents 
only national imports for those regions. The imports to the northern Mazar and Kunduz 
are all from Kazakhstan, and imports to the western Herat are mostly from Kazakhstan 
but some from Pakistan. Wheat and flour inflows to regions from different sources are 
presented in Table 8-9.  
 






 Imports from 
Kazakhstan  
HER*  7,165  71,208 
JAL  198,090  - 
KAB 308,737 304,100  248,499 
KAN 49,302 338,555  1,586 
KDZ*  -  84,405 
KST  256,372  - 
MAZ*  -  124,947 
Total 358,038  1,104,282 530,644 
Includes flour imports expressed in wheat equivalent. Units are MT 
 
 The inflow to the four deficit regions are mostly from Pakistan. The imports to 
eastern Khost and Jalalabad regions are all from Pakistan. Kabul, the largest deficit 
region, is supplied by Kazakh, Pakistani and domestic wheat and flour. About 308 
thousand MT of the total deficit of 861 thousand MT is supplied by domestic wheat from 
Mazar and Kunduz. The remaining Kabul deficit is supplied roughly half by Pakistan, 
304 thousand MT, and nearly another half by Kazakhstan, 248 thousand MT. Kandahar is 
the second largest deficit region supplied mostly by Pakistan and partially by domestic 





exports were the highest in 2008, and the country exported large quantities of flour to 
Afghanistan through unofficial channels (Persaud, 2013; Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). 
Moreover, the imports of wheat and flour from Kazakhstan in 2008 was not high enough 
to meet all the wheat deficit in Afghanistan. The imports from Kazakhstan in 2008 were 
less than one million MT, implying wheat and flour imports from Pakistan continued to 
supply the eastern deficit regions in spite of the export restrictions from Pakistan.   
  
In order to capture that scenario in our static model, we use a high transportation 
costs for wheat and flour imports from Pakistan. Hence, in the static export restriction 
case everything is the same as in the base case, except the transportation costs for wheat 
and flour imports from Pakistan increases.  
To capture this scenario in the stochastic model, we use two different values for 
transportation costs for wheat and flour imports from Pakistan, conditional on Kazakh 
prices. Based on the realized Kazakh price data and the observed occurrence of export 
restriction policy, a threshold is defined. If Kazakh prices are below the threshold level, 
the actual transportation costs for Pakistani wheat and flour is used in the model. If 
Kazakh prices exceed the threshold level, the high value of transportation costs on 
Pakistani wheat and flour imports is used to capture the export restriction from Pakistan. 
Hence, the export restrictions in the stochastic model occurs only during the period of 
high world prices. However, world prices are the same as the base case in the static 
export restrictions scenario.  
It is difficult to predict how often Pakistan restricts its wheat exports to 
Afghanistan. The key point to note is how the market outcomes look in the cases when 
Pakistan restricts its wheat exports. Based on the current threshold set for Kazakh prices, 
in less than 2% of iterations Pakistan restricts its wheat exports to Afghanistan.  
 Wheat plus flour flows from the static modeling results in the base case versus the 
static export restriction case are presented in Table 8-11. Modeling results show the 
export restriction policy has a large impact on the wheat and flour imports in 
Afghanistan. The Pakistani export restriction policy leads to a large decrease in imports 




from Pakistan fall from 1.1 MMT in the base case to 0.62 MMT in the export ban case. 
Imports from Kazakhstan increases from 0.53 MMT in the base case to 0.81 MMT in the 
export ban case. Central Kabul is mostly supplied by Pakistani wheat and flour in the 
base case. In the export restrictions case, the share of Kazakh wheat and flour become 
larger than the share of Pakistani wheat and flour in the Kabul Market.  
 Also, more wheat and flour from the northern surplus regions flows to the eastern 
deficit region in the export restrictions case than in the base case. Total national imports 
of wheat and flour fall and this forces domestic wheat from rural surplus regions to flow 
to deficit regions where prices are high.  Wheat and flour flows from surplus to deficit 
regions increase from 358 thousand MT in the base case to 603 thousand metric tons in 
the export ban scenario. In the base case, wheat and flour flows from surplus regions are 
observed only to Kabul and Kandahar, and eastern Khost and Jalalabad are supplied by 
Pakistani flour. With the Pakistani export restriction policy in place, wheat and flour 
flows from surplus regions to all deficit regions, including those close to the Pakistani 
border are observed.  
 
Table 8-11: Wheat plus Flour Flows: Base case versus Export Restrictions case. 
 Region Inflow from Import from Import from 
Base Case 
HER*  7,165 71,208 
JAL  198,090 0 
KAB 308,737 304,100 248,499 
KAN 49,302 338,555 1,586 
KDZ*  0 84,405 
KST  256,372 0 
MAZ*  0 124,947 




HER*  4,424 155,682 
JAL 71,320 98,242 0 
KAB 368,907 120,739 344,136 
KAN 161,494 186,695 3,424 
KDZ*  0 120,803 
KST 1,597 207,745 0 
MAZ*  0 181,979 
 Total 603,318 617,846 806,024 





the realized production and border price data of 2008. We adjust the error realizations for 
area, yield and prices to represent a scenario similar to 2008.  
 An export restriction combined with low domestic production leads to high wheat 
prices in Afghanistan. Wheat prices from the base case versus the export restriction 
combined with low production scenario are presented in Table 8-13. Price increases in 
rural areas are greater than those observed in urban areas. Domestic production is low 
and it is costly to carry imported flour to rural areas. Modeling results suggest that wheat 
prices in rural areas of surplus regions increase more than 100% due to the export 
restrictions from Pakistan combined with low domestic production. Results are consistent 
with the observed price data in 2008, as the highest price spikes were observed in rural 
areas during 2007-08 food crisis. Highest prices are observed in the rural zone of the 
Khost region, as this region is primarily dependent on Pakistan for its wheat 
consumption.    
 
Table 8-13: Wheat Prices: Export Restrictions plus Low Domestic Production Case. 
  Base Case 
Export Ban plus 
Low Production % Change  
Region Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
HER 364 303 539 605 48.18 99.62 
JAL 411 464 589 619 43.34 33.42 
KAB 415 486 569 632 37.22 29.91 
KAN 404 464 579 629 43.41 35.55 
KDZ 375 311 545 633 45.36 103.23 
KST 402 461 597 655 48.38 42.16 
MAZ 375 300 529 586 41.19 95.64 
Units are in US$/MT 
 
 With a low domestic production and export restrictions from Pakistan, imports 
from Kazakhstan increase. Results are similar to the observed market outcomes in 2008. 
Imports from Kazakhstan increases from 530 thousand metric ton in the base case to 
about 1.17 MMT in this low production scenario. Trade flows for wheat and flour from 





regions, particularly in the northern Kunduz region. Although prices in commercial 
centers are close to each other, high variability in prices of rural areas are observed in the 
high production case. Prices in commercial centers ranges between $314/MT in northern 
Kunduz and $374 in eastern Jalalabad, as the price difference is equal to transportation 
costs in this case. Prices in rural areas vary from a low $172/MT in Kunduz to $424 in 
Central Kabul. Wheat prices in rural areas of the Kunduz region fall from $301/MT in the 
base case to $172/MT in the high production scenario. The second largest decline in 
prices are observed in rural areas of the Mazar region. Higher domestic production 
reduces prices in central Kabul, but does not have a large impact on prices in the eastern 
regions close to Pakistan.  
 
Table 8-15: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus High Production Case 
  Base Case High Production  % Change  
Region Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
HER* 341 291 327 266 -4.12 -8.65 
JAL 388 449 374 409 -3.50 -8.91 
KAB 396 470 354 424 -10.46 -9.86 
KAN 381 444 367 406 -3.69 -8.59 
KDZ* 356 301 314 172 -11.64 -42.76 
KST 377 440 367 414 -2.50 -5.95 
MAZ* 356 289 314 238 -11.64 -17.58 
Units are in US$/MT 
 
 Given the weak market integration, wheat surpluses are mostly retained as stocks 
in rural areas and do not fully replace wheat imports. In the high production case wheat 
output is about 700 thousand MT higher than in the base case. The decrease in imports is 
about 400 thousand MT in the high production scenario, compared to the base case. 
Wheat plus flour flows expressed in wheat equivalent are presented in Table 8-16. The 
major difference is observed in central Kabul, where wheat surpluses from the northern 
regions replace about 200 thousand MT of imports in this region in the high production 
scenario. The decrease in imports from Pakistan versus Kazakhstan is similar in quantity, 





and the 2009 bumper harvest. We examine the impacts of stabilization policies in these 
extreme cases, as the main objective of stabilization policies is trimming the tails of 
distribution and preventing occurrence of those extreme cases. Although the expected 
impacts of these policies on market outcomes will be discussed in detail in the stochastic 
model results presented in the following chapter, here we look at how these policies 
affect prices and trade flows under specific alternative cases. We will also look at the 
costs of these policies in these extreme cases.  
 
8.8.1 Variable Levy  
In the variable levy scenario, we set a fixed price at border points, after the tariffs, 
for both imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan. As prices in Kazakhstan and Pakistan 
change, the variable levy is adjusted in order to keep border prices fixed. Now domestic 
markets face a fixed border price for imports, as the variability in the world price is 
captured by the variable levy. We assume that the Afghan government continues 
subsidizing wheat and flour imports from Pakistan even when Pakistani export 
restrictions are in place.  
A variable levy may result in revenue or costs for the government depending on 
the world prices and the policy setting the domestic prices. If the world prices are lower 
than the domestic prices, a positive variable levy can generate revenue for the 
government. If world price is high, a variable levy leads to large import subsidy costs. 
We will discuss this in more detail with the stochastic model results presented in chapter 
9.  
A variable levy is expected to be mainly effective in the cases of high world 
prices and low domestic production, similar to 2008. While public stockholding can also 
be effective in trimming the upper tail of the price distribution, its key objective is 
trimming the lower tail of price distribution and preventing producer price falls as in 
2009. Therefore, in this part we assess the impacts of the variable levy on prices, 
assuming low domestic production and high world prices.  
A variable levy does stabilize prices both in rural and urban areas. Wheat prices 




case are presented in Table 8-17. Comparing the prices from the export ban plus low 
production case with the prices in the variable levy case shows the impacts of the variable 
levy on prices. The effects of variable levy on prices are more pronounced in urban areas 
than in rural zones. Also, consumers in eastern and southern deficit regions close to 
Pakistan are better off relative to the northern regions, as we assume here the variable 
levy fully compensates the increase in prices due to export restrictions from Pakistan. 
 
Table 8-17: The Effects of a Variable Levy on Wheat Prices. 
  Base Case 
Export Ban plus 
Low Production Variable Levy 
Region Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  
HER 364 303 539 605 411 488 
JAL 411 464 589 619 398 491 
KAB 415 486 569 632 433 521 
KAN 404 464 579 629 395 473 
KDZ 375 311 545 633 455 543 
KST 402 461 597 655 386 478 
MAZ 375 300 529 586 417 483 
Units are in US$/MT 
 
We assume the government continues to subsidize wheat and flour imports from 
Pakistan in spite of the Pakistani export restriction policy in place. However, the costs of 
the import subsidy surge in such scenarios. In this scenario, the level of import subsidy 
on wheat and flour imports from Pakistan is $147/MT, and it is $58/MT on imports from 
Kazakhstan. A high level of import subsidy combined with a large volume of wheat and 
flour imports leads to huge costs to the government. In this scenario the import level from 
Pakistan is 1.3 MMT and from Kazakhstan is almost 1 MMT. Given the import quantity 
and the high level of import subsidy, the costs of subsidy on imports from Pakistan is 
about US$193 million, and it is approximately US$58 million on imports from 






8.8.2 Modified Variable Levy  
Normally, it is not practical for a government with a large fiscal deficit to pay 
such huge costs for import subsidies. The Afghan government may not consider fully 
subsidizing wheat and flour imports from Pakistan in the export restriction cases. We 
assume the government cannot keep prices fixed at the mean at the Pakistani border 
during the periods when Pakistani export restriction policy is in place. Therefore, we now 
assume there will be an import subsidy on wheat and flour imports from Pakistan equal to 
the subsidy on imports from Kazakhstan. This will reduce the costs of the import subsidy 
on wheat and flour imports from Pakistan, and at the same time will reduce extreme price 
shocks but not as effectively as the variable levy case.  
Wheat prices from the export restriction case versus variable levy and modified 
variable levy cases are presented in Table 8-18. In the modified variable levy case prices 
are higher compared to the variable levy case, but lower than the prices in the export 
restrictions case with no government intervention. Wheat prices are approximately 
$100/MT higher in regions supplied by Pakistani flour in the modified variable, 
compared to the variable levy case.  In the modified variable levy case, the level of 
import subsidy is $58/MT and it is the same for both imports from Pakistan and 
Kazakhstan. Consumers are worse off in the modified levy case compared to the earlier 
variable levy case, especially consumers in the eastern and southern deficit regions. The 
impacts of this policy on the welfare of consumers and producers will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 9.  
 
Table 8-18: Wheat Prices: Variable Levy Case versus Modified Variable Levy Case. 
  Export Ban plus Variable Levy Modified Levy 
Region Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  
HER* 539 605 411 488 439 515 
JAL 589 619 398 491 491 559 
KAB 569 632 433 521 471 553 
KAN 579 629 395 473 479 548 
KDZ* 545 633 455 543 455 543 
KST 597 655 386 478 486 567 





with supporting producer prices. Thus, pursuing multiple purposes is identified as one of 
the key causes leading to failure of stockholding policies (Dorosh, 2009; Goyal, 2012).  
In our analysis, public stocks refers to buffer stocks with the objectives to 
stabilize wheat prices annually. A set of operating rules for the model are specified in 
order to capture the behavior of government policy institutions as they respond to varying 
market conditions. Policy response rules are needed for both stockholding and alternative 
trade strategies.  
We are interested in evaluating the effects of stockholding policies on the 
distribution of wheat prices and on producer and consumer welfare. The main purpose of 
stocks policy here is to stabilize inter-annual price and consumption variability. This 
policy is expected to stabilize the wheat market and mainly support producers by 
preventing price falls below a certain level. This policy can also help stabilize inter-
seasonal price variability by procuring wheat in the post-harvest period when prices are 
low and sell in the next pre-harvest or shortage period. Due to lack of data we develop an 
annual model and the focus here is to stabilize inter-annual prices only.  
In order to stabilize prices, the stocks policy must be responsive to price 
movements. A common type of public stock rule is to define a minimum support price 
and accumulate all surplus at that price. This policy does not allow prices to fall below 
the price floor. The government intervenes and procures all surplus to keep the price 
above the minimum support price. Public stocks are released during production shortfalls 
and high prices. Based on the above description we develop a downward sloping stocks 
function for public stock which gets very elastic at low prices and it is very steep and 
close to zero with high prices. Both public and private stocks functions are presented in 





Figure 8-1: Public and Commercial (private) Stocks Functions.  
 
Without government intervention there are only commercial (private) stocks, 
which are presented with the dashed line. The minimum support price (MSP) is assumed 
to be $100 per metric ton in the absence of government intervention. Public stocks are 
presented with the solid black line which prevents price falls below the minimum price 
(MSP) of $200 per metric ton. The stock model does not force a price floor or price 
ceiling. Stocks are modeled11 based on the approximated L shaped stock function 
presented in Figure 8-1. The minimum support price for public stocks is set based on the 
price distribution in the market. In practice it is decided by the government and normally 
it is announced during planting season of wheat to farmers. The Minimum support price 
                                                 
11 Stocks are modeled using a smooth continuums function that approximates the L-
shaped, kinked behavior derived from storage theory. Under this approximation prices 
asymptotically approach the MSP from above, getting closer as stocks become larger. 






























is typically estimated based on open market prices, including prices in the international 
wheat market.  
We assume public stocks are built only from domestically produced wheat. Thus, 
public stocks are held only in the surplus regions, Herat, Kunduz, and Mazar. The 
maximum public stock level is 0.5 MMT in each of the three surplus regions, Kunduz, 
Mazar and Herat. Maximum capacity is set based on the expected maximum quantity of 
surplus wheat in each region. 
The objective of the stock function presented in Figure 8-1 is mainly trimming the 
lower tail of price distribution and supporting producer price. Public stocks can also be 
used to prevent price spikes by setting a price ceiling and does not allow prices to exceed 
the price ceiling as longs as stocks are available. However, large quantities of stocks are 
required in extreme cases in order to stabilize consumer prices.  
Figure 8-2 represents the public stocks function with a price ceiling and price 
floor. Approximately 300 thousand MT of public stocks are the “normal” capacity 
assumed in each region. Public stocks are released in extreme cases of low domestic 
production and high world prices in order to keep the prices below or at the price ceiling. 
Thus, public stocks are zero at a price of $600/MT in principle. Similarly, more public 
stocks are accumulated in extreme cases of high domestic production in order to keep 
prices above or at price floor. This type of public stockholding policy which pursue two 
objectives, supporting producer price and stabilizing consumer prices, is very costly. 
Large quantities of public stocks are required to be maintained in order to prevent price 






Figure 8-2: Public Stocks with Price Ceiling and Price Floor 
 
 
8.9.1 Costs of Stockholding Policy 
 A major downside of stabilization policy through public stocks is the costs 
associated with carrying large quantities of stocks over time. Stockholding programs 
carry large direct costs to the agencies holding those stocks. The direct costs for public 
stocks include storage costs, transport costs, management costs, acquisition costs and the 
costs associated with distribution. These costs surge as the government increases its 
stocks and/ or broaden the objectives of stockholding policy. The costs of public 
stockholding increases if the government tries to help both producers and consumers.  
 Data and information regarding public stockholding are not available for 
Afghanistan. However, there are data available on the costs of public wheat storage in 
Pakistan. Pakistan procures wheat from farmers at a minimum support price during the 
harvest season, April and May, and the government stores wheat in its own or rented 
private storage. The government normally release the wheat to millers from early October 































 Public storage costs are calculated based on the costs estimates of public storage 
in Pakistan. Costs of public storage for wheat in Pakistan are presented in Table 8-19. 
The total costs to the government from carrying stocks are $44 per metric ton, assuming 
the release price is $16/MT higher than the MSP. If the release price is the same as the 
MSP, the government has to pay the whole costs of carrying public stocks, which is 
$60/MT. The costs of the stockholding policy for the government depends on how this 
policy is implemented. Setting a high release price reduces the costs of stockholding 
policy for the government. Instead the consumers have to pay a high price for wheat. The 
largest share of the public stockholding costs come from the interest on financing the 
wheat procurement program.  
 
Table 8-19: Costs of Public Wheat Storage in Pakistan in 2010/11 
  PKR/Ton US$/Ton 
Minimum Support Price 23750 279 
Storage Costs 825 10 
Bagging, transportation, labor, etc. 896 11 
Interest on commercial bank financing  3279 39 
Total Costs 5000 60 
Total Costs plus price 28750 338 
Release price to millers 25000 294 
Cost/Revenue  -3750 -44 
Source: (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). 
 
If Afghanistan decides to implement public stockholding policy for wheat, the 
costs of the policy might not be very different from the policy implemented in Pakistan. 
Thus, the costs estimates for public wheat storage in Pakistan can be used as a rough 
estimate for the costs of public stockholding policy in Afghanistan. Procurement and 
release prices may differ between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hence, the distribution of 
the costs for the stockholding policy across agents may be different depending on how 




8.9.2 Static Results from the Public Stockholding Policy 
In this part we assess the impact of public stockholding policy on trade flows of 
wheat and flour and on prices. However, it is difficult to see the impacts of stockholding 
on market outcomes in full picture from a static case. Stabilization policies, including 
trade and stockholding policies, are mainly effective in extreme cases where domestic 
production is extremely high or low. The effects of the stockholding policy can be better 
captured in a stochastic model, which is presented in the following chapter. From this 
static model we want to see how much public stocks are required to be accumulated in 
high production cases and how this policy then affects trade flows and prices. Also, we 
will investigate how much public stocks are required to be released to stabilize prices and 
ensure food security in periods of low production plus high world prices, similar to 2008.  
In the high production case, the largest wheat surpluses were observed in the 
northern Kunduz region. With a minimum support price of $200/MT, the total public 
stock accumulation is about 300 thousand MT, with 200 thousand MT in Kunduz and the 
remaining in Herat and Mazar. If the objective of the stockholding policy is mainly 
stabilizing producer prices, it can be achieved by carrying an average of 200 thousand 
MT of wheat annually. However, this quantity of stocks is about 5% of total wheat 
requirement and it is unlikely to be enough to trim the upper tail of the price distribution 
during the periods of low domestic production and high world prices. We will discuss the 
impacts of the stockholding on price distribution in more detail in stochastic model in 
chapter 9.  
Modeling results suggest public stockholding policy is potentially effective in 
preventing extreme price falls in rural surplus regions. Prices from the high production 
scenario while public stockholding policy is in place are compared with the base case and 
the high production case in Table 8-20. In the high production case prices reach as low as 
$172/MT in surplus regions. With the public stockholding policy with MSP of $200, 







Table 8-20: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus High Production and Public Stocks Case. 
  Base Case High Production  
High Production & 
Public Stock 
Region Urban Rural  Urban Rural  Urban Rural  
HER 364 303 327 266 331 295 
JAL 411 464 374 409 374 409 
KAB 415 486 354 424 377 443 
KAN 404 464 367 406 371 410 
KDZ 375 311 314 172 337 220 
KST 402 461 367 414 367 414 
MAZ 375 300 314 238 337 266 
 
 
8.9.3 Stockholding Policy in Urban Areas 
Stockholding policy may also be used to trim the upper tail of price distributions 
and stabilize consumer welfare. However, carrying large quantities of public stocks 
possibly for a long period of time is required to stabilize prices for consumers. Also, a 
stockholding policy with an objective of stabilizing consumer prices is required to 
maintain large quantities of stocks, mainly in commercial centers of deficit regions 
instead of surplus regions.  
In this section, we assess how much public stocks are required to stabilize prices 
in the periods of high world prices and low domestic production, similar to 2008. We 
implement the public stockholding policy in the low domestic production plus export 
restriction case. Here, we assume a price ceiling similar to Figure 8-2 and release stocks 
to maintain price below a price ceiling.  
In the earlier section we assessed the impacts of the variable levy on price in that 
extreme scenario of low production plus export restriction. Here, we assume instead of a 
variable levy, prices are stabilized by releasing public stocks in commercial centers of 
each regions. We assume the objective of the public stockholding policy is stabilizing 
consumer prices and thus stocks are held in commercial centers in this scenario. We 




In each commercial center the levels of stocks release are determined and adjusted 
exogenously until the prices are stabilized at a level similar to the price levels from the 
variable levy scenario. The key point is to determine the level of public stocks release 
that can achieve the same stabilization objective achieved with a variable levy in the 
static low production plus export restrictions scenario.  
Modeling results show that the same price stabilization level achieved with a 
variable levy can be reached by releasing large quantities of public stocks in commercial 
centers. Wheat prices from both variable levy and public stocks cases along with the 
stocks quantity are presented in Table 8-21. Prices are very similar across the variable 
levy and public stocks scenarios in both rural and urban areas. 
 
Table 8-21: The Effects of Variable Levy versus Public Stocks on Prices. 
  
Export Restrictions 




Region Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* 539 605 411 488 407 485 140 
JAL 589 619 398 491 398 491 215 
KAB 569 632 433 521 442 529 650 
KAN 579 629 395 473 398 477 380 
KDZ* 545 633 455 543 453 542 180 
KST 597 655 386 478 389 481 275 
MAZ* 529 586 417 483 415 481 190 
TOTAL       2,030 
Prices are measured in US$/MT 
 
Either of these two policy options can be used to prevent price shocks like the 
ones in 2008 food crisis. However, public stockholding policy appears to be more costly 
than a variable levy. In order to stabilize prices in the periods of low domestic production 
plus export restrictions from Pakistan, carrying (having on hand) more than 2 MMT of 
annual public stocks in commercial centers are required. About half of these stocks are 
required to be accumulated in central Kabul and southern Kandahar. Assuming similar 






proposed removing the 10% tariffs on wheat imports to reduce flour imports and increase 
wheat imports. This policy may not have a large impact on the Afghan wheat producers, 
as imported wheat is required to be blended with the low quality domestic wheat in the 
milling process. Based on our trader survey, flour produced only from local wheat is not 
preferred by most consumers, especially in urban areas. Our model specifications assume 
imported wheat flour is an imperfect substitute to domestic wheat and flour when we 
assess the impacts of differential tariffs across actors in the market.  
In this section, we assess the effects of removing the tariffs on wheat, while 
leaving the flour tariffs fixed at 10%. We expect this policy will lead to a reduction in 
flour imports and an increase in wheat imports. However, the effects are unlikely to be 
large, as in a framework of imperfect market integration trade policy is not as effective as 
in a competitive spatial equilibrium. The Armington framework captures the elasticity of 
substitution across flour types.  
The effects of removing wheat imports tariffs on total wheat milled, imports of 
wheat versus flour, and on domestic production are presented in Table 8-23. As expected, 
the policy increases wheat imports and reduces flour imports, which subsequently leads 
to an increase in wheat milled domestically. Total wheat milled goes up by approximately 
1.27%. Wheat imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan increase by 48% and 38%, 
respectively. Modeling results suggest this reduces wheat production by approximately 
1%. The impacts of this policy are not economically significant, since the initial wheat 
imports are much lower than flour imports. 
 
Table 8-23: Effects of Differentials Tariffs on Wheat versus Flour.  
Variables  Base 
No Tariffs 
on Wheat Difference 
% 
change 
Total wheat milled 3,337,513 3,379,752 42,239 1.27 
flour import Pakistan 954,486 931,262 (23,224) -2.43 
wheat import Pakistan 43,742 64,834 21,092 48.22 
flour import Kazakhstan 416,170 405,657 (10,513) -2.53 
wheat import Kazakhstan 68,234 94,315 26,081 38.22 
Domestic Production  4,365,669 4,321,198 (44,471) -1.02 




Removing the 10% ad valorem tariffs on wheat imports leads to a decrease in 
wheat prices in both rural and urban areas. Wheat prices from the base case versus the 
zero tariff scenario are presented in Table 8-24. As expected, a higher difference in prices 
between the two cases are observed in urban areas than in rural zones. The effects of this 
policy on the border are more pronounced in urban commercial centers than in rural 
areas. Removing the 10% tariffs on wheat imports leads to a decreases of about 6% in 
prices in commercial centers, and approximately 4% in rural areas, on average.  
 
Table 8-24: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus Zero Tariffs on Wheat Imports. 
  Base Case 
Zero Tariffs on 
Wheat Imports % Change 
Region Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
HER 364 303 339 290 -6.89 -4.36 
JAL 411 464 385 446 -6.45 -3.82 
KAB 415 486 393 468 -5.27 -3.79 
KAN 404 464 379 442 -6.21 -4.71 
KDZ 375 311 353 299 -5.83 -3.95 
KST 402 461 375 438 -6.87 -5.00 
MAZ 375 300 353 288 -5.83 -3.92 
 
A differential tariff on wheat versus flour is expected to affect the welfare of 
producers and consumers, as well. On average, this policy reduces producer welfare by 
5%, from $115 million in the base case to $109 million in the zero wheat tariff scenario. 
Since there are price decreases, modeling results show an increase of $6 million in 
consumer surplus as a result of removing wheat tariffs. Consumer welfare increases from 
$283 million in base case to $289 million in the zero tariff scenario. So, the gains to 
consumers are roughly equal to producer losses. The revenue of millers increases by $3.8 






 case. Prices have been stable in Pakistan historically and the transportation costs for 
wheat and flour flows from Pakistan to Afghanistan are low, assuming no export 
restrictions from Pakistan. Thus, stable prices in Pakistan combined with low 
transportation costs between Pakistan and Afghanistan lead to fairly stable prices in 
southern and eastern regions in Afghanistan.  
 
 
Figure 9-1: Price Distribution: Base Case versus Base & no Export Restrictions Case. 13 
 
Higher variability in prices is observed in regions mainly supplied by Pakistani 
wheat and flour when the export restriction policy is captured in the model, however. The 
                                                 
13 Regions with the star signs (*) indicates surplus areas. The bottom and top of the box 
are the first and third quartiles, and the band inside the box is the median. The ends of the 
whiskers represent the lowest datum still within the 1.5 interquartile range of the lower 
quartile and the highest datum still within the 1.5 interquartile range of the upper quartile. 
Interquartile range is the difference between upper and lower quartiles. The dots outside 





















box plots with light color exhibit prices distributions assuming export restrictions from 
Pakistan during periods of high world prices. The export restriction policy by Pakistan 
does not affect the price distribution in northern Mazar and Kunduz as Pakistani flour 
does not flow to northern regions of Afghanistan. The effects of the Pakistan export 
restriction policy are more pronounced in deficit urban centers, and to some extent the 
price shocks are transmitted to rural areas of deficit regions as well. The modeling results 
from this scenario that assume export restrictions from Pakistan appears to better fit the 
observed price distribution. Price spikes are observed in deficit regions close to Pakistan 
in historical price data. Therefore, the model that assumes export restrictions from 
Pakistan is used as the base for our subsequent analysis.  
The distributions of observed prices for wheat are shown in Figure 9-2. These are 
monthly price data obtained from FAO and WFP. Thus, we may observe higher 
variability in the distributions of observed prices than the ones from the modeling results, 
as modeling results are annual prices. The price data for urban centers are for a longer 
period of time, 2000-2015, and thus have lower means. The price data for rural areas are 
for a short period of time, as they are not available for a longer period. Also, price data 
for the urban center of Kunduz region are not available. The observed rural prices are 
only for a specific market in rural areas and might not represent the average rural prices 
in a given region.  The key point to notice is that the highest price spike is observed in a 
rural market of the Kunduz region. Price data from the modeling results are consistent 
with the observed prices, as modeling results also suggests high price shocks in rural 
surplus regions. Also, some variability in urban deficit regions close to Pakistan is 






Figure 9-2: Observed Price Distribution for Wheat.  
 
Prices are more volatile in the northern Kunduz region than in other regions. A 
shortfall in domestic production combined with high prices in Kazakhstan lead to price 
spikes in northern Kunduz and Mazar regions. The transportation costs are too high for 
Pakistani flour to flow all the way to the northern regions. Domestic production is more 
volatile in surplus northern and western regions than in southern and eastern deficit 
regions, as there is large rainfed wheat production in surplus regions depending directly 
on the amount of rainfall. Therefore, volatility in domestic production creates variability 
in wheat prices. Moreover, northern and western regions are mostly supplied by imported 
wheat and flour from Kazakhstan. Kazakh wheat prices are more variable than Pakistani 
price, as seen in Figure 9-3. Therefore, some of the variability in prices is imported from 
Kazak prices.  
Pakistani government historically has been implementing stabilization policies 































































accumulated only from domestic wheat. The analysis on public stocks are done under two 
scenarios of domestic production and two different levels of the minimum support price: 
normal production with a MSP of $200/MT (Stock1) versus high domestic production 
with a MSP of $250/MT (Stock2). 
 
9.2.1 Public Stockholding Policy with a MSP of $200 (Stock1) 
The public stockholding policy is effective in stabilizing prices, mainly in rural 
surplus areas where the stocks are held. The lower tail and somewhat the upper tail of the 
price distribution are trimmed when public stocks are introduced as seen in Figure 9-4. 
Dark color boxplots shows the price distribution from the base case, and the price 
distribution from the public stock scenario is presented with the light color boxplots. 
Changes in means and standard deviations of prices as a result of public stocks are 
presented in Figure 9-4.  
Public stocks reduce the variability in prices in all regions where stocks are held, 
and in central Kabul as well. However, the larger effects are observed in rural surplus 
areas. The decrease in the standard deviation of the prices ranges between 11 and 14 
percent in rural surplus areas, while it is between 6 and 7 percent in urban surplus 
regions. The effects of public stocks are observed in Kabul due to the fact that Kabul is 
the closest deficit commercial center to the northern surplus regions and it is often 
supplied by surplus wheat from the northern regions. Eastern deficit regions are mostly 
supplied by Pakistani flour and surplus wheat from the northern regions does not often 
move to the deficit regions close to Pakistan. Thus, a public stockholding policy 
implemented in the northern surplus region is unlikely to have a significant impact on the 






Figure 9-4: Price Distribution: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case 
 
 Public stock policy does not change the mean of the prices significantly, on 
national average. However, a considerable increase in the mean of the prices in rural 
surplus areas is observed, with the largest a 6 percent increase in Herat. This is due to the 
fact that the public stocks are more effective in trimming the lower tail of the price 
distribution than the upper tail. Therefore, a public stock policy based on domestically 









































































Table 9-1: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case  
Region   Base  Public Stocks  % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 292 338 310 343 6.16 1.47 
 Std. Dev. 77 37 66 34 -13.92 -5.89 
JAL Mean 437 377 439 379 0.32 0.50 
 Std. Dev. 48 33 49 33 0.94 0.00 
KAB Mean 459 385 464 391 0.99 1.36 
 Std. Dev. 40 36 38 33 -4.69 -7.40 
KAN Mean 434 371 438 375 0.84 1.10 
 Std. Dev. 45 33 45 32 -1.30 -3.93 
KDZ* Mean 311 353 324 357 4.17 1.30 
 Std. Dev. 96 45 85 42 -12.05 -6.60 
KST Mean 434 374 434 374 0.03 0.05 
 Std. Dev. 44 35 45 35 0.27 0.42 
MAZ* Mean 297 348 307 353 3.23 1.41 
 Std. Dev. 78 39 69 36 -11.00 -7.45 
Total14 Mean 381 364 388 368 1.89 1.02 
  Std. Dev. 96 41 88 39 -8.23 -4.64 
Units are in US$/MT 
 
Although public stockholding is effective in stabilizing prices in rural surplus 
areas, price shocks are observed in some rural areas of northern Kunduz and Mazar even 
after implementing the stockholding policy. These are the cases when there are 
production shortfalls for two years in sequence, and there are not enough stocks in the 
second year to prevent price shocks. Stocks cannot completely eliminate the upper tail of 
the price distribution. A stockholding policy with a primary objective to support producer 
prices are not large enough to prevent price shocks in the extreme cases of low domestic 
production and high world prices.  
Modeling results suggest public stocks are not as effective in stabilizing prices in 
deficit regions as in surplus regions. Markets are not well integrated between rural and 
                                                 
14 The mean and standard deviation in this row (Total) are from the overall data, 
including all regions. The standard deviations in this row are typically higher than those 




urban areas and this limits wheat flows from rural surplus regions where wheat is stored 
to deficit regions. Moreover, on average public stocks are not carried over time in large 
quantities as normally large surpluses are not available. Although public stock 
accumulation reaches as high as 0.5 MMT in Mazar and Kunduz, the average public 
stocks is approximately 62,000 metric tons in each region, as seen in Table 9-2. The 
distributions of the public stocks suggest stock accumulations are normally less than 100 
thousand MT in each of the surplus region, as seen in Figure 9-5. Public stocks 
accumulation exceeds 150 thousand MT in each region only in 8% of repetitions.   
 
Table 9-2: Public Stocks Accumulation 
Region Mean Std. Dev. 
HER 57,615 46,522 
KDZ 61,873 63,266 
MAZ 67,169 67,402 
Total 62,212 59,854 
Units are in MT 
 
 




























 Although the main objective of stabilization policies is not changing the mean of 
the market outcomes, the distributional impacts of such policies often lead to changes in 
the means of producer and consumer surplus. Trimming the lower tail of the price 
distribution with public stocks is likely to improve producer welfare in our model. 
Modeling results show that producer welfare increases on average for all regions. A 
larger increase in producer welfare is observed in surplus regions where stocks are held. 
As public stockholding policy is more effective in trimming the lower tail of price 
distribution than the upper tail, this leads to an increase in the mean of prices, especially 
in surplus regions. The increase in mean of prices subsequently increases the mean of 
producer welfare.  
 
Table 9-3: Producer Surplus: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case   
Region Base  Public Stocks  % Change  
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
HER* 89.20 9.74 96.77 8.75 8.49 -10.17 
JAL 75.59 7.99 75.95 7.91 0.48 -1.05 
KAB 101.51 12.55 102.88 12.22 1.35 -2.70 
KAN 117.08 12.32 118.23 12.12 0.98 -1.65 
KDZ* 137.88 16.33 146.03 14.24 5.91 -12.83 
KST 72.02 8.52 72.05 8.53 0.04 0.11 
MAZ* 144.91 15.49 152.66 16.81 5.35 8.47 
Average 105.46 29.47 109.22 31.62 3.23 -2.83 
 
 Public stockholding reduces the variability of producer surplus in most cases. 
With the exception of Khost and Mazar, the standard deviation of producer welfare 
decreases when the public stockholding policy is active, compared to the base case for all 
regions, as shown in Table 9-3. Variability in producer welfare increases in Mazar where 
public stocks are held. The increase in variability of producer welfare in Mazar is mainly 
in the upper tail of the welfare distribution. Domestic production in Mazar is more 
volatile than in other regions. A large production combined with stable prices leads to 




during years of large production and this does not allow producer welfare to surge. 
Welfare distributions for producer surplus in the base case versus public stock scenario is 
presented in Figure 9-6.  
 
 
Figure 9-6: Producer Surplus: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case  
 
Modeling results show that public stockholding policy as implemented in this 
case is in favor of producers in Afghanistan. Procurement of wheat surplus from farmers 
with a minimum price not only stabilizes, but also increases producer welfare on average.   
As public stockholding policy stabilizes prices, it reduces the variability in 
consumer welfare. However, its distributional effects lead to a small decrease in the mean 
of consumer welfare, as well. The mean and standard deviation of consumer surplus from 
the base case versus the public stock scenario are presented in Table 9-4.  
The distributional effects of a stockholding policy are expected to be larger in the 
























centers. As seen in Table 9-4, the changes in consumer surplus in urban centers are very 
small, approximately 0.5%, on average, in most cases. However, the decrease in 
consumers’ welfare in rural surplus areas is higher, ranging between 1.68% in Kunduz 
and 2.31% in Herat.  
 
Table 9-4: Consumer Surplus: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case 
Region   Base  Public Stocks  % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 303.87 57.40 296.85 57.03 -2.31 -0.65 
 Std. Dev. 28.88 2.70 24.50 2.53 -15.18 -6.26 
JAL Mean 352.41 29.20 351.86 29.14 -0.16 -0.21 
 Std. Dev. 19.10 1.05 19.27 1.05 0.88 -0.05 
KAB Mean 584.64 512.94 581.87 510.24 -0.47 -0.53 
 Std. Dev. 23.91 18.34 22.73 16.93 -4.92 -7.68 
KAN Mean 706.19 66.15 703.70 65.90 -0.35 -0.38 
 Std. Dev. 30.84 2.06 30.39 1.97 -1.46 -4.11 
KDZ* Mean 480.79 27.52 472.71 27.35 -1.68 -0.60 
 Std. Dev. 56.18 1.56 48.73 1.45 -13.26 -6.93 
KST Mean 389.47 21.57 389.41 21.57 -0.02 -0.02 
 Std. Dev. 19.44 0.83 19.49 0.83 0.26 0.40 
MAZ* Mean 472.60 52.65 466.83 52.32 -1.22 -0.63 
 Std. Dev. 44.48 2.60 39.18 2.40 -11.92 -7.79 
Total Mean 470.00 109.63 466.18 109.08 -0.81 -0.51 
  Std. Dev. 31.83 4.16 29.19 3.88 -8.32 -6.76 
 
Consumer surplus is more stable in the public stockholding case compared to the 
base case, as seen in Figure 9-7. As public stocks stabilize prices, this policy regime trims 
the upper tails and somewhat the lower tails of the consumer welfare distribution. The 
effects are more visible in surplus regions where stocks are held. Modeling results show 
that public stock policy lead to a reduction of 15%, 13% and 12% in the standard 





Figure 9-7: Consumer Surplus: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case 
  
 There are some distributional effects associated with the public stockholding 
policy across producers and consumers. The increase in producer surplus from the 
stockholding policy roughly equals the welfare loss in consumer surplus. However, there 
are other agents in the market, in addition to producers and consumers that can be 
affected by stockholding policy. Public stocks policy is likely to reduce welfare of traders 
who hold commercial stocks and the government, which pays the costs of carrying public 
stocks over time.  
 Public stocks often works as a substitute for commercial stocks. When 
government intervenes in the market through stockholding, it limits the accumulation of 
commercial stocks by traders or farmers. However, in Afghanistan commercial stocks for 
wheat are not significant. Surplus wheat is accumulated in rural areas by farmers in most 
cases. The quantity of commercial stocks are affected by public stocks as presented in 






















Figure 9-8: Commercial Stocks: Base Case versus Public Stocks Case.  
 
 Commercial stocks are much larger in the base case compared to the scenario 
when public stock policy is active. Extreme cases are observed only in surplus regions. 
As expected, the difference in commercial stocks between the two cases are observed 
only in surplus areas where public stock policy is implemented.  
Assuming the same per metric ton costs as in Pakistan for carrying public stocks 
in Afghanistan, the annual average storage costs are about US$8 million. The total costs 
of the stockholding policy can reach as high as US$34 million in the periods of high 
domestic production and accumulation of a high level of public stocks. The level of 
public stocks and the costs associated with the public stockholding policy are presented 
in Table 9-5.   On average, approximately 186 thousand MT of public stocks are carried 


























Table 9-5: The Costs of the Public Stockholding Policy. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Stocks (000 MT) 2000 186.27 111.00 44.55 780.23 
Costs (Million US$) 2000 8.20 4.88 1.96 34.33 
 
Nationally, the effects of public stocks are small on most variables on average, 
but they are more pronounced on wheat and flour imports. Table 9-6 shows the effects of 
public stocks on key variables at the national level. With the public stock intervention, 
imports for wheat and flour increase as domestic production is accumulated in 
government stocks. There is an increase of 3% and 5% in flour imports from Pakistan and 
Kazakhstan, respectively. Similarly, wheat imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan 
increase, as well. There is also a 2.27% decrease in quantity of wheat milled domestically 
as wheat accumulated in public stocks is mostly replaced by imported flour. Domestic 
production increases slightly as a result of an increase in the mean of the prices.  
 
Table 9-6: Public Stocks Effects on Key Variables   
Variable  Base Public Stocks % Change 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Consumption 4,381,641 87,843 
       
4,364,090  78,552 -0.40 -10.58 
Production  4,295,443 355,703 
       
4,323,076  376,646 0.64 5.89 
Flour Imports_p 901,706 195,946 
          
930,126  194,774 3.15 -0.60 
Wheat imports_p 40,433 7,272 
            
41,434  7,162 2.48 -1.52 
Flour Imports_k 443,829 185,838 
          
466,706  189,297 5.15 1.86 
wheat imports_k 77,405 43,351 
            
81,917  43,468 5.83 0.27 
Wheat milled 3,373,452 266,200 
       
3,296,954  232,694 -2.27 -12.59 






9.2.2 Public Stockholding Policy with a MSP of $250 (Stock2) 
The role of public stockholding policy on price stabilization become more visible 
as the policy becomes more aggressive and high stocks are accumulated. In this section 
we increase the minimum support price from $200/MT to $250/MT.  Everything else is 
the same as in the stock1 case.  
Modeling results show that public stockholding becomes more effective with a 
high minimum support price. Large stocks not only trim the lower tail of price 
distribution, but also the upper tail. Price distribution from the base case versus the public 
stock2 case are presented in Figure 9-9.   
 
 
Figure 9-9: Price Distribution: Base Case versus Stock2 Case 
 
Modeling results also show that public stockholding policy can stabilize prices in 
urban centers of the surplus regions as well. The impacts of the public stocks on price 
stabilization is more pronounced in Kunduz region, where domestic production is high, 


































































prices stabilization increases with an increase in minimum support price and stock 
accumulation. 
Large public stocks lead to a larger decrease in price variability, especially in 
surplus regions where stocks are held. Changes in the standard deviation of prices due to 
this stockholding policy are presented in Table 9-7. Stock1 represents the effects of 
public stocks with a minimum support price of $200. Stock2 represents the effects of 
public stockholding policy with a minimum support price of $250. Modeling results show 
that the effects of stockholding policy on price stabilization in stock2 case is twice as 
much as in the stock1 scenario in rural areas of surplus regions.   
 
Table 9-7: Changes in Price Variability: Stock1 Case versus Stock2 Case  
Region   % Change Stock1 % Change Stock2 
    Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 6.16 1.47 11.51 2.49 
 Std. Dev. -13.92 -5.89 -28.53 -10.04 
JAL Mean 0.32 0.50 0.49 0.77 
 Std. Dev. 0.94 0.00 1.94 1.19 
KAB Mean 0.99 1.36 1.83 2.52 
 Std. Dev. -4.69 -7.40 -6.47 -10.56 
KAN Mean 0.84 1.10 1.36 1.78 
 Std. Dev. -1.30 -3.93 -1.25 -4.49 
KDZ* Mean 4.17 1.30 8.51 2.38 
 Std. Dev. -12.05 -6.60 -24.27 -10.64 
KST Mean 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 
 Std. Dev. 0.27 0.42 0.36 0.50 
MAZ* Mean 3.23 1.41 7.25 2.61 
  Std. Dev. -11.00 -7.45 -25.29 -11.20 
 
Assuming a high minimum support price increases stocks accumulation and the 
costs associated with the stockholding policy. With a minimum support price of 
$250/MT, public stocks accumulation is twice as much as in the normal production case. 
In stock1 case the stock accumulation is about 186 thousand MT, and it is approximately 
337 thousand MT in stock2 case. Subsequently, the costs of the stockholding policy in 





regions prices are mainly determined by the world price, but in surplus regions prices are 
partially determined by domestic production.  
The variable levy is more effective in trimming the upper tail of price distribution 
than the lower tail. The variability in the lower tail is mainly due to high domestic 
production. In addition to stabilizing prices, a variable levy may lead to a change in the 
mean of the prices in Afghanistan. Thus, the variable levy is expected to result in 
distributional impacts across producers and consumers. The policy is designed to have 
minimal distributional effects across producers and consumers, however.   
 
 
Figure 9-10: Price Distribution: Base Case versus Variable Levy Case. 
 
The mean and standard deviation of prices are presented in Table 9-9. A variable 
levy leads to a large decrease in standard deviation of prices in urban centers. The largest 
decrease is observed in eastern deficit regions close to Pakistan. The standard deviation in 


































































Kabul. Thus, a variable levy appears to be very effective in stabilizing prices in urban 
centers.  
Modeling results suggest the distributional impacts of a variable levy are not 
large, as the variable is designed to have minimal distributional effects. On average, the 
change in mean of prices as a result of variable levy is less than 0.5 percent. A variable 
levy leads to a slight decrease in the mean of prices in most cases. Thus, this policy might 
result in small decrease in producer surplus.    
 
Table 9-9: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus Variable Levy Case 
Region   Base  Variable Levy  % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 292 338 289 334 -0.84 -1.19 
 Std. Dev. 77 37 73 22 -4.76 -39.60 
JAL Mean 437 377 438 378 0.20 0.01 
 Std. Dev. 48 33 45 17 -5.40 -48.81 
KAB Mean 459 385 459 385 0.06 -0.04 
 Std. Dev. 40 36 30 21 -24.25 -43.03 
KAN Mean 434 371 433 370 -0.18 -0.35 
 Std. Dev. 45 33 38 17 -16.95 -48.55 
KDZ* Mean 311 353 310 352 -0.10 -0.20 
 Std. Dev. 96 45 93 31 -3.89 -32.07 
KST Mean 434 374 430 369 -0.96 -1.41 
 Std. Dev. 44 35 35 12 -22.21 -65.59 
MAZ* Mean 297 348 297 348 0.10 -0.07 
 Std. Dev. 78 39 76 24 -2.12 -37.60 
Total Mean 381 364 380 362 -0.24 -0.46 
  Std. Dev. 96 41 93 27 -3.00 -32.97 
 
Modeling results suggest that variable levy stabilizes consumer surplus. 
Consumer surplus from the simulation modeling is present in Table 9-10. The effects of 
variable levy are more pronounced in urban areas, as it has higher impacts on prices in 
urban centers than in rural areas.  On average, a variable levy leads to a decrease of 42% 
and 9% on in the standard deviation of consumer surplus in urban and rural areas, 




stabilized more in eastern and southern urban centers which are mostly supplied by 
imported wheat and flour.  
The change in the mean of consumer surplus as a result of the variable levy is 
insignificant. This implies the distributional impacts of variable levy are not large 
between consumer and producer welfare. On average, the change in the mean of 
consumer surplus as a result of variable levy is less than 0.07%. Thus, distributional 
impacts of variable levy are less than from public stocks, based on modeling results. On 
average, a variable levy has better impacts than public stocks on stabilizing prices. 
However, a variable levy is more effective in urban areas than in rural zones, and the 
public stock is more effective in rural zones than in urban centers. 
 
Table 9-10: Consumer Surplus: Base Case versus Variable Levy Case. 
Region   Base  Variable Levy % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 303.87 57.40 304.74 57.68 0.29 0.49 
 Std. Dev. 28.88 2.70 27.61 1.64 -4.42 -39.21 
JAL Mean 352.41 29.20 352.04 29.20 -0.10 -0.02 
 Std. Dev. 19.10 1.05 18.11 0.55 -5.17 -47.34 
KAB Mean 584.64 512.94 584.38 512.91 -0.04 -0.01 
 Std. Dev. 23.91 18.34 18.17 10.52 -24.02 -42.64 
KAN Mean 706.19 66.15 706.63 66.22 0.06 0.10 
 Std. Dev. 30.84 2.06 25.69 1.07 -16.69 -48.24 
KDZ* Mean 480.79 27.52 480.85 27.53 0.01 0.05 
 Std. Dev. 56.18 1.56 54.31 1.06 -3.34 -31.75 
KST Mean 389.47 21.57 391.20 21.69 0.44 0.56 
 Std. Dev. 19.44 0.83 15.22 0.30 -21.71 -64.31 
MAZ* Mean 472.60 52.65 472.38 52.65 -0.05 0.00 
 Std. Dev. 44.48 2.60 43.59 1.63 -2.00 -37.42 
Total Mean 470.00 109.63 470.32 109.70 0.07 0.06 
  Std. Dev. 31.83 4.16 28.96 2.40 -9.04 -42.45 
 
 Modeling results suggest a variable levy also stabilizes producer welfare, but it 
does not have a major impact on the mean of the producer surplus. Producer surplus from 




leads to a decrease of 26% in the standard deviation of producer welfare, on average. A 
variable levy does not have a large effect on the mean of producer welfare. This policy 
reduces the producer surplus by 0.32%, on average. The stabilization impacts of the 
variable levy are similar across regions on producer surplus.  
As variable levy is more effective in trimming the upper tail of price distribution 
than the lower tail, it is expected to reduce the variability of consumer welfare from the 
lower tail and producer welfare from the upper tail. The welfare distributions of 
consumers and producers from the base case versus the variable levy case are presented 
in Figure 9-11 and in Figure 9-12, respectively. Mostly the lower tail of the consumer 
welfare distribution has been eliminated in the variable levy case compared to the base 
case. The effects of variable levy on producer welfare are more often observed in the 
upper tail of the welfare distribution than in the lower tail.  
 
Table 9-11: Producer Surplus: Base Case versus Variable Levy Case 
Region Base    Variable Levy % Change  
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
HER* 89.20 9.74 88.33 7.21 -0.98 -25.99 
JAL 75.59 7.99 75.66 5.47 0.09 -31.57 
KAB 101.51 12.55 101.51 10.28 0.00 -18.15 
KAN 117.08 12.32 116.76 9.38 -0.27 -23.84 
KDZ* 137.88 16.33 137.74 12.89 -0.10 -21.10 
KST 72.02 8.52 71.04 5.98 -1.36 -29.80 
MAZ* 144.91 15.49 144.79 9.44 -0.08 -39.10 







Figure 9-11: Consumer Surplus: Base Case versus Variable Levy Case 
 
 






































Modeling results show a variable levy is more effective than a stockholding 
policy on price and welfare stabilization in Afghanistan, on average. Moreover, the 
distributional impacts of variable levy appear to be less than public stocks policy. 
Normally, a variable levy is a more cost effective policy tool than public stockholding. 
The most important costs associate with the variable levy are the costs of the 
import subsidy in the periods of high world prices. The level of the variable levy in each 
iteration is multiplied by the import level in that given iteration to estimate the 
costs/revenue of this policy. Summary statistics of costs/revenue associated with the 
variable levy from 2000 repetitions are presented in Table 9-12. On average, the 
government can generate revenue on wheat and flour imports by implementing a variable 
levy policy, with an amount of US$27 million on imports from Pakistan and about US$7 
million on imports from Kazakhstan. However, the costs of the import subsidy are nearly 
US$ 198 million in extreme cases of high world prices combined with export restrictions 
from Pakistan.  
 
Table 9-12: Revenue from Variable Levy 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Levy on imports from Pakistan 27.16 34.54 -154.50 163.37 
Levy on imports from Kazakhstan 6.90 14.73 -55.02 90.36 
Levy on total imports 34.11 38.78 -197.94 176.31 
Units are in million US$ 
 
Depending on the world price the level of variable levy changes in each iteration. 
The variable levy on imports from Pakistan is negative in 18% of iterations, and it is 
negative on imports from Kazakhstan in 30% of iterations. Although the mean of the 
variable levy is positive, the costs of the import subsidy are extremely high during the 
periods of high world prices and when there are export restrictions from Pakistan. 
Figure 9-13 represents the distribution of the cost/revenue generated from a 
variable levy, from 2000 repetitions. This distribution is the sum of revenue/costs 
generated on imports from Pakistan and imports from Kazakhstan.  The likelihood of the 




shows. On average, about 15% of the time the revenue from a variable levy is negative. 
There are only 17 cases out of 2000 iterations where the costs of the import subsidy 
exceeds US$100 million. 
 
 
Figure 9-13: The Distribution of Variable Levy Revenue. 
 
The level of the costs associated with the variable levy policy depends on what 
level the government wants to fix domestic prices. Fixing domestic price at a high level 
will increase tax revenue as the government can charge a high variable levy, and vice 
versa. But changing the mean of domestic prices can lead to distributional impacts on 
expected welfare across consumers and producers. The price fixed at the border in our 
model is the average price over the period 2010-2013, so it does not now have large 
distributional impacts on the welfare of producers and consumers.  
Given the small chances of extreme cases where an import subsidy is required, a 
variable levy is more cost effective than a public stockholding policy in stabilizing 
consumer prices. Modeling results show the total revenue from a variable levy is negative 


































in approximately one out of seven years. The costs of import subsidy are higher than 
releasing stocks in that given scenario of high world prices and low domestic production. 
However, stocks are required to be maintained annually until that specific scenario of low 
production and high world prices occurs. Adding up the costs of carrying public stocks 
for seven years is much higher than the costs of an import subsidy for one year.  
 
9.3.2 Modified Variable Levy 
In the first scenario for the variable levy, we assumed that the Afghan government 
continued subsidizing wheat and flour imports from Pakistan even when Pakistani export 
restrictions were in place. However, this becomes very costly for the Afghan government 
as the import subsidy increases sharply in order to keep border domestic prices fixed. 
This also appears to be impractical to subsidize imports from Pakistan while Pakistani 
governments restricts exports to ensure food security for its own nation. Thus, this 
assumption might not be practical in the real world.  In this section, we modify this 
assumption. We assume the Afghan government does not fully subsidize wheat and flour 
imports from Pakistan during the periods of export restrictions. Prices are no longer fixed 
at the ports on the Pakistani border. However, there will be an import subsidy equal to the 
one on wheat and flour imports from Kazakhstan. This modification will undermine the 
stabilization impacts of variable levy in the cases when Pakistan restricts its wheat and 
flour exports to Afghanistan.  
Under the modified variable levy prices are not as stable as in the variable levy 
case in regions mostly supplied by Pakistan. Price distributions in the variable levy case 
versus modified variable levy are presented in Figure 9-14. Under the modified variable 
levy assumption, the upper tail of price distribution is not eliminated as much as in the 
variable levy for eastern regions supplied by Pakistan. This difference in price 
distributions under the two assumptions of the variable levy policies is observed in 
Jalalabad, Khost, Kandahar and Kabul. The largest (smallest) difference in price 
distributions is observed in Khost (Kabul). Khost is isolated from the northern wheat 
market and rarely does domestic and Kazakh wheat flow to Khost, while about 50% of 




restriction policy has smaller effects in Kabul than in eastern Khost. In Figure 9-14, the 
boxplots with the dark color present the price distribution under the standard variable 
levy and the ones with the light blue color presents the price distribution under the 
modified variable levy case.  
 
 
Figure 9-14: Price Distribution: Variable Levy Case versus Modified Variable Levy Case 
 
Price spikes as a result of Pakistani export restrictions are observed mainly in the 
urban centers of eastern regions. Price signals are not fully transmitted to the rural zones 
of the eastern regions, as markets are not well integrated between rural and urban regions. 
Pakistani export restriction policy does not significantly affect prices in the northern and 
eastern surplus regions either, as Pakistani flour does not flow to the northern surplus 
regions of Mazar and Kunduz.  
Variability in prices is high in the eastern regions supplied by Pakistani wheat and 





































































However, prices are more stable even in the modified variable levy case than in the base 
case. Under the modified variable levy assumption prices are not fixed at eastern ports on 
the Pakistan border during periods of export restriction, but there is an import subsidy 
equal to the subsidy at the northern port and this somewhat prevents price spikes in the 
eastern region.  
Price distributions from the base case versus the modified variable levy case are 
presented in Figure 9-15. Modeling results show that the modified variable levy stabilizes 
prices in all regions. The stabilization impacts of the modified variable levy case is more 
pronounced in urban centers than in rural zones, as urban centers are better integrated 
than rural areas with the world markets. On average, the impacts of the modified variable 
levy on price stabilization are higher in the eastern deficit regions than in the northern 
surplus regions, even with the modified variable levy assumptions (Table 9-13). Trade 
policy plays a key role in stabilizing prices in regions mostly supplied by imported wheat 
and flour. The impacts of the trade policy are less significant in the surplus regions in a 
framework of imperfect market integration.  
 
 


































































Table 9-13: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus Modified Variable Levy Case 
Region   Base  Modified Levy % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 292 338 289.20 333.28 -0.91 -1.28 
 Std. Dev. 77 37 72.96 22.81 -4.72 -37.64 
JAL Mean 437 377 438.13 377.17 0.14 -0.08 
 Std. Dev. 48 33 45.01 16.12 -6.33 -51.17 
KAB Mean 459 385 459.21 385.35 0.06 -0.04 
 Std. Dev. 40 36 29.63 19.94 -25.31 -44.60 
KAN Mean 434 371 432.79 369.18 -0.29 -0.49 
 Std. Dev. 45 33 37.91 17.96 -16.41 -46.20 
KDZ* Mean 311 353 310.48 352.16 -0.10 -0.20 
 Std. Dev. 96 45 92.43 30.19 -3.98 -32.99 
KST Mean 434 374 429.58 368.51 -1.07 -1.53 
 Std. Dev. 44 35 35.20 15.24 -20.69 -56.62 
MAZ* Mean 297 348 297.30 347.74 0.10 -0.07 
 Std. Dev. 78 39 75.89 24.21 -2.25 -38.18 
Total Mean 381 364 379.53 361.91 -0.29 -0.52 
  Std. Dev. 96 41 92.59 27.32 -3.09 -32.62 
 
The impacts of modified variable levy on price stabilization are not very different 
from the variable levy case. High price spikes are observed in the eastern deficit regions 
during the periods when the export restriction policy is in place. However, price spikes 
are not as high as in the base case. Wheat and flour flows from northern and western 
surplus to eastern and southern deficit regions are observed in those periods.  
An import subsidy stabilizes prices in the northern and western regions supplied 
partially by Kazakhstan wheat and flour. This does not allow extreme price shocks in the 
eastern deficit regions even after Pakistan restricts its exports to Afghanistan. However, 
import flows of Kazakh wheat and flour to eastern deficit regions close to Pakistan are 
not as effective as import flows from Pakistan in stabilizing prices in these regions. The 
transportation costs of moving Kazakh wheat to eastern and southern deficit regions are 
much higher than the transportation costs of import flows from Pakistan. 
The costs of the import subsidy in the modified variable levy scenario are less 




subsidy in the extreme scenario of high world prices combined with the export 
restrictions is approximately US$110 million, compared to US$ 198 million in the 
standard variable levy. The distribution of the variable levy revenue on total wheat and 
flour imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan is presented in Figure 9-16. In 15% of the 
repetitions the variable levy is negative, implying an import subsidy is required in one out 
of seven years to stabilize domestic prices.  
 
 
Figure 9-16: The Distribution of Revenue from Modified Variable Levy Case. 
 
 The distribution of the revenue from the modified variable levy appears more 
realistic than the distribution of revenue from the standard variable levy, as the costs of 
the import subsidy in the modified variable levy case are not extremely high in the 
periods of high world prices and Pakistani export restrictions. The largest change in the 
costs of the import subsidy is observed in the imports on Pakistan. As the Pakistani 










































provide some results from the scenario that combines the modified variable levy plus 
stock2 case.  
9.4.1 Variable Levy plus Stock1 
Modeling results suggest the combined effects of trade and stock policies on price 
distributions are consistent with this principle, and both lower and upper tails of price 
distributions are eliminated. Price distributions from the base case versus the scenario of 
combined trade and stocks are presented in Figure 9-17. Prices are more stable with the 
trade and stock policy compared to the base case in all regions. The effects of the 
stabilization polices are more pronounced in urban centers compared to rural zones. The 
variable levy is more effective than the stockholding policy in stabilizing prices. The 
stabilizing impacts of the variable levy are mostly observed in urban centers, as urban 
centers are better integrated than rural areas with the world markets. The combined 
effects of trade and stockholding policy lead to a 40% and 12% decrease in the standard 
deviation of prices in urban and rural areas, respectively (Table 9-15).  
Implementing both policies simultaneously changes the mean of prices too, but 
the change in the price mean is very small compared to the decrease in variability. The 
mean of prices increases in most cases in rural areas, and it decrease in urban centers 
mostly supplied by Pakistani flour. The distributional impacts of both trade and 
stockholding policies are insignificant compared to their stabilization effects, since we 






Figure 9-17: Price Distribution: Base Case versus Variable Levy plus Stock1Case 
 
Table 9-15: Wheat Prices: Base Case versus Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case 
Region   Base  Levy & Stock1 % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 292 338 306 336 4.88 -0.47 
 Std. Dev. 77 37 62 19 -18.54 -47.54 
JAL Mean 437 377 438 377 0.08 -0.24 
 Std. Dev. 48 33 45 15 -5.47 -53.07 
KAB Mean 459 385 462 389 0.70 0.83 
 Std. Dev. 40 36 27 14 -31.72 -59.87 
KAN Mean 434 371 435 372 0.22 0.17 
 Std. Dev. 45 33 37 14 -19.46 -58.84 
KDZ* Mean 311 353 322 355 3.54 0.56 
 Std. Dev. 96 45 81 26 -16.20 -42.96 
KST Mean 434 374 428 366 -1.49 -2.11 
 Std. Dev. 44 35 34 12 -22.76 -65.15 
MAZ* Mean 297 348 305 351 2.85 0.78 
 Std. Dev. 78 39 67 19 -13.19 -51.38 
Total Mean 381 364 385 364 1.19 -0.07 


































































 The combined effects of stockholding and trade policy on price stabilization is 
larger than the effects of each of these policies implemented individually. The means and 
the standard deviations of prices from different scenarios are presented in Table 9-16. 
Looking at the national average at the bottom of the table, the standard deviation of prices 
is the smallest for both rural and urban areas in the levy plus stock scenario. However, the 
combined effects of both polies are much larger on urban prices than on rural prices.  
 
Table 9-16: Price Descriptive Statistics across Scenarios 
Region   Base  Public Stocks Variable Levy 
Levy & 
Stock1 
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 292 338 310 343 289 334 306 336 
 Std. Dev. 77 37 66 34 73 22 62 19 
JAL Mean 437 377 439 379 438 378 438 377 
 Std. Dev. 48 33 49 33 45 17 45 15 
KAB Mean 459 385 464 391 459 385 462 389 
 Std. Dev. 40 36 38 33 30 21 27 14 
KAN Mean 434 371 438 375 433 370 435 372 
 Std. Dev. 45 33 45 32 38 17 37 14 
KDZ* Mean 311 353 324 357 310 352 322 355 
 Std. Dev. 96 45 85 42 93 31 81 26 
KST Mean 434 374 434 374 430 369 428 366 
 Std. Dev. 44 35 45 35 35 12 34 12 
MAZ* Mean 297 348 307 353 297 348 305 351 
 Std. Dev. 78 39 69 36 76 24 67 19 
Total Mean 381 364 388 368 380 362 385 364 
  Std. Dev. 96 41 88 39 93 27 84 24 
 
As public stockholding and trade policies trim both the lower and upper tails of 
price distribution, it is expected to stabilize both producer and consumer welfare. 
Figure 9-18 compares the distributions of producer surplus from the base scenario and 
from the case when both trade and public stockholding policies are implemented, and the 
means and standard deviations of producer surpluses are presented in Table 9-17.  




producer surplus in all regions. The combined effects of both trade and stockholding 
policies lead to a decrease of approximately a 26% in the standard deviation of producer 
surplus, on average. The impacts of stabilization policies on producer welfare are similar 
across regions. The largest effects are observed in in Kunduz, with about 29% decrease in 
standard deviations, and smallest effects are in Mazar, with a decline of 18% in the 
standard deviation of producer surplus. The effects of stabilization policies are small in in 
Mazar, as production is volatile there, and volatility in domestic production largely 
contributes in variability of producer welfare.  
 
 




























Table 9-17: Producer Surplus: Base Case versus Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case 
Region Base    Levy & Stocks % Change  
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
HER* 89.20 9.74 95.44 7.24 6.99 -25.63 
JAL 75.59 7.99 75.49 5.07 -0.14 -36.53 
KAB 101.51 12.55 102.40 9.75 0.87 -22.36 
KAN 117.08 12.32 117.31 9.04 0.20 -26.60 
KDZ* 137.88 16.33 145.13 11.55 5.25 -29.28 
KST 72.02 8.52 70.56 6.01 -2.03 -29.48 
MAZ* 144.91 15.49 151.65 12.76 4.65 -17.64 
Average 105.46 11.85 108.28 8.77 2.68 -25.95 
 
As the combined impacts of both trade and stockholding polices increase the 
mean of prices, they lead to an increase in the mean of producer welfare, as well. A large 
increase in producer welfare is observed in surplus regions. Modeling results show a 7% 
increase in producer welfare in Herat, and about 5% in Kunduz and Mazar. The 
distributional impacts on producer welfare are small in eastern deficit regions, and even 
negative in Khost. Wheat and flour does not flow from surplus regions to eastern 
Jalalabad and Khost regions. Results are consistent with the principle that stockholding 
policy helps mainly producers in surplus areas. Trade policy stabilizes prices in eastern 
commercial centers, but the effects of stockholding policy do not flow from northern 
regions to help producers in deficit regions.  
The combined effects of trade and stockholding policies are more pronounced in 
stabilizing consumer welfare than producer welfare. Price variability is a key contributor 
in creating variability in consumer welfare. However, volatility in domestic production 
appears to be a significant factor leading to variability in producer welfare in 
Afghanistan. Thus, price stabilization is more effective in reducing variability of 
consumer welfare than producer welfare. Modeling results show that combined trade and 
stockholding policies lead to a large decrease in variability of consumer welfare in 
Afghanistan. Descriptive statistics for consumer welfare from the base versus variable 




of 57% and 18% in standard deviation of consumer welfare in urban and rural areas, 
respectively.  
The combined impacts of stockholding and trade policies are larger on stabilizing 
consumer welfare in urban centers than in rural areas. Stabilization policies lead to a 
larger decrease in the standard deviation of consumer welfare in urban centers than in 
rural zones, in all regions. Urban centers are stabilized mainly by trade policy and 
stockholding policy stabilizes mostly rural zones. Stockholding policy is less effective 
than a variable levy, as stocks cannot stabilize prices if there are production shortfalls for 
two years in sequence. Also, stockholding policy is not aggressive in this scenario, as 
MSP is $200/MT.  
 
Table 9-18: Consumer Surplus: Base Case versus Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case 
Region   Base  Levy & Stocks % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 303.87 57.40 298.21 57.50 -1.86 0.16 
 Std. Dev. 28.88 2.70 23.30 1.42 -19.33 -47.43 
JAL Mean 352.41 29.20 352.24 29.23 -0.05 0.08 
 Std. Dev. 19.10 1.05 18.09 0.51 -5.27 -51.95 
KAB Mean 584.64 512.94 582.57 511.17 -0.35 -0.35 
 Std. Dev. 23.91 18.34 16.33 7.37 -31.70 -59.83 
KAN Mean 706.19 66.15 705.43 66.10 -0.11 -0.08 
 Std. Dev. 30.84 2.06 24.90 0.85 -19.27 -58.65 
KDZ* Mean 480.79 27.52 473.75 27.43 -1.46 -0.31 
 Std. Dev. 56.18 1.56 46.80 0.89 -16.71 -43.15 
KST Mean 389.47 21.57 392.21 21.76 0.70 0.85 
 Std. Dev. 19.44 0.83 15.13 0.30 -22.15 -63.74 
MAZ* Mean 472.60 52.65 467.44 52.44 -1.09 -0.39 
 Std. Dev. 44.48 2.60 38.34 1.26 -13.81 -51.60 
Total Mean 470.00 109.63 467.41 109.38 -0.55 -0.24 
  Std. Dev. 31.83 4.16 26.13 1.80 -17.93 -56.80 
 
There are some small distributional impacts associated with these stabilization 
policies. Modeling results suggest on average consumers are worse off and producers are 




Stabilization policies lead to an increase of 2.7% in the mean of producer welfare on 
average and a total loss of less than 1% in consumer welfare in both rural and urban areas 
(Table 9-17 & Table 9-18).  
The distributional impacts of the trade policy can be managed somewhat by 
setting different domestic prices at the border. These analyses are based on a fixed 
average price at the border points. Setting a lower fixed price than the average price at the 
border point will help consumers, and a higher fixed price than the average will lead to a 
welfare gain for producers. Moreover, setting a lower fixed price at the border affects the 
government revenue from taxes on imports.  
In addition to producers and consumers, there are other agents in the market that 
can be affected by the stabilization policies. Government revenue, and the welfare of 
millers and traders can also be a concern for policymakers to be considered in 
policymaking decisions. We will assess the impacts of combined trade and stockholding 
polices on government revenue from the import tax on wheat and flour, and on millers 
and traders.  
Modeling results suggest that the combination of trade and stockholding policies 
leads to huge costs of import subsidy during the periods of high world prices. The costs 
of subsidy on wheat and flour imports gets as high as $158 million on imports from 
Pakistan and $60 million on wheat and flour imports from Kazakhstan. Similarly, the 
revenues from the tax on wheat and flour imports increases in periods of low wheat 
prices in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Therefore, stabilizing wheat and flour markets 
through a variable levy leads to variability in tax revenue on wheat and flour imports. The 
costs/revenues associated with the variable levy in the variable levy plus stockholding 
scenario are presented in Table 9-19. On average, the value of the variable levy is 
positive on both imports from Pakistan and Kazakhstan, implying this policy generates 







Table 9-19: Revenue from Variable Levy: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Levy on imports from Pakistan 26.23 36.70 -158.52 159.62 
Levy on imports from Kazakhstan 6.80 15.68 -60.09 95.28 
Levy on total imports 33.02 41.23 -202.75 172.87 
Units are in million US$ 
 
The distribution of the revenue generated from a variable levy on total imports are 
presented in Figure 9-19. The distribution of the revenue from a variable levy 
implemented along with a stockholding policy exhibits a similar shape as in the variable 
levy scenario presented in Figure 9-13. This implies implementing a stockholding policy 
in rural surplus region does not have a major impact on imports. The distribution of the 
revenue on total imports is left skewed mainly due to the Pakistani export restrictions. 
The costs of the import subsidy are extremely high during the periods of high world 
prices when Pakistan restricts its exports. However, the chances of occurrence of such 
extreme scenarios are low. The revenue from the variable levy is negative in 15% of 






Figure 9-19: The Distribution of Revenue: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case. 
 
While a variable levy is often positive and generates revenues for the government, 
there are always annual costs with carrying public stocks. In the current scenario, the 
government maintains about 190 thousand MT of public stocks annually, with a costs of 
about $8 million, on average. Public stocks along with costs associated with the 
stockholding policy are presented in Table 9-20. In extreme cases of high domestic 
production, the public stocks reaches about 1.26 MMT, with a costs of about $55 million. 
The stocks accumulation and their costs are slightly higher when implemented along with 
a variable levy than implemented independently. When stockholding policy is 
implemented without a variable levy the mean of public stocks is about 186 thousand MT 
with a maximum of 780 thousand MT in extreme cases of high production (see 
Table 9-8).  
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Table 9-20: Public Stocks and Their Estimated Costs: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public Stocks (000 MT) 189.81 122.74 41.48 1256.75 
Costs (Million US$) 8.35 5.40 1.83 55.30 
 
A public stockholding policy with a primary objective to support producer prices 
is not very costly most of the time. The costs of carrying stocks in surplus regions with a 
main objective to trim the lower tail of price distribution is less US$ 20 million in 96% of 
the repetitions. The distribution of the costs associated with a public stockholding policy 
in surplus region is presented in Figure 9-20.  
 
 
Figure 9-20: The Distribution of Public Stockholding Costs 
 
With the government intervention in the market, opportunities for traders who 
benefits from price variation are limited. Assuming commercial stocks are retained by 
traders, those traders will face welfare loss as a public stock policy is introduced in the 


































Modeling results show public stocks lead to a decrease in commercial stocks, 
especially in regions where the public stocks policy is implemented. Figure 9-21 show 
commercial stocks in the base case versus the public stock plus variable levy scenario. 
Commercial stocks are low in the public stocks plus levy case, as surplus wheat is 
retained by public stocks in surplus regions. Thus, agents who handle commercial stocks 
in the absence of government intervention will be worse off with the stabilization 
policies. The impacts of the stockholding policy on commercial stocks is the same as if 
implemented without a trade policy as in Figure 9-8, presented in earlier section.  
Millers are also key player in the wheat and flour markets in Afghanistan. 
Stabilization policies have some effects on the milling industry, as the share of wheat and 
flour imports changes. Stabilization policies through public stocks lead to an increase of 
flour imports in the country, as domestic wheat is retained in government stocks in 
surplus regions. Thus, the quantity of wheat milled domestically decreases with 
stabilization policy through public stocks. However, the change in the quantity of wheat 
milled domestically is not large. Stockholding policy decreases the quantity of wheat 
milled domestically from 3.37 MMT in the base case to 3.27 MMT in the stocks plus 






Figure 9-21: Commercial Stocks: Base Case versus Variable Levy plus Stock1 
 
9.4.2 Modified Variable Levy plus Stock2 
In the earlier section on trade plus stockholding policy the standard variable levy 
was combined with a stockholding policy at a MSP of $200/MT. The standard variable 
levy appears to be too rigorous in stabilizing prices, and continues fixed border prices 
during the periods of high world prices and export restrictions from Pakistan. Moreover, 
the stockholding policy with a MSP of $200/MT does not accumulate large enough 
public stocks to sufficiently trim the upper tail of price distributions in rural zones of 
surplus regions.  Thus, in the earlier combination of trade and stockholding policy, prices 
were more stable in urban areas supplied mainly by imported wheat and flour than in 
rural zones of surplus regions. Here we modify the combination of trade and stockholding 
policy such that higher stabilization levels to be achieved in rural areas of surplus 
regions, compared to the earlier combination of trade plus stockholding scenario.  
In this section, we assess the combination of a less rigorous trade policy plus a 
more aggressive stockholding policy, compared to the earlier combination of trade plus 

























more aggressive stockholding policy. In the modified variable levy the costs of the import 
subsidy are lower than in the standard variable levy, as the government does not fully 
subsidize imports from Pakistan during the period of Pakistani export restrictions. We 
also assume a more rigorous stockholding policy, with a minimum support price of 
$250/MT in this section. This policy is expected to allow some variability in prices in 
eastern and southern deficit regions mostly supplied by Pakistan. As stockholding policy 
is implemented in the northern surplus regions, more stable prices are expected in those 
regions, compared to the previous scenario of trade plus stockholding policy.  
Wheat prices from the previous combination of trade and stockholding policy 
versus the prices from the modified levy plus the stockholding policy with a MSP of 
$250/MT are presented in Figure 9-22. The results are consistent with expectations; 
prices in eastern Khost and Jalalabad, and southern Kandahar regions are more variable 
in the modified levy plus stock2 scenario than in the variable levy plus stock1 scenario. 
On the contrary, prices in the rural areas of northern and western surplus regions are more 
stable in the modified levy plus stock2 scenario than in the variable levy plus stock1 
scenario15. Stockholding policy plus modified variable levy is more effective here than 
the earlier case on price stabilization in surplus regions, as large stocks are accumulated 
with a MSP of $250/MT. A rigorous stockholding policy plus the modified variable levy 
with a high MSP not only trims the lower tail of price distribution, but also the upper tail.  
 
                                                 
15 Variable levy plus stock1 scenario is the combination of the standard variable levy plus 
a stockholding policy with a MSP of $200/MT. Modified levy plus stock2 case is the 







Figure 9-22: Wheat Prices: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case versus Modified Variable 
Levy plus Stock2 Case 
 
 The stock2 plus modified variable levy policy regime also reduces price 
variability in central Kabul, as Kabul is partially supplied by northern surplus regions. A 
stockholding policy with a high MSP combined with the modified variable levy leads to 
an increase in the mean of prices, especially in regions where stocks are held. The mean 
and standard deviations of prices from these two types of trade and stockholding policy 
combinations are presented in Table 9-21. On average, the new combination of trade and 
stockholding policy is more effective on prices, compared to the earlier case. A rigorous 
stockholding policy combined with the modified levy leads to a reduction of 
approximately 9% in the standard deviations of prices in the rural areas, and about 3% in 
urban areas, compared to the standard variable levy plus stock1. As stockholding policy 
is more rigorous in the new combination of trade and stockholding policy, impacts are 























Table 9-21: Wheat Prices: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case Versus Modified Variable 
Levy plus Stock2 Case 




plus Stock2 % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 306 336 323 341 5.51 1.49 
 Std. Dev. 62 19 52 19 -17.13 -2.25 
JAL Mean 438 377 440 379 0.39 0.60 
 Std. Dev. 45 15 46 16 1.11 6.48 
KAB Mean 462 389 468 396 1.30 1.79 
 Std. Dev. 27 14 26 11 -3.40 -21.92 
KAN Mean 435 372 439 376 0.93 1.23 
 Std. Dev. 37 14 37 14 0.48 0.80 
KDZ* Mean 322 355 336 361 4.55 1.78 
 Std. Dev. 81 26 70 23 -13.67 -10.20 
KST Mean 428 366 430 369 0.44 0.60 
 Std. Dev. 34 12 35 15 2.96 25.43 
MAZ* Mean 305 351 318 357 4.26 1.90 
 Std. Dev. 67 19 57 16 -15.76 -16.31 
Total Mean 385 364 393 368 2.16 1.34 
  Std. Dev. 84 24 77 23 -9.25 -3.14 
 
 Since the new combination of trade and stockholding policy reduces the price 
variability compared to the earlier combination, it is expected to reduce variability in 
consumer welfare as well. Consumer welfare from the variable levy plus stock1 versus 
the modified levy plus stock2 is presented in Table 9-22. Modeling results show that 
variability in consumer welfare falls in all surplus regions and in central Kabul in the new 
combination of trade and stockholding policy. The stabilization achieved in surplus 
regions and central Kabul is mainly due to the aggressive stockholding policy. Since the 
modified levy is less rigorous than the standard variable levy, prices and consumer 
welfare are more variable in eastern and southern deficit regions mainly supplied by 
Pakistan in the new combination of trade and stockholding policy compared to the 




A stockholding policy with a high MSP leads to small distributional impacts 
across producers and consumers. On average, consumers lose and producers gain in the 
modified levy plus stock2 case, compared to the variable levy plus stock1 scenario. 
Changes in consumer welfare are larger in surplus rural areas where public stockholding 
policy is implemented than in deficit regions. Overall, changes in the mean of consumer 
welfare are very small compared to the changes in the variability.  
 
Table 9-22: Consumer Surplus: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case versus Modified 
Variable Levy plus Stock2 Case 
Region   
Variable Levy 
plus Stock1  
Modified Levy 
plus Stock2 % Change  
    Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
HER* Mean 298.21 57.50 291.75 57.14 -2.16 -0.62 
 Std. Dev. 23.30 1.42 19.03 1.40 -18.34 -1.19 
JAL Mean 352.24 29.23 351.61 29.16 -0.18 -0.24 
 Std. Dev. 18.09 0.51 18.24 0.53 0.81 5.39 
KAB Mean 582.57 511.17 579.04 507.69 -0.60 -0.68 
 Std. Dev. 16.33 7.37 15.76 5.83 -3.51 -20.81 
KAN Mean 705.43 66.10 702.78 65.83 -0.38 -0.41 
 Std. Dev. 24.90 0.85 25.07 0.88 0.70 2.81 
KDZ* Mean 473.75 27.43 464.81 27.22 -1.89 -0.79 
 Std. Dev. 46.80 0.89 39.74 0.79 -15.09 -10.47 
KST Mean 392.21 21.76 391.40 21.71 -0.21 -0.24 
 Std. Dev. 15.13 0.30 15.51 0.37 2.50 21.98 
MAZ* Mean 467.44 52.44 459.79 52.01 -1.64 -0.83 
 Std. Dev. 38.34 1.26 31.86 1.06 -16.90 -16.12 
Total Mean 467.41 109.38 463.03 108.68 -0.94 -0.64 
  Std. Dev. 26.13 1.80 23.60 1.55 -9.67 -13.73 
 
Producers are better off in all regions with the new combination of trade and 
stockholding policy, compared to the earlier one with less rigorous stockholding policy. 
On average, there is approximately a 4% increase to producer welfare in the modified 
levy plus stock2, compared to the earlier case of variable levy plus stock1. This policy 
does not reduce variability in producer surplus, as most of the variability in producer 




producer welfare is mainly in the upper tail of surplus distribution. High production 
combined with high prices due to a stockholding policy leads to spikes in producer 
welfare. Producer welfare from the variable levy plus stock1 versus modified levy plus 
stock2 are presented in Table 9-23.  
 
Table 9-23: Producer Surplus: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case versus Modified Variable 
Levy plus Stock2 Case 




Levy plus Stock2 
% Change  
  
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
HER* 95.44 7.24 102.68 10.02 7.58 38.39 
JAL 75.49 5.07 75.90 5.05 0.55 -0.49 
KAB 102.40 9.75 104.16 9.65 1.73 -1.04 
KAN 117.31 9.04 118.55 9.21 1.06 1.80 
KDZ* 145.13 11.55 154.19 15.40 6.24 33.30 
KST 70.56 6.01 70.96 6.21 0.55 3.43 
MAZ* 151.65 12.76 162.36 21.93 7.07 71.88 
Average 108.28 8.77 112.68 11.07 4.07 26.12 
 
While a rigorous stockholding policy stabilize prices, it has to accumulate more 
public stocks and that increases the costs of the policy. The costs of stockholding from 
the above two scenarios are presented in Table 9-24. On average, the public stock 
accumulation increases from 190 thousand MT in variable levy plus stock1 case to 336 
thousand MT in the modified levy plus stock2 case. The increase in public stocks 
accumulation leads to an extra cost on average of approximately $6 million, annually 
($8.35 million versus $14.79 million). In the extreme cases of high domestic production, 
the costs of public stockholding increases from $55 million in Stock1 scenario to $71 






Table 9-24: Costs of Public Stockholding Policy: Variable Levy plus Stock1 Case versus 
Modified Variable Levy plus Stock2 Case 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable Levy Plus Stock1     
Public Stocks (000 MT) 189.81 122.74 41.48 1256.75 
Costs (Million US$) 8.35 5.40 1.83 55.30 
Modified Levy plus Stock2    
Public Stocks (000 MT) 336.20 208.69 55.51 1623.28 
Costs (Million US$) 14.79 9.18 2.44 71.42 
 
The costs of the import subsidy on imports from Pakistan  is less in the modified 
levy scenario than in the standard variable levy case in the extreme cases of high world 
prices plus export restrictions from Pakistan. However, the costs of the import subsidy on 
Kazakh imports is higher in the new combination of trade and stockholding policy than in 
the standard variable levy plus stock1 case. Pakistani imports fall in the modified variable 
levy when Pakistan restricts its exports to Afghanistan, and that is compensated by more 
imports from Kazakhstan. Therefore the costs of the import subsidy increases on imports 
from Kazakhstan when the Pakistani export restriction policy is in place. On average, the 
revenue from variable levy is higher in the modified levy plus stock2 case than in the 
variable levy plus stock1 scenario, as imports are higher in the earlier scenario than in the 
later one. A rigorous stockholding policy increases imports, as surplus wheat is retained 
in public stocks. The revenue from variable levy in the variable levy plus stock1 scenario 
versus modified levy plus stock2 case is presented in Table 9-25.   
 
Table 9-25: Revenue: Variable Levy Case versus Modified Variable Levy Case 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Levy on Pakistani imports  Variable 
Levy plus 
Stock1 
26.23 36.70 -158.52 159.62 
Levy on Kazakh imports  6.80 15.68 -60.09 95.28 
Levy on total imports 33.02 41.23 -202.75 172.87 
Levy on Pakistani imports  Modified 
Levy plus 
Stock2 
28.26 34.64 -99.62 144.77 
Levy on Kazakh imports  14.48 28.97 -95.04 118.25 
Levy on total imports 42.72 47.10 -171.99 207.19 




In summary, a stockholding policy with a primary objective of supporting 
producer prices is mainly effective in trimming the lower tail of price distribution. If a 
stockholding policy pursues multiple objectives, supporting producer prices and 
stabilizing prices for consumers, the costs of the policy surge. A variable levy is more 
cost effective than a public stockholding policy to stabilize prices for consumers. 
However, a variable levy does not appear to be effective in trimming the lower tail of 
price distribution in rural areas where wheat is produced. Therefore, a combination of 
trade and stockholding policy appears to be a better option to stabilize wheat prices in 
Afghanistan. A trade policy can be used mainly to trim the upper tail of price 
distributions and ensure food security in deficit regions. A stockholding policy is used in 
surplus regions to support producer prices.  
The impacts of these stabilization policies across regions, and across producers 
versus consumers depend on how aggressively these policies are implemented. An 
aggressive trade policy plus a moderate stockholding policy is more effective in 
stabilizing prices in deficit regions, compared to surplus regions.  An aggressive 
stockholding policy with a high MSP is mainly effective in stabilizing prices and 
consumer welfare in surplus regions where stock policy is implemented. A modified 
variable levy which does not maintain fixed prices on the Afghan-Pakistan border during 
the periods of Pakistani export restriction appears to be more cost effective than a straight 





 a statistically significant price linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Regression 
analysis also reveals that wheat markets are not well connected between rural and urban 
areas. However, prices are strongly linked and move together across commercial centers. 
Findings from our trader survey also suggest that domestic wheat and flour are 
not perfect substitutes for imported wheat and flour. Imported wheat and flour from 
Kazakhstan has high quality and it is preferred by most commercial bakeries in the urban 
areas. After Kazakh flour, Pakistani flour is preferred by consumers, and it has a high 
price in the Afghan markets. Generally, local wheat and flour is the least preferred option 
for the Afghan consumers and it has the lowest price in the Afghan markets. However, 
some of the high quality local wheat is preferred over Pakistani wheat. The quality 
difference between imported and local wheat combined with weak market integration 
between rural and urban areas suggest that an increase in domestic production will not 
fully replace imports. Moreover, findings from the trader survey and the results from the 
price transmission analyses suggest an Armington modeling approach better fits the 
Afghan wheat market than a competitive spatial equilibrium to assess the stabilization 
policies. An Armington model recognizes that commodities may not be perfect 
substitutes and markets are not perfectly competitive across space.  
Simulation analyses in a framework of imperfect market integration suggest that 
using only a trade policy cannot effectively stabilize the welfare of both producers and 
consumers. A trade policy is effective mainly in trimming the upper tail of price 
distributions, and thus mostly improving consumer welfare. A trade policy is ineffective 
in eliminating the lower tail of price distribution, especially in rural areas of surplus 
regions where wheat is produced. This is largely due to the imperfectly integrated 
markets between rural and urban areas.  
A stockholding policy can be used to support producer prices and/or stabilize 
prices for consumers, depending on where and how much stocks are maintained annually. 
Modeling results show that a stockholding policy held in rural areas of surplus regions is 
mainly effective in eliminating the lower tail of price distributions, and this mostly 
improves producer welfare. In order to stabilize prices for consumers, large quantities of 




regions. About 2 MMT of annual public stocks are necessary to prevent price shocks in 
extreme cases of low production and high world prices and restore normal prices (as 
occurred in 2008).  
A summary of alternative policy options with their expected impacts on market 




























Table 10-1: Policy Implications of Alternative Scenarios. 
Policy Options Policy Implications  
Stockholding 
policy with MSP 
of $200 (Stock1) 
This policy mainly trims the lower tail of price distribution and 
mainly helps producers. This policy stabilizes prices and the 
welfare of producers and to a lesser extent consumers mainly in 
rural areas of surplus regions where stockholding policy is 
implemented.  
Stockholding 
policy with a 
MSP of $250 
(Stock2) 
This stockholding policy is more aggressive than the earlier one 
with a MSP of $200. Although this policy is mainly effective in 
trimming the lower tail of price distribution, it also trims 
somewhat the upper tail of price distribution. On average, stocks 
accumulation and costs in stock2 case are twice as much as in 
stock1 case. The impacts of this aggressive stockholding policy is 
also observed in commercial centers of surplus regions.  
Stocks policy in 
commercial 
centers 
This stockholding policy maintains large quantities of stocks in 
commercial centers to prevent price spikes. A stockholding policy 
can be used to stabilize prices both in rural and urban areas but 
large quantities of stocks are required to stabilize prices in 
commercial centers. Therefore, a trade policy is more cost 
effective than a stockholding policy to stabilize prices in 
commercial centers.  
Variable Levy A variable levy is mainly effective in trimming the upper tail of 
price distributions and it is good for consumers. The impacts of a 
variable levy is more pronounced in commercial centers than in 
rural areas due to poor urban-rural market integration.  
Modified 
Variable Levy 
Prices are more variable in modified variable levy than in variable 
levy, especially in eastern regions supplied by Pakistan. The costs 
of the import subsidy in the modified variable levy are about half 
of the costs in the variable levy in extreme cases of high world 
prices and export restrictions from Pakistan.  
Variable Levy 
plus Stock1 
The combined impacts of a variable levy plus stockholding policy 
are large in commercial centers and rural areas. Prices and the 
welfare of producers and consumers are fairly stable when both 
policies are implemented. However, prices are more stable in 
commercial centers than in rural areas, since an aggressive 
variable levy is combined with a moderate stockholding policy.  
Modified variable 
levy plus Stock2 
In this scenario a more aggressive stockholding policy and less 
aggressive variable levy are combined, compared to the earlier 
case. This combination of trade and stockholding policy 
effectively stabilizes prices in commercial centers and rural areas. 
In this scenario prices are more stable in rural areas of surplus 
regions, compared to earlier combination of trade and 





Implementing stabilization policies is often associated with large costs to the 
government and distributional effects between rural and urban areas. Trade policy is 
generally a more cost effective tool than stockholding policy. Trade policy is costly only 
in the years of high world prices when the government has to subsidize imports to 
stabilize domestic prices. In other years it generates revenue from taxes on imports. The 
simulation modeling results show that the total revenue from a variable levy is negative 
(an import subsidy is required) in 15% of repetitions. Although the costs of import 
subsidies are high in the periods of high world prices combined with export restrictions 
from Pakistan, revenue from variable levy is positive on average. The costs of the import 
subsidy in the modified variable levy plus stock2 is approximately $172 million in 
extreme cases of high world prices and low domestic production. On average, this policy 
generates about $42.7 million revenue each year.  
In contrast to a variable levy, Public stockholding policy normally leads to a 
welfare loss to the government. There are always costs associated with carrying stocks 
over time. The costs of the stockholding policy and the level of public stocks increases if 
the policy pursues multiple objectives. Stabilizing only producer prices and welfare 
requires stockholding policy only in rural surplus areas. That objective can be achieved 
by carrying stocks of about 200 thousand metric tons, on average, with an average annual 
costs of about $8 million. However, stabilizing consumer prices and preventing scenarios 
like the food crisis in 2008 with only stockholding policy requires carrying large 
quantities of public stocks annually (approximately 2MMT). Assuming a holding costs of 
$60/MT leads to an annual cost of approximately $120 million to the government.  
Our simulation analyses suggests a combination of a stockholding policy plus a 
variable levy is the most cost effective strategy to stabilize wheat markets in Afghanistan. 
It is preferred that stockholding policy focuses on stabilizing producer prices in surplus 
regions, while a variable levy is used to stabilize prices in commercial centers and in 
deficit regions. Given the weak market integration between rural and urban areas, a 
variable levy cannot effectively stabilize producer prices in rural areas. A stockholding 
policy may be used to stabilize consumer prices in deficit regions, but carrying large 






model is developed on an annual basis. Short term price dynamics are not captured in this 
model. Based on our annual model, prices can be stabilized with a variable levy. 
However, the delays in imports are not considered in this annual model. A key feature of 
a stockholding policy is stabilizing prices across seasons. The seasonal effects of the 
stockholding policy cannot be assessed in an annual model. Using a short term model to 
assess the impacts of the stabilization policies may improve the results. To enhance the 
projections results a quarterly model is suggested to be used for future research. Data 
limitation is a key challenge for a quarterly model.  
In this model, we assumed all provinces surrounding commercial centers are at 
equal distance from the commercial centers. However, some of the areas are extremely 
remote and disconnected from the commercial centers, while some others are located 
close to the commercial centers and well integrated with the urban areas. Disaggregating 
rural areas into different groups may also enhance the results.  
The time series production, area and price data used to estimate the supply 
elasticities and to estimate error distributions are only for a short period of time. In 
addition to prices, potentially there are other variables that might explain the area 
harvested and yield. We could not get access to the rainfall data for Afghanistan to 
incorporate in our regression analysis. Using annual data series for a longer period of 
time, and the rainfall data as an explanatory variable to explain area harvested and yield 
may improve the results. 
 The limitations to our research are not expected to have significant impacts on the 
qualitative results of our model.  Addressing those limitations in future research may 
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Appendix A Summary Statistics and Diagnostic Test Results 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of the Price Series 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Country  Market  Commodity  N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
st        
Afghanistan Herat  Wheat 184 261.6 114.0 110 680 
Afghanistan Herat Flour 184 375.5 166.0 140 840 
Afghanistan Jalalabad Wheat 184 284.6 119.1 120 720 
Afghanistan Jalalabad Flour 184 349.5 142.1 140 830 
Afghanistan Kabul Wheat 184 312.2 132.8 120 780 
Afghanistan Kabul Flour 184 371.8 155.7 150 880 
Afghanistan Kandahar Wheat 181 314.3 136.2 100 720 
Afghanistan Kandahar Flour 181 350.7 142.4 100 860 
Afghanistan Mazar Wheat 145 296.8 107.0 117 711 
Afghanistan Bamyan Wheat 21 246.3 29.60 191.4 287.5 
Afghanistan Badakhshan Wheat 147 416.2 163.2 140.2 1,038 
Afghanistan Ghor Wheat 38 384.7 128.6 210.4 747.9 
Afghanistan Faryab Wheat 128 400.3 133.1 158.9 915.7 
Afghanistan Daykundi  Wheat 99 619.5 132.4 327.2 934.9 
Kazakhstan  National Average  Wheat  103  241.3 71.09 107.5 385 
Kyrgyzstan National Average  Flour 124 539.8 139.3 340 870 
Pakistan National Average  Wheat 112 294.5 50.19 190 405 
Pakistan  National Average  Flour 131 319.8 64.54 216 442 
USA Gulf Wheat 184 219.7 80.37 105.1 439.7 




Table A2: Stationarity Test on Price Series, and Price Differentials 
Country Market Commodity Price  Series Price Differentials 
   ADF PP ADF PP 
       
Afghanistan Herat  Wheat -2.083* -1.882 -9.197*** -11.232*** 
Afghanistan Herat Flour -1.810 -1.619 -9.786*** -11.224*** 
Afghanistan Jalalabad Wheat -1.744 -1.730 -10.778*** -13.139*** 
Afghanistan Jalalabad Flour -1.763 -1.716 -10.617*** -12.843*** 
Afghanistan Kabul Wheat -2.000 -1.899 -13.043*** -12.498*** 
Afghanistan Kabul Flour -1.904 -1.739 -12.085*** -11.730*** 
Afghanistan Kandahar Wheat -1.272 -1.478 -9.572*** -13.081*** 
Afghanistan Kandahar Flour -1.703 -1.899 -12.456*** -12.425*** 
Afghanistan Mazar Wheat -2.061 -1.923 -7.902*** -10.118*** 
Afghanistan Bamyan Wheat -1.012 -1.403 -2.941* -4.076*** 
Afghanistan Badakhsh Wheat -2.137 -1.942 -9.732*** -10.627*** 
Afghanistan Ghor Wheat -0.958 -1.332 -5.004*** -8.114*** 
Afghanistan Faryab Wheat -2.313 -2.510 -7.114*** -12.630*** 
Afghanistan Daykundi  Wheat -2.829* -2.268 -5.710*** -6.873*** 
Kazakhstan  Average  Wheat -2.730* -2.145 -5.436*** -6.567*** 
Kyrgyzstan Average  Flour -2.314 -1.993 -6.215*** -8.143*** 
Pakistan  Average  Wheat -1.991 -1.864 -8.435*** -8.390*** 
Pakistan  Average  Flour -1.669 -1.678 -10.715*** -11.021*** 
US Gulf Wheat -2.093 -1.922 -9.409*** -10.931*** 
Note: ADF is the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test and PP is the Phillips-Perron test.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A3: Kyrgyzstan Prices Related to Kazakhstan Prices 
 (1) 
PARAMETERS Kazakhstan 










Standard errors in parentheses 




Appendix B GAMS Code 
*Afghan Wheat Model* 
* taking into account Pakistani export restriction scenario 
 




   h        ports   / BOLD, HAIR, TGDI, TOUR, KHST / 
   r        regions / HER,JAL,KAB,KAN, KDZ, KST, MAZ/ 
   d(r)     deficit regions /JAL, KAB, KAN, KST/ 
   j(r)     surplus region /HER, KDZ, MAZ/ 
   z        urban and rural areas in each region /Urb, Rur/ 
   w        exporter countries of wheat and flour to Afghanistan /KAZ, PAK/ 
   k(h)     northern ports for Kazakh wheat and flour /HAIR, TGDI/ 
   P(h)     eastern ports for Pakistani wheat and flour / BOLD, TOUR, KHST/ 
*Monte Carlo iteration 
   iterM    Monte carlo iterations /1*1000/ 
*Years 








Xw(r,s,ty)          interregional quantity wheat flows from center r to s 
Xf(r,s,ty)          interregional quantity flour flows from center r to s 
XwR(r,ty)           wheat flows from rural to urban center in each region 
XfU(r,ty)           flour flows from urban center to rural 
Xwm(h,r,ty)         wheat import (m) flows from ports to centers 
Xfm(h,r,ty)         flour import (m) flows from ports to centers 
 
C(r,z,ty)           consumption in each region r and zone z 
Cp(r,z,ty)          consumption per capita in region r and zone z 
M(r,z,ty)           metric tons of wheat going to milling in region r zone z 
ST(r,z,ty)          private carry out stocks in region r zone z 
PS(r,z,ty)          public stocks in surplus regions 
Qe(r,ty)            wheat production region r on year ty for year ty+1 
A(r,ty)             area with respect to price 
Ae(r,ty)            realized area (area times the cholesky matrix) 




PwWe(h,ty)   wheat price at border points before tariffs 
PwRZ(r,z,ty) domestic wheat price  in region r zone z 
PfWe(h,ty)   flour price at border points before tariffs 
PfRz(r,z,ty) domestic flour price  in region r zone z 
 
Sc(r,z,ty)           consumer surplus 
Sp(r,z,ty)           producer surplus 
Tr(r,z,ty)           trader welfare 
; 
 





  cXm(h,r)    cost of imports from PORTS to URBAN centers in wheat and flour 
  cXR(r,s)    costs of INTERREGIONAL flows from r to s in Wheat 
  Ptc         pakitani wheat transportation costs to Afghan border /20/ 
  ptc2         pakistan wheat trans cost with export restriciton /150/ 
  Ktc         Kazakh wheattransportation costs to Afghan border /60/ 
  Fpck         flour processing costs kazakhstan /80/ 
  Fpcp         flour processing costs pakistan /50/ 
  Fd          flour processing costs inside the county /80/ 
 
*Unidirection INTER-REGIONAL flows (Wheat to URBAN, Flour only to provinces) 
  cXWZ(r)     costs of wheat flows from RURAL to URBAN center in each region 
   /HER 30, JAL 20, KAB 20, KAN 20, KDZ 30, KST 20, MAZ 30/ 
  cXfZ(r)     costs of FLOUR flows from Urban to provinces 
 
*INITIAL Land Use and Production 
 
  Qo(r)       base regional net production of whheat in metric tons in 2013 
/ 
 HER         643487 
 JAL         321974 
 KAB         424695 
 KAN         547382 
 KDZ         962638 
 KST         322626 









  Ao(r)       Base area of wheat in hectare in 2013 
/ 
HER        404486 
JAL        108143 
KAB        162312 
KAN        204259 
KDZ        568484 
KST        115897 




  yo(r)       Base yield of WHEAT in each region in 2013 
 
*FUTURE Area Land and Yield (Note: Expected production is endogenous) 
  Ye(r,ty)    Expected net yield in region r in years 2 3 and so forth 
 
*INITIAL WORLD Prices 
  Pw(w)        world price of wheat in 2013/ KAZ 256, PAK 313/ 
  Pwe(w,ty)    world expected price ( Kazakhstan and Pakistan) 
  PfWo(h)      Initial world price of flour (FAO) Border prices before tarrifs 
  PwWo(h)      Initial world price of wheat 2013 at port (border price) 
  Pmax(r,z)         max price 
 
*Average Wheat Prices 
  PwR(r)      average wheat prices by region in 2013 
  /HER 320, JAL 375, KAB 406, KAN 425, KDZ 327, KST 375, MAZ 327/ 
 
*INITIAL Per Capita Wheat Consumption 
  Co          Per capita wheat consumption tons per million population /150000/ 
 
*SEED Requirement Per Planting 
  seeds(r)    Seed requirments for planting per region in 2013 
  /HER 49200, JAL 18900, KAB 27200, KAN 38900, KDZ 74500, KST 23000, MAZ 
90700/ 
 
*Elasticity of Area with respect to price which is = to Elasticity of Quantity 
 
  ESUB(r)        Short run elasticity of area with respect to price 
 /HER 0.185, JAL 0.552, KAB 0.337, KAN 0.166, KDZ 0.079, KST 0.261, MAZ 0.307 / 
 
psm   min publick stocks /50/ 
 
* elasticity of per capita demand for cosnumption is the same across regions 





*COST of Mill and Storage parameters 
  costS(r,z)  stocks costs handling and finance charges 




  ac(r,z)     aggregate demand function (intercepts) 
  bc(r,z)     aggregate demand function (slopes) 
  bs(r)     aggregate supply function slope for stocks 
  as(r)     aggregate supply function intercept for stocks 
 
LLAREA(r,ty) stochastic term of area; 
 
*Initial average Yield: Y*A=Q 
   yo(r) = Qo(r) /Ao(r); 
 
* DATA REQUIREMENT IN TABLES 
 
*INITIAL storage (STOCKS) 
table Si(r,z) beginning stocks 
            Urb         Rur 
HER        7000        13000 
JAL        5000        5000 
KAB        10000       10000 
KAN        7000        8000 
KDZ        7000        13000 
KST        5000        5000 
MAZ        7000        13000 
; 
 
table Sm(r,z) min stocks 
         Urb     Rur 
HER     5000   10000 
JAL     5000   5000 
KAB     5000   5000 
KAN     5000   5000 
KDZ     5000   10000 
KST     5000   5000 









*POPULATION (Constant in the time period) 
table pop(r,z) 
            Urb           Rur 
HER        0.5148        2.5658 
JAL        0.2174        2.8036 
KAB        3.435         4.2174 
KAN        0.4097        4.6425 
KDZ        0.2436        4.0256 
KST        0.16          3.0873 
MAZ        0.4633        3.8951; 
 
 
Table cXJD(j,d)  the costs of wheat flow from surplus to deficit regions 
 
         JAL     KAB     KAN     KST 
HER      200    100      40      200 
KDZ      60      40      80      100 
MAZ      60      40      80      100; 
 
 
Table XWo(j,d)  initial wheat flow from surplus to deficit regions 
 
         JAL     KAB     KAN     KST 
HER      0       0       1000     0 
KDZ      0       50000   0        0 
MAZ      50      10000   50       0; 
 
Table Xfo(j,d)  initial flour flow from surplus to deficit regions 
 
         JAL     KAB     KAN     KST 
HER      0       0      1000      0 
KDZ      1000    50000  1000      0 




table cXm(h,r) import flow cost from ports to region 
             HER        JAL         KAB          KAN   KDZ     KST     MAZ 
BOLD        40          1000        1000         20    1000    1000    1000 
HAIR        1000        1000        40           1000  30      1000     30 
TGDI        20          1000        1000         60    1000    1000    1000 
TOUR        1000        20          40           1000  1000    1000    1000 






table Xmo(h,r) initial flour flow from ports to regions 
            HER        JAL         KAB         KAN    KDZ     KST     MAZ 
BOLD      10000         0          0           230000  0       0       0 
HAIR        0           0        200000         0     90000    0     100000 
TGDI      80000        0         0             1000   0       0       0 
TOUR        0           120000     140000        0     0       0       0 
KHST        0            0         90000        0     0      180000   0; 
 
table Xwmo(h,r) initial wheat flow from ports to regions 
            HER        JAL         KAB         KAN    KDZ     KST     MAZ 
BOLD        0           0          0           15000  0       0       0 
HAIR        0           0         10000         0    10000    0      50000 
TGDI       10000        0          0           1000   0       0       0 
TOUR        0           15000      100          0     0       0       0 
KHST        0            0         100          0     0      15000    0; 
 
 
table ci(r,z) initial consumtions metric tons per region 
 
            urb          rur 
HER        82368        410528 
JAL        34784        448576 
KAB        549600       674784 
KAN        65552        742800 
KDZ        38976        644096 
KST        25600        493968 
MAZ        74128        623216 
; 
 
parameter Xwro(j) initial wheat flow from rural to urban in surplus regions 
/ HER 50000, KDZ 60000, MAZ 100000/ 
 
Xfuo(r) initial flor flows from urban to rural areas 







Table LLPW(w, wa)  Cholesky matrix for the world price 
 
             KAZ             PAK 
KAZ        52.10731795        0 




Table LLA(r,s)  Cholesky decomposition for the area errors 
       HER        JAL      KAB       KAN       KDZ      KST        MAZ 
HER  0.12260   0.00000   0.00000   0.00000   0.00000  0.00000   0.00000 
JAL -0.03162   0.09744   0.00000   0.00000   0.00000  0.00000   0.00000 
KAB  0.04373   0.05118   0.04480   0.00000   0.00000  0.00000   0.00000 
KAN  0.01028   0.03777   0.04610   0.04074   0.00000  0.00000   0.00000 
KDZ  0.03988  -0.02537   0.04796   0.00743   0.05005  0.00000   0.00000 
KST  0.02724   0.04870   0.02297   0.05381  -0.01574  0.04160   0.00000 
MAZ  0.10154   0.04010   0.01461  -0.08021  -0.03990 -0.01202   0.01478 ; 
 
 
table LLY(r,s) cholesky matrix for yield 
      HER        JAL        KAB        KAN       KDZ       KST        MAZ 
HER  0.28895    0.00000    0.00000    0.00000    0.00000   0.00000   0.00000 
JAL  0.16038    0.52694    0.00000    0.00000    0.00000   0.00000   0.00000 
KAB  0.11425    0.02128    0.34066    0.00000    0.00000   0.00000   0.00000 
KAN  0.23705    0.22153    0.15250    0.20401    0.00000   0.00000   0.00000 
KDZ  0.26731    0.00786    0.04411   -0.07435    0.25355   0.00000   0.00000 
KST  0.25131    0.19968    0.25591    0.10388   -0.05632   0.10866   0.00000 
MAZ  0.23412   -0.00975   -0.10134   0.01418    0.12663    0.02307   0.14450 
; 
 
* intercept and slope for demand and supply curve 
 
 bc(r,z) = es*co*pop(r,z)/PwR(r); 
 ac(r,z) = co*pop(r,z) - bc(r,z)*PwR(r); 
 bs(r)  =   Ao(r)*ESUB(r)/PwR(r); 
 as(r)  =   Ao(r)-bs(r)*PwR(r)  ; 
 Pmax(r,z) = -ac(r,z)/bc(r,z) 
display bc, ac, bs, as, Pmax; 
 
 
Scalar tw Tariff on wheat /0.1/; 
scalar tf tariff on flour /0.1/ 
scalar Ls post harvest losses 10 percent of total production /0.15/ 
scalar FER flour extraction rate in rural areas /0.9/  ; 
scalar FEU flour extraction rate in urban cities /0.9/; 
scalar Pm  min price /100/; 
scalar sub pakistan milling subsidy 10 dollar per metric tons /10/; 
 
EQUATIONS 
 Object                Objective function is surplus less costs 
 URBANw(r,ty)          Supply and use balance for wheat in surplus regions 
 URBANf(r,ty)          Supply and use balance for flour in surplus regions 




 RURALf(r,ty)          supply and use balance for flour in rural areas 
 URBANw2(r,ty)         supply and use balance for wheat deficit regions 
 URBANf2(r,ty)         supply and use balance for flour in defict regions 
 
 cons(r,z,ty)          demand for consumption 
 Storage(r,z,ty)       private storage function 
*pubstock              publick storage function 
 pro(r,ty)             supply function for wheat 
 Area(r,ty)            area as a function of price 
 Erea(r,ty)            stochastic area 
 
 WPP(p,ty)             wheat prices at ports close to Pakistan 
 WPP2(p,ty)             wheat prices at ports close to Pakistan 
 WPK(k,ty)             wheat prices at ports close to Kazakhstan 
 FPP(p,ty)             flour prices at ports close to Pakistan 
 FPK(k,ty)             flour prices at ports close to Pakistan 
 
 FPU(r,z,ty)           Slackness conditions for milling process in urban areas 
 FPR                   Slackness conditions for milling process in rural areas 
 FPU1(r,z,ty)           Slackness conditions for milling process in urban areas 
 FPR1                   Slackness conditions for milling process in rural areas 
 pcap                   per capita consumption 
 Scon                    consumer surplus 
 
* the following equations are complentary slackness conditions 
 
CS1         slackness conditions for wheat flows between regions 
CS2         slackness conditions for wheat flows between regions 
CS3         slackness conditions for flour flows between regions 
CS4         slackness conditions for flour flows between regions 
CS5         armington equation for wheat imports 
CS6         armington equation for flour imports 
CS7         armington equation for wheat flow from rural to ruban areas 
CS8         armington equation for flour flow from urban to rural areas 
CS9         armington equation for wheat flows from rural to urban in region d 
; 
Object .. obj =e=sum(ty,(sum((r,z),(Qe(r,ty)*pwrz(r,z,ty))))/2000000    ); 
 
*demand for consumption and stocks 
cons(r,z,ty).. C(r,z,ty) =e= ac(r,z) + bc(r,z)*PfRz(r,z,ty); 
pcap(r,z,ty).. Cp(r,z,ty) =e= C(r,z,ty)/pop(r,z); 
 
STORAGE(r,z,ty).. (ST(r,z,ty)-sm(r,z))* (PwRZ(r,z,ty)-pm)=e= 3000000 ; 





ps.fx(j,"rur",ty) = 0; 
*ps.up(j,"rur",ty) = 300000; 
 
*supply function 
Area(r,ty).. A(r,ty) =e=  as(r) + bs(r)* PwRz(r,"rur",ty); 
Erea(r,ty).. Ae(r,ty) =e=  A(r,ty)* LLAREA(r,ty); 
pro(r,ty).. Qe(r,ty) =e=  Ae(r,ty)*ye(r,ty) ; 
Scon(r,z,ty).. Sc(r,z,ty) =e= C(r,z,ty)*(Pmax(r,z)-PWRz(r,z,ty))/2000000; 
Spro(r,z,ty).. Sp(r,z,ty) =e= Qe(r,ty)*PwRz(r,"rur",ty)/2000000; 
 
 




   Si(r,"Urb")$(ord(ty) eq 1)+ ST(r,"Urb",ty-1)$(ord(ty) gt 1) 
*Wheat from port to region + Wheat send from rural to urban (received by urban) 
   + Sum(h,Xwm(h,r,ty)) 
   + XwR(r,ty) 
               =E= 
*Carry out in urban stock + Wheat converted to flour + interregional flow 
   + ST(r,"Urb",ty) 
   +  M(r,"Urb",ty) 




   Si(r,"Urb")$(ord(ty) eq 1)+ ST(r,"Urb",ty-1)$(ord(ty) gt 1) 
*Wheat from port to region + Wheat send from rural to urban (received by urban) 
   + Sum(h,Xwm(h,r,ty)) 
   + sum(j,Xw(j,r,ty)) 
               =E= 
*Carry out in urban stock + Wheat converted to flour + interregional flow 
   + ST(r,"Urb",ty) 
   +  M(r,"Urb",ty); 
 
*Note the change, here was x(r,s) but now it is xf(r,s) because is flour 
URBANf(r,ty)$j(r).. 
   Sum(h,Xfm(h,r,ty))+ feu*m(r,"Urb",ty)   =E= 
     C(r,"Urb",ty)+ sum(d,Xf(r,d,ty)) 
     +  XfU(r,ty); 
 
URBANf2(r,ty)$d(r).. 
   Sum(h,Xfm(h,r,ty))+ feu*m(r,"Urb",ty)+sum(j,xf(j,r,ty))   =E= 





* supply and use balance in rural areas 
 
RURALw(r,ty).. 
*Beginning stock in rural plus initial production 
 
     Si(r,"Rur")$(ord(ty) eq 1)+ST(r,"Rur",ty-1)$(ord(ty) gt 1) 
    + PS(r,"Rur",ty-1)$(ord(ty) gt 1)$j(r) + Qe(r,ty) =E= 
     ST(r,"Rur",ty) +PS(r,"rur",ty)$j(r)+ XwR(r,ty)$j(r) 
     + M(r,"Rur",ty)+ Seeds(r)+Qe(r,ty)*LS; 
 
RURALf(r,ty).. fer*M(r,"Rur",ty) + XfU(r,ty) =E= 
               C(r,"Rur",ty) 
; 
 
* price linkage from Pakistan and Kazakhistan to border points 
 
WPP(p,ty)$(pwe("kaz",ty)lt 370)..   pwWe(p,ty) =E= pwe("pak",ty) + Ptc + 
Pwe("pak",ty)*tw; 
WPP2(p,ty)$(pwe("kaz",ty)gt 370)..   pwWe(p,ty) =E= pwe("pak",ty) + Ptc2 + 
Pwe("pak",ty)*tw; 
 
WPK(k,ty)..   pwWe(k, ty) =e= pwe("kaz", ty) + Ktc + Pwe("kaz",ty)*tw; 
 
FPP(P,ty)..   PfWe(P,ty) =e= PwWe(P,ty) + Fpcp + Fpcp*tw; 
 
FPK(K,ty)..   PfWe(K,ty) =e= PwWe(K,ty) + Fpck + FpcK*tw; 
 
* price linkage between wheat and flour 
 
FPU(r,z,ty).. PfRz(r,"urb",ty) =L= PwRz(r,"urb",ty) + Fd ; 
FPR(r,z,ty).. PfRz(r,"rur",ty) =L= PwRz(r,"rur",ty) + Fd ; 
FPU1(r,z,ty).. m(r,"urb",ty)*(PwRz(r,"urb",ty) + Fd- PfRz(r,"urb",ty))=e=0; 
FPR1(r,z,ty).. m(r,"rur",ty)*(PwRz(r,"rur",ty) + Fd- PfRz(r,"rur",ty))=e=0; 
 
* wheat flows between commercial centers 
 
CS1(j,d,ty).. pwRz(d,"urb",ty)=L= PwRz(j,"urb",ty)+ cXJD(j,d); 
CS2(j,d,ty)..xw(j,d,ty)*( PwRZ(J,"urb",ty)+ cXJD(j,d) - PwRZ(d,"urb",ty))=E= 0; 
 
* flour flows between commercial centers 
 
CS3(j,d,ty).. pfRz(d,"urb",ty)=L= PfRz(j,"urb",ty)+ cXJD(j,d); 







CS5(h,r,z,ty).. Xwm(h,r,ty) =e= 
Xwmo(h,r)*((Pwwe(h,ty)+ cXm(h,r))/PwRz(r,"urb",ty))**(-5); 
 
CS6(h,r,z,ty).. Xfm(h,r,ty) =e= 
Xmo(h,r)*((Pfwe(h,ty)+ cXm(h,r))/PfRz(r,"urb",ty))**(-5); 
 
CS7(j,ty).. Xwr(j,ty) =E= 
Xwro(j)*(( PwRz(j,"rur",ty)+ cXwZ(j))/PwRz(j,"urb",ty))**(-4); 
 
CS8(d,ty).. Xfu(d,ty) =E= 
Xfuo(d)*((PfRz(d,"urb",ty)+ cXwz(d))/PfRz(d,"rur",ty))**(-4); 
 
CS9(j,ty).. Xfu(j,ty) =E= 
Xfuo(j)*((PfRz(j,"urb",ty)+ cXwz(j))/PfRz(j,"rur",ty))**(-15); 
 
* initial conditions 
xw.l(j,d,ty) = xwo(j,d); 
xf.l(j,d,ty)=  xwo(j,d); 
xwm.l(h,r,ty) = xmo(h,r); 
xfm.l(h,r,ty) = xmo(h,r); 
xfu.l(d,ty) = 1000 ; 
c.l(r,z,ty) = ci(r,z) ; 
Ae.l(r,ty) = Ao(r); 
qe.l(r,ty) = qo(r); 
st.l(r,z,ty) = si(r,z); 
PwRz.lo(r,z,ty)= Pm+1; 
PwRz.up(r,z,ty)= Pmax(r,z); 
pwwe.lo(h,ty) = 100; 
pfwe.lo(h,ty) = 120; 
PfRz.lo(r,z,ty)= Pm+1; 
 
Model Wheat /all/ ; 
 




AeMC(r,ty,iterM)                 stochastic area 
yeMC(r,ty,iterM)                 stochastic yields 
QeMC(r,ty,iterM)                 realized production 
CMC(r,z,ty,iterM)                consumption 
CpMC(r,z,ty,iterM)               consumption per capita 




PSMC                             public stocks 
PweMC(w,ty,iterM)                kazak and pakistan prices of wheat 
PwWeMC(h,ty,iterm)               prices of wheat at each ports 
PFWeMC(h,ty,iterm)               flour prices at ports 
pWrZMC(r,z,ty,iterM)             domestic what prices 
pFrZMC(r,z,ty,iterM)             domestic flour prices 
XWmMC                            wheat imports 
XFmMC                            flour imports 
XwrMC                            wheat flows to urban centers 
XfuMC                            flour flows to rural areas 
Xwmc                             wheat flows to deficit regions from surplus 
Xfmc                             flour flows to deficit regions 
ScMC                             consumer surplus 
SpMC                             producer surplus 
MMC                              wheat going to milling industry 
MS                               model status 
tc                               total annual national consumption 
tq                               total annual national produciton 
tfm                              total annual flour imports 
twm                              total annual wheat imports 
ts                               total annual stock 
tps                              total annual public stock 
tm                               total annual milling 
xfmp                             total flour imports from pakistan 
xfmk                             total flour imports from kazakhstan 
xwmp                             total wheat imports from Pakistan 








ye(r,ty) = yo(r)+ sum(s,LLY(r,s)*Normal(0,1)); 
Pwe(w,ty) = Pw(w) + sum(wa,LLPW(w,wa)*Normal(0,1)); 
LLAREA(r,ty) = exp(sum(s,LLA(r,s)*Normal(0,1))); 
 
Solve Wheat using nlp maximizing obj; 
 
 AeMC(r,ty,iterM)= Ae.l(r,ty); 
 yeMC(r,ty,iterM)= ye(r,ty); 
 QeMC(r,ty,iterM)= Qe.l(r,ty); 
 Cmc(r,z,ty,iterM) =  c.l(r,z,ty); 




 STMC(r,z,ty,iterM)= ST.l(r,z,ty); 
 PSMC(j,"rur",ty,iterM) = PS.l(j,"rur",ty) ; 





XWmMC(h,r,ty,iterM) = Xwm.l(h,r,ty); 
XFmMC(h,r,ty,iterM) = Xfm.l(h,r,ty); 
XwrMC(j,ty,iterM)  =  Xwr.l(j,ty); 
XfuMC(r,ty,iterM) =   Xfu.l(r,ty); 
Xwmc(j,d,ty,iterM) =  Xw.l(j,d,ty); 
Xfmc(j,d,ty,iterM) =  Xf.l(j,d,ty); 
ScMC(r,z,ty,iterM) = Sc.l(r,z,ty); 
SpMC(r,z,ty,iterM) = sP.l(r,z,ty); 
MMC(r,z,ty,iterm)  = m.l(r,z,ty); 
MS(iterm) = wheat.modelstat; 
tc(ty,iterm)   = sum((r,z), cmc(r,z,ty,iterm)); 
tq(ty,iterm) = sum(r,qemc(r,ty,iterM)); 
tfm(ty,iterm) = sum((h,r),xfmMC(h,r,ty,iterM)); 
twm(ty,iterm) = sum((h,r),XwmMC(h,r,ty,iterM)); 
ts(ty,iterm) = sum((r,z),stmc(r,z,ty,iterm)); 
tps(ty,iterm) = sum(j,psmc(j,"rur",ty,iterm)); 
tm(ty, iterm) = sum((r,z),mmc(r,z,ty,iterm)); 
xfmp(ty,iterm) = sum((p,r),XFmMC(P,r,ty,iterM)); 
xfmk(ty,iterm) = sum((k,r),XfmMC(k,r,ty,iterM)); 
xwmp(ty,iterm) = sum((p,r),XwmMC(P,r,ty,iterM)); 










pWrZMC,PFWeMC,pFrZMC,XWMMC, XFMMC, XWRMC, XFUMC, XWMC, 
XFMC, MS,SCMC, SPMC,MMC, 









Appendix C Trader and Miller Survey Forms  
Trader Survey Questionnaire 
A. Interviewee information:     
 Date:_________________ Trader Name: ________________________, 
Commodities: _____________________ 
Market: ___________________, City: ________________________________                      
Province: __________________, Other business activities: ________________ 
 
B. Sources of wheat purchased and wheat buyers  
1. Where do you buy wheat?  
Source  Amount  Unit  Time Period  When 
Local wheat __________  ________ __________ __________ 
Imported wheat__________  ________ __________ __________  
From food aid  __________  ________ __________ ___________ 
  
2. List the name of provinces that you buy local wheat from and the amount per 
period. 
Province  Amount  Unit  Time period 
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________ 
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 3. How much of imported wheat do you buy from each country? 
 Country    Amount  Unit  Time period  
 Pakistan    _____________ _______ ______ 
 Iran    _____________ _______ ______ 
 Turkmenistan   _____________ _______ ______ 
 Uzbekistan    _____________ _______ ______ 
 Tajikistan   _____________ _______ ______ 
 Kazakhstan    _____________ _______ ______ 




4. Wheat purchased through Food Aid program, lists the name of country and 
purchased amount in one year period.  
Country      
Tons       
 
5. How much storage capacity do you have for wheat (tons)? 
_________________________ 
6. On average, how much local wheat do you buy in one transaction? 
__________________ 
7. On average, how much imported wheat do you buy in one transaction? 
______________ 
8. On average, how much food aid wheat do you buy in one transaction? 
_______________ 
 
9. Who are your wheat buyers?  
Buyers    Amount  Unit  Time period 
Sold inside the province ____________ ________ _____ 
Export to other provinces ____________ ________ ______ 
Export to other countries ____________ ________ ______ 
 
10. Buyers’ categories inside the province. 
Household   ____________ ________ ______ 
Bakery   ____________ ________ ______ 
Wheat millers  ____________ ________ ______ 
Government organization ____________ ________ ______ 







11. If export to other provinces, list the name of those provinces with exported 
amount. 
Province   Amount  Unit  Time period 
_______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
_______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
_______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
_______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
_______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 




C. Sources of flour purchased and flour buyers  
1. Where do you buy flour?  
Source  Amount Unit  Time Period  When 
Local flour __________ ________ __________ _____________ 
Imported flour __________ ________ __________ _____________  
From food aid  __________ ________ __________ _____________ 
  
2. List the name of provinces that you buy local flour from and the amount per 
period. 
Province  Amount  Unit  Time period 
 _______________ _____________ ________ ___________ 
 _______________ _____________ ________ ___________ 
 _______________ _____________ ________ ___________ 
 _______________ _____________ ________ ____________ 






3.  How much of imported flour do you buy from each country? 
 Country   Amount  Unit  Time Period  
 Pakistan   _____________ _______ ______________ 
 Iran   _____________ _______ ______________ 
 Turkmenistan  _____________ _______ ______________ 
 Uzbekistan   _____________ _______ ______________ 
 Tajikistan  _____________ _______ ______________ 
 Kazakhstan   _____________ _______ ______________  
  Other (specify) _____________ _______ ______________ 
 
4. Flour purchased through Food Aid program, lists the name of country and 
purchased amount in one year period.  
Country      
Tons       
 
5. How much storage capacity do you have for flour (tons)? 
_________________________ 
6. On average, how much local flour do you buy in one transaction? 
__________________ 
7. On average, how much imported flour do you buy in one transaction? 
______________ 
8. On average, how much food aid flour do you buy in one transaction? 
_______________ 
9. Who are your flour buyers?  
Buyers    Amount Unit  Time period 
Sold inside the province ____________ ________ __________ 
Export to other provinces ___________ ________ __________ 





10. Buyers’ categories inside the province. 
Household   ____________ ________ __________ 
Bakery   ____________ ________ __________ 
Government organization ____________ ________ __________ 
Other traders  ____________ ________ __________ 
 
11. If export to other provinces, list the name of those provinces with exported 
amount. 
Province   Amount  Unit  Time period 
 _______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 _______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 _______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 _______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 _______________ _____________ _______ __________ 
 




D. Transportation Costs:  




    
    
    
    
    





Questionnaire for Flour Mills Survey in Afghanistan  
Date: _______________ 
A. Interviewee Information:      
Interviewee Name: ____________________, Interviewee Position: 
____________________ Mill Name: ______________________________, Location: 
__________________________ 
1. Private    2.  Public  
 
B. Milling Operation and Capacity  









wheat milled  
Maximum 
Capacity 
January       
February       
March      
April      
May       
June      
July      
August       
September       
October       
November       
December       
 
C. Sources of wheat purchased and flour sold  
Source  Amount  Unit  Time Period  When 
Local wheat __________  ________ __________ __________ 
Imported wheat __________  ________ __________ __________  








1. List the name of provinces that you buy local wheat from and the amount per 
period. 
Province  Amount  Unit  Time period 
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 _______________ _____________ ________ _________  
 
2. How much of imported wheat do you buy from each country? 
 Country   Amount  Unit  Time period  
 Pakistan   _____________ _______ ____________ 
 Iran   _____________ _______ ____________ 
 Turkmenistan  _____________ _______ ____________ 
 Uzbekistan   _____________ _______ ____________ 
 Tajikistan  _____________ _______ ____________ 
 Kazakhstan   _____________ _______ ____________ 
  Other (specify) _____________ _______ ____________ 
 
3. How much storage capacity do you have for wheat (tons)? 
_________________________ 
4. How much storage capacity do you have for flour (tons)? 
_________________________ 
5. On average, how much local wheat do you buy in one transaction? 
__________________ 








7. Who are your flour buyers?  
Buyers    Amount  Unit  Time period 
Sold inside the province ____________ ________ __________ 
Export to other provinces ____________ ________ __________ 
8. Buyers’ categories inside the province: 
Buyers    Amount  Unit  Time period 
Household   ____________ ________ __________ 
Bakeries   ____________ ________ __________ 
Government organizations ____________ ________ __________ 
Traders   ____________ ________ __________ 
 
D. Costs of Milling  
 
D. Adjustments to policy changes from Pakistan  
 
1. Is Pakistani subsidized flour a problem for your mill?  
 
2. How can you complete with Pakistani subsidized flour?  
 
3. How do you adjust your capacity when Pakistan bans its flour exports to 
Afghanistan?  
 
E. What are some key challenges your mill face?
Category Costs/MT Category  Price/ MT 
Variable costs per MT  Domestic wheat  
Fixed costs per MT  Imported wheat  
Total costs per MT  Domestic flour  
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